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Note
The Minnesota Supreme Court
1963

-

1964

The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively surveys significant decisions of the 1963-1964 Term* of the
Minnesota Supreme Court [hereinafter referred to as the
Minnesota Court or simply the Court]. The cases selected
were thought to represent new developments in Minnesota
law and also to present perplexing questions common to
most jurisdictions; accordingly, the decisions have been
evaluated in terms of Minnesota law but the Minnesota
Court'sresults have frequently been compared with the law
of other jurisdictions,so that the analysis is universally applicable. While the cases are discussed separately, they are
arranged according to the general legal issue involved. In
addition,the Note statisticallysummarizes all cases decided
by the Court this Term.

THE TABLES
The data contained in the following Tables summarizes the
October, 1963 to October, 1964 Term* of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. All 220 opinions filed from October 1, 1963 to September
30, 1964 are included. So that the reader can evaluate these Tables
comprehensively, the Review presents a detailed statement of
their purposes and bases.
Tables I, II, and III concentrate primarily on patterns of
opinion writing and voting among the individual justices. Table
I tabulates the written opinions of each justice according to the
disposition represented and, also, categorizes the number of votes
cast by him, indicating abstentions (cases in which the justice
took no part in the consideration or decision) as well as dissents.
Table I shows that Mr. Justice Nelson declared the Opinion of
* Although the statutory term commences each year on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in January [Minn. Stat. § 480.01 (1961)], an October
term is used for our convenience.
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the Court most often and also wrote the greatest number of opinions, including the only concurring opinion. Furthermore, he was
the only justice to participate in every decision of the Court this
Term. The Court disagreed in result only about three per cent of
the time (7 out of 220 decisions); Chief Justice Knutson and
Justices Nelson and Sheran cast no dissenting votes, while Mr.
Justice Thomas Gallagher was the leading dissenter with four
negative votes. Table II classifies the total number of decisions
this Term according to whether the opinion was unanimous, per
curiam, or with a dissent or concurrence, and gives the percentage
of the total in each category. Table III endeavors to determine
the alignment among the justices by measuring the extent of their
disagreements. It records the number of cases in which the justices
voted for opposite dispositions plus the number of cases in which
the justices voted for the same disposition but did not join in an
opinion; that is, the total number of cases in which the justices
disagreed. Although no bloc is discernible, partly due to the small
number of dissents, Chief Justice Knutson and Justices Nelson
and Sheran never disagreed with each other, while Justices Gallagher and Rogosheske disagreed most often.
Table IV categorizes by source and disposition all of the cases
decided by the Court this Term. The primary purpose is to show
the number and outcome of cases appealed (or in which certiorari
was granted) from each judicial district (including juvenile
courts), commission, department, or board, and the number and
outcome of cases that originated in the Court itself. For this purpose, per curiam decisions and cases dismissed without consideration of the merits are counted as dispositions. Table IV also indicates the disposition ordered where the Court's decision required
further consideration by the trial court.
Table V indicates the general subject matter of the main issue
on appeal or certiorari in all cases considered by the Court this
Term, excluding the cases that originated in the Court itself; in
areas of high interest the subjects are subdivided to indicate the
subject matter more specifically. The greatest number of appeals
involved tort questions, of which most involved personal injury;
criminal law questions were the second most prevalent and Workmen's Compensation issues were third. Table V is also designed
to indicate the relative success on appeal of cases appealed by the
defendant below compared with those appealed by the plaintiff
below. It shows that defendants appealed more cases to the Court
than did plaintiffs and that the defendants also were able to obtain
a reversal in a greater proportion of the cases appealed.
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Table I
ACTIoN or INMDVIDUAL JUSTicES*
Ornuous WarTTN

Knutson, C. J ........
Gallagher, T., J........

Nelson,.

.............

Absten-

Opinions

Concur-

Dis-

of Court

rences

sents

ToTr,

4

18
27

219
214

s0

220

25
28
23
95
20

213
216
216
211

18
9.

.9

Murphy,J............
Otis, . ..............
Rogosheske, J .........
Sheran, J.............
Gallagher, F., Conmnr*.

25
27
21
25
20

Per Curiam .........

32

Totals ...............

Voirs

.

220

1
1
2

Majorityi Dissents

tions

4

1
9

2
1
2

5
34
2
9b

32
1

7

9

228

22

* Commissioner Frank Gallagher, a retired justice, does not sit regularly with the Court and has
no vote, but he did write 20 opinions during the year.
t Includes concurrences.
a. Includes one case in which Mr. Justice Otis had presided at the pretrial conference.

b. Includes one ease when Mr. Justice Sheran was not a member of the Court at the time of argument and submission of the case, and one when he was a member of the Board of Tax Appeals at the
time the case was decided by it.

Table II
CLASSIICATION OF Wmrm OPrMoNs

Number of Cases
Unanimous ...............
With Concurrence Only ...

With Dissent Only .......

Per Curiam .............
Totals ..................

-178

..

3
7

32
220

Percentage of Total
80.9
1.4

3.2
14.5
100.0
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Table III
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES*

Sheran
Knutson ....

D
C
T

0
210

2
2
4
217

D
C
T

3

6

0
3

1
7

N

209

216

D

0
0

2
2
4
218

0
0

N
______________
I

Gallagher, T.

Nelson .

Murphy

Otis ..........

Rogosheske

Rogosheske

C
T
N
D
C
T
N
D
C
T

0
211

Otis

1

2

2

1
3

3
216

3

212

1

5
215

N

208

D
C
T

2

N

209

1
5

2

3

2

4

0

2
3
217

5

2

2

1

215

1

214

2
213

2
0
2
206

Nelson

0
0
0
219

5
1
6
215

3
1
4

4
1

Murphy

Gallagher, T.
4
1
5

217

218

1

215

1
3

*Commissioner Frank Gallagher, who does not sit regularly with the Court and has no vote, is
not included in this table.
"D" represents cases before the Court in which the justices voted for opposite results. "C" represents cases in which the justices voted for the same result, but did not join together in an opinion.
"T" represents the total number of cases in which the justices did not join together in an opinion,
i.e., the total number of cases on which the justices disagreed (D + C). "N" represents the total
number of cases in which both justices participated.

Table IV
SOURCE AND DISPOSITION OF CASES APPEALED*

DISPOSITION

DISPOSITION
SOURCE
TOTL

Tow

Ist Judicial District . . ..
2nd Judicial District. . ..
3rd Judicial District. .. .
4th Judicial District. . ..
5th Judicial District. . ..
6th Judicial District. . ..
7th Judicial District. .. .
8th Judicial District. . ..
9th Judicial District. . ..
10th Judicial District. ..
Board of Tax Appeals. ..
Industrial Commission. .
Dep't of Employment. ..

15

42
15
53
3
10
16
4
14
8
2
21
3
206

Supreme Court .. . .. .....

14

Prohibition .. . .. . .....
1
Mandamus .. .. . . .....
4
Quo Warranto. .. .. .... 1
Certification. .. .. .. ...
O
Discipline .6
Election ............
.1
Habeas Corpus .... .
1
220

11
26
8
32
2
5
11#
8
5
1
14
2
125
Absolute

ff'Rv'd
Af'd evd

3
To

17
1
5e
4
2'
5
2
1
6
1k

68

Dim'dDe'd
Dsm'
De'd

Remanded

New
Trial

0

2

0

1P
0
0
0

2
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
1
0

3
7
0
2
2
0
0
0
1
4
0

6
1
2
4
0
4
1
0
0
0

8

5

27

27

1

14a1b6
0
2
0
0
0
2
1P

,d

Discharged

1
3
0
0
6
0
0

0
1
1
0
0
1
1

10

4

1

*Include cases in which certiorari w
granted
a. Includes two cases which werermed in part and reversed in part and one case which was
remanded without reversal.
b. Includes one case which ws not reversed but a new trial was .granted upon a condition.
c. Includes one case which was not reversed but a new trial was granted unless the plaintiff
would consent to a remittitur reducing the amount of his verdict.
d. Includes one case which was remanded for retrial of only two issues.
e. Includes one case which was vacated and remanded.
f. Includes one case which was remanded for a new trial unless the plaintiff would consent
to a remittitur reducing the amount of his verdict.
g. Includes one case which was affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
h. Case in which a motion was conditionally denied and remanded with direcons.
i. Includes one case which was previously affrmed but had since been vacated and remanded
by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration.
j. Case in which the appeal was dismissed as moot.
k. Case which was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
1. Case in which an application to appoint counsel to represent the defendant in a habeas corpus
proceeding was denied.
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Table V
SUBJEcT MATTER

SUBJECTMATTER

TOTAL

or DIsPosiTiONs*
DrPosmox oN APPEALt
CaswsAppealed
CasesAppealed
byPlaintiff
b Defendant
Affirmed

Administrative Law ..........
2
Constitutional Law ........... .6
19
Contracts ...................
Cancellation ................
Damages .................
Restitution ................
Sales .....................
Other .....................
Courts ......................
8
ChargetoJury.............
Costs .....................
Jurisdiction ...............
Res Judicata ..............
31
Criminal Law ................
Habeas Corpus .............
Other ....................
Domestic Relations ........... .5
12
Evidence ....................
4
Insurance ...................
2
Labor Law ..................
2
MechanicsLien ..............
Municipal Government ....... . 7

Reversed

Affirmed

Reversed

1

0
1

1
1

0
2

1

0

0

0
0
6

0
lb
1
0
2

1
1
2

0
0
lb

0
0
0
0

0
Se
0
1

1
1
2
0

0
0
1
0

0

1
15d
1
2
1
1
1
4

16
12*
2

O

0

0

1

1

3

2

0
1
0
2

1
0
1
0

5

2
0
0
1

*Excludes 14 cases that originated in the Supreme Court itself.
tIneludes cases in which certiorari was granted.
a. Includes one case in which the appeal was dismissed.
b. Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
c. Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part and one case in which the a
peal was by a relator (attorney for the defendant) challenging the order for attorney's fees.
d. Includes one case in which the motion was denied.
e. Includes one case that was not reversed but a new trial was granted upon a condition.
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Table V
(continued)

DisrostrioN oN APPiEALt
SBCTMATTER

TOTAL

CasesAppealed

by Plntif

iAffrmed

Procedure ...................

Affirmed

Reversed

18

Appealable Orders ...

Review ...................
Other .....................
Property ....................
10
Assessment ................
Eminent Domain .....
Other .....................
School Districts ..............
4
Statutory Construction .......
2
Taxation (Income) ........... . 3
Torts ......................
44
CivilDamage Act.......
Damages ..................
Personal Injury ............
Other .....................
Trusts & Estates .............
2
Unemployment Compensation .
2
Wills .......................
1
Worlaen's Compensation ..... .9 2
Sotal......................

Reversed

CasesAppealed
byDefendant

206

2
26
1
8
2
1
9
0
3
8
9.
1
1'
1
9d

60

0.......
0
2

0

0
1Ia

0
2
1
0
0
0

0
2
0
9
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
1

0
1
2
2
0
0
0
2

1
3
11
1
1
1
0
6

25

75

g

1
0
Oh
0
0
0
0
5

46

f. Includes four cases in *which the appeal was dismissed.
g. Includes one case that was armed in part and dismissed in part.
h. Includes one case that was not reversed but a new trial was granted unless the plaintiff would
consent to a remittitur reducing the amount of his verdict.
i. Case in which both the plaintiffs and defendant filed writs of certiorari.
j. Includes one case that was remanded without reversal.
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CREDITORS' REMEDIES

A. OCUPANT'S FUTURE

INTEREST PROTECTED BY HOMESTEAD

ExEmPToN

In Denzer v. Prendergast,' plaintiff owned the vested remainder interest in a farm on which he and his family had lived
for 10 years with the life tenant, plaintiff's 85-year-old mother,
under an oral arrangement. Plaintiff received $100 monthly to
care for his mother - of which $500 was withheld annually in
lieu of rent - and paid the taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses of the farm. Defendants had obtained tort judgments
against plaintiff, and plaintiff brought the instant action for a
determination that his interest in the farm was homestead, and
hence exempt from execution to satisfy defendants' judgments.2
The district court held the interest exempt, and the Minnesota
Court affirmed, holding (1) that no distinction is to be made
between tort and contract debts in applying the homestead exemption, and (2) that qualification for the homestead exemption
in close cases depends upon whether the debtor's property interest
affords a substantial "community connection" likely to assist in
his remaining self-sustaining.
Minnesota's homestead exemption statute antedates statehood3
and exempts from judgment liens "the house owned and occupied
by a debtor as his dwelling place . .

. ."'

This exemption is de-

1. 126 N.W. 2d 440 (Minn. 1964).
2. The Minnesota Constitution provides: "A reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or
liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined by law." Art. I,
§ 12.
The homestead exemption statute provides:
The house owned and occupied by a debtor as his dwelling place, together with the land upon which it is situated .. . shall constitute the
homestead of such debtor and his family, and be exempt from seizure or
sale under legal process on account of any debt not lawfully charged
thereon in writing, except . . . [mechanics' liens and servants' wages].
MmN. STAT. § 510.01 (1961). The size of the homestead is limited to 80 acres
if located in rural areas, 1/3 of an acre if in the platted area of an incorporated
place having 5,000 or more inhabitants, and 1/2 acre if in the platted area of
an incorporated place having fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Mmx. STAT.
§ 510.02 (1961).

For a good discussion of the Minnesota homestead provisions, see Note,
Homesteads-Applicationof Minnesota Statutes, 25 Maw. L. REv. 66 (1940).
3. The homestead exemption first appears in MmNs. REv. STAT. ch. 71,
§ 93 (1851), seven years before Minnesota became a state.
For brief discussions of the origins of homestead exemption laws, see Vance,
Homestead Exemption Laws, 7 ENcyc. Soc. Sm. 441-42 (1987); Comment,
State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YAIa L.J. 1028-27 (1937).
4. MIx. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2 supra)
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signed to protect the debtor and his family," but it also encourages
the eventual fulfillment of obligations and eases the burden upon
public charity, since it is hoped that a debtor who retains his
home will be better able to remain self-sufficient.! Although its
basic purpose is the protection of the home, the statute imposes
no use or value restrictions on homestead property.' As a result,
the exemption has frequently been applied to protect property
bearing greater resemblance to a business investment than a home.
For example, a debtor whose home happens to be on his farm
or place of business may secure exemption for the entire property
if it is within the applicable area limitations. Similarly, rentals
derived from homestead property are exempt on the theory that
they represent use of the property, to which the debtor is entitled
in full.9 Furthermore, a debtor who owns a house in fee receives
protection not only of his home but also of his investment, since
the exemption protects his entire interest in the property rather
than merely his right to occupy the home. 0 Although these applications appear to confuse the basic purpose of the exemption
and to permit the just claims of creditors to go unsatisfied even
where the debtor possesses property beyond his interest in his
home," the homestead exemption has been liberally construed by
5. Bacon v. Mirau, 148 Minn. 268, 269, 181 N.W. 579, 580 (1921); Ferguson
v. Kumler, 27 Minn. 156, 159, 6 N.W. 618, 619 (1880); Note, Homesteads- Application, of Minnesota Statutes, 25 Mum. L. REv. 66-67 (1940); Comment
State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YAun LJ. 1023, 1030 (1937).
6. See Ryan v. Colburn, 185 Minn. 347, 350, 241 N.W. 388, 389 (1932);
Ferguson v. Kumler, 27 Minn. 156, 159, 6 N.W. 618, 619 (1880); Joslin,
Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959);
Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revion Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV.
484, 486 (1961).
7. See Mum. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2 supra).
8. Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N.W. 833 (1910); Jacoby v.
Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 48 N.W. 52 (1889).
9. Cysewski v. Steingraber, 222 Minn. 291, 24 N.W.2d 266 (1946).
10. See Mmw. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2. supra). The Illinois
homestead exemption, on the other hand, is effective only for the lives of the
debtor and his spouse and until his youngest child becomes 21 years old.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 2 (1963).
11. With the exception of mechanics' liens and servants' wages, the exemption provision is absolute and does not make distinctions based upon the
justness of creditors' claims. See MINm. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in
note 2 supra); Tomlinson v. Kandiyohi County Bank, 162 Minn. 230, 234, 202
N.W. 494, 495 (1925). Of course the possibility does exist that the debtor will
subsequently acquire assets which can be reached by execution. Judgments are
valid for 10 years, Mum. STAT. § 541.04 (1961), and may be renewed by bringing a second action within ten years upon the first judgment, see Sandwich
Mfg. Co. v. Earl, 56 Minn. 390, 57 N.W. 938 (1894); Dole v. Wilson, 89 Minn.
330, 40 N.W. 161 (1888).
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the Minnesota Court. 2 For example, land need not be owned in
fee simple to qualify for the exemption;' tenancies in common,' 4
leaseholds,' 5 and equitable interests have been treated as homestead property.
Where the relevant statutory language does not explicitly
limit application of the exemption to contract debts, most courts
have held that it applies to tort liabilities as well.1 The Denzer
case contains the first express holding by the Minnesota Court to
this effect.' 8 Defendants argued that the statutory exemption of

homesteads from seizure to pay "debt[s]"19 manifested a legislative
intention to distinguish between contract debts and tort liabilitiesYo They further contended that since the tort victim cannot
regulate the parties and the terms of the transaction, he ought to
be treated more favorably than the contract creditor who has
these opportunities 2 Persuasive as these arguments may be, they
collide with the constitutional provision that the statutory ex12. See, e.g., Jensen v. Christensen, 216 Minn. 92, 95, 11 N.W.2d 798, 799
(1943); Ryan v. Colburn, 185 Minn. 347, 350, 241 N.W. 388, 889 (1932).
is. Mnm. STAT. § 510.04 (1961). For cases involving other jurisdictions, see
Annot., 74 AL.R.d 1855 (1960); Annot., 89 A.LR. 511 (1934).
14. Kaser v. Haas, 27 Minn. 406, 7 N.W. 824 (1881).
15. In Te Emerson's Homestead, 58 Minn. 450, 60 N.W. 23 (1894).
Although there are no Minnesota decisions directly in point, exemption of
life estates would seem to follow a fortiori from that of leaseholds. Other jurisdictions have agreed almost unanimously in granting homestead exemptions
to life tenants. See, e.g., Livasy v. State Bank, 185 Iowa 442, 170 N.W. 756
(1919); Donahue v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Ky. 755, 46 S.W. 211 (1898);
Schumann v. Davis, 215 Mich. 19, 183 N.W. 740 (1921).
16. Hook v. Northwest Thresher Co., 91 Minn. 482, 485, 98 N.W. 468, 464
(1904); Keith v. Albrecht, 89 Minn. 247, 94 N.W. 677 (1908).
17. See cases cited Annot., 108 AL.R. 1042 (1937). But cf. Crawford v.
Slaton, 183 Ala. 393, 81 So. 940 (1901); Davis v. Henson, 29 Ga. 345 (1859);
Schouton v. Kilmer, 8 How. Pr. 527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853); Shelby v. Ziegler,
22 Okla. 799, 98 Pac. 989 (1908); Burton v. Mill, 78 Va. 468 (1884).
18. 126 N.W.2d at 445. However, the validity of the proposition had previously been implied. See, e.g., Cysewski v. Steingraber, 222 Minn. 221, 24
N.W.2d 266 (1946).
One writer had predicted the contrary result. See Note, HomesteadsApplication of Minnesota Statutes, 25 Mnum. L. REv. 66, 77-78 (1940).
19. See MAfm. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2 supra).
20. Brief for Defendants, pp. 24-46.
21. Brief for Defendants, p. 47. Defendants also argued that a tort-feasor
ought not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing. Brief for Defendants, pp.
48-49. Tort-feasors, however, do not usually profit from their acts. The
Denzer case, for example, arose out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff also
countered the assertion that the exemption ought not be extended to benefit
a "wrongdoer" by arguing that a negligent tort-feasor should not be "tartred]
. . . with a criminal brush." Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 19-29.
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emption extends to the payment of "any debt or liability,"' the
commonly understood meaning of the statutory word "debt,"2 3
and the strong public policy favoring protection of debtors' homes,
irrespective of the justness of their creditors' claims.?' This protection is no less significant to tort than contract debtors, and may
actually be of greater importance to the former, since they usually
do not assume their obligations voluntarily or for consideration.
Many jurisdictions have required not only that a homestead
claimant occupy the property in question, but also that his right
of occupancy arise from the asserted homestead interest?8 In the
Denzer case the Minnesota Court rejected this authority and its
own dicta 0 supporting it. It substituted a "community connection" test: In "close cases," a homestead exemption shall be recognized where ownership and occupancy afford a community connection of such significance that preservation of that connection
is likely to enable the debtor and his family to remain selfsustaining.2 7 Thus, if the conditions of this test are fulfilled,
exemption will be granted to an interest in property occupied by
the claimant even though his present occupancy does not depend
upon the interest. This test does not conflict with the statute.
Moreover, its application in the Denzer case does little violence to
the requirement that right of occupancy derive from the owned
interest. Since the life tenant is 85 years old, the plaintiff's right
of occupancy is likely to depend within a relatively short time
22. See 1Vmw. CONST. art. I, § 12 (quoted in note 2 supra).
23. See 1Vma. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2 supra). Mauo. STAT.
§ 645.08 (1961) provides that words are to be construed according to their
common usage, unless they are technical words with a special meaning.
24. Tomlinson v. Kandiyohi County Bank, 162 1inn. 230, 234, 202 N.W.
494, 495 (1925).
25. E.g., Caple v. Warburton, 125 Kan. 290, 264 Pac. 47 (1928); Fisher v.
Kellogg, 128 Neb. 248, 258 N.W. 404 (1935); Davis v. Brown, 62 S.W. 381
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1901). See authorities cited Annot., 74 AL.R.2d 1355, 1868-71
(1960); Annot., 89 AL.R. 511, 528-26 (1934).
Some cases have also said that no more than one person may claim a
homestead interest in a given piece of property at any one time. However, close
reading reveals them to be based on a judicial Ending that the occupancy of

only one of the owners sprang from his owned interest. Thus, this "rule" seems
no more than a special application of the requirement discussed in the text.
There is no indication, for example, that it would prevent two tenants in common, both of whom occupy the premises, from claiming the exemption with
respect to their interest. See, e.g., Bogie v. Nelson, 153 Ky. 440, 155 S.W. 1142
(1913); Johnson v. Prosper State Bank, 125 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
26. In re Emerson's Homestead, 58 Minn. 450, 453, 60 N.W. 23, 24 (1894);
Kaser v. Haas, 27 Minn. 406, 408, 7 N.W. 824, 825 (1881).
27. 126 N.W.2d at 444.
28. See Mma. STAT. § 510.01 (1961) (quoted in note 2 supra).
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upon ownership of the remainder interest in which he asserts a
homestead claim. Refusal to exempt this interest would be likely
to result in depriving him in the near future of the house which
he has made his home for 10 years and from which he has evinced
no intent to move in the foreseeable future. The application of
the community connection test in this case is consistent with the
paramount public policy favoring protection of the debtor's home.
It is also arguable that the community connection test would
support exemption where past and foreseeable future occupancy
is long standing, but the remainder interest is not likely to become
possessory for a substantial period of time. In such cases exemption would give the debtor incentive to remain on the property to
protect his interest in it.2 Thus, as in the Denzer case, exemption
would both permit and encourage the continuance of a single
long-term occupancy which might soon be terminated if the
debtor's property interest were seized."o In both cases, "connections with the community are stabilized by a protected interest
in a relatively permanent place of abode . . . ."s1

The Denzer case contains intimations of the limits to which the
community connection rationale may be carried. The Court's
emphasis upon the length and continuity of the plaintiffs residence3 2 indicates that if the plaintiff were an unmarried minor, or
had commenced his occupancy only after his tort, or for other
reasons it appeared that the plaintiff's residence was transitory
and bore little relation to his ownership interest in the property,
the result would have been different. In such a case deprivation
of the remainder interest would be unikely to interrupt a long continuous residence in the community. The nexus between ownership
and occupancy would be tenuous if not entirely absent.
The Minnesota Court has employed the community connection
rationale to stretch the ownership-occupancy test to accomplish
the basic legislative purpose of protecting the debtor's home. The
Court insisted upon looking behind the strict legal basis for the
debtor's occupancy to determine whether in fact the ownership
of a future interest played a substantial role in encouraging the
29. The statute requires that the claimant occupy as his dwelling place the
property claimed as a homestead. See MaNr. STAT. &510.01 (1961) (quoted in
note 2 supra). Absent this occupancy the debtor's interest would be liable to
seizure.
30. Although the remainderman-debtor's right of occupancy is dependent
upon the arrangement with the life tenant, he would have less incentive to
remain if his interest were seized. This would be particularly true where the
arrangement involves support and care of the life tenant.
31. 126 N.W.2d at 443.

32. Id. at 444.
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maintenance of a single continuous residence. Although the desirability of various forms of homestead exemptions remains the
subject of legitimate debate, 3 the Court in the Denzer case quite
commendably avoided sterile legalism to reach a result consistent
with their principal purpose.

B.

ASSIGNEE

OF PROCEEDS OF FUTURE SALa

GIVEN

PIOITY

OVER INTERVENING GARNISHOR

Under the old common law, only property interests or rights
which had a "present existence" could be transferred by assignment or mortgage.' To keep pace with the necessities of the expanding commercial world, the common-law courts gradually expanded this rule through the doctrine of "potential existence." 2
Under this concept the mortgaging of crops to be grown in the
future, the assignment of wages to be earned under an existing
contract of employment, and transfers of other rights having a
real and substantial foundation in anticipation were upheld.3 The
courts of equity departed even further from the early commonlaw practice by upholding assignments of expectancies, contingent
interests, and things not in esse whose future existence or acquisition was highly speculative at the time of the assignment.' The
common-law and equity rules were distinguishable; under commonlaw doctrine an assignment conferred a present title while in equity title did not transfer until the thing assigned actually came
33. For some criticisms of homestead exemption laws, see Joslin, supra
note 6; Rombauer, supra note 6.
1. See Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 226, 152 N.W.
265, 266 (1915); Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 291, 43 N.W. 137, 139
(1889); authorities cited 6 Am. Jun. 9D Assignments

§ 8, at 193 nn.19-20

(1963).
2. Authorities cited note I supra.
8. E.g., Cutting Packing Co. v. Packers' Exch., 86 Cal. 574, 25 Pac. 52
(1890); Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347 (1871); Leitch v. Northern Pac. Ry., 95
Minn. 85, 103 N.W. 704 (1905); Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 66 Minn.
344, 69 N.W. 1 (1896); Miller v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 35 Minn.
399,29 N.W. 52 (1886); Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Maginnis, 32 Minn. 193,
20 N.W. 85 (1884).
4. Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 199 Minn. 228, 226, 152 N.W. 265,
266 (1915); Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 222, 43 N.W. 137, 139
(1889); authorities cited 6 Am. Jun. 2D Assignments § 8, at 193 n.1 (1963). In
Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co., supra note 3, the Minnesota Court explicitly

went beyond the common-law doctrine of potential existence by holding that
the interest of a chattel mortgagee of wheat to be grown in the future was
superior to that of a subsequent good faith purchaser for value, even though
the mortgagor did not own the land when the mortgage was executed, and
the wheat therefore had no "potential existence."
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into being.' However, this distinction is no longer of practical
significance. At present, the assignment of a thing not in existence
is held to create an immediate equitable interest in the assignee
which has the effect of an executory agreement between the parties until the assignor acquires the property. At that point, the
beneficial interest in the property is transferred to the assignee by
operation of law." Consequently, by clear expression of their intent
to create an interest in personalty, parties may effectively assign
things not in esse and the beneficial interest will pass as soon as
the thing comes into being and the assignor acquires it.7
Although the latter rule is well established in Minnesota,8 the
Court recently had occasion to re-examine it in the case of Wilkie
v. Becker.' Defendant had executed written instruments purporting to assign the proceeds of a future sale of his personal property.1 0 His bank, which "clerked" the sale, acknowledged receipt
of the assignments, and on the day of the sale plaintiff, who had
commenced a prior action against defendant, served a garnishee
summons upon defendant and his bank. Subsequent to the sale,
plaintiff obtained a judgment in that action; however defendant
was adjudged bankrupt in federal district court. Plaintiff then
brought the present action against the defendant-bankrupt, his
trustee in bankruptcy, the garnishee bank, and the assignees,
claiming that the assignments were void and that the money in
the hands of the garnishee bank should be paid to the trustee for
the benefit of all the creditors. The trial court denied this claim,
and on appeal the Minnesota Court affirmed, holding that the
assignments had effectively transferred defendant's interest in the
sale proceeds to his assignees.
While the validity of a present transfer of property not yet in
5. See Hubbard v. Bibb Brokerage Co., 44 Ga. App. 1, 160 S.E. 639
(1931); Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N.E. 564 (1904); Godwin v.
Murchison Nat'1 Bank, 145 N.C. 320, 59 S.E. 154 (1907); of. Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, supra note 4, at 227; 6 Am. Jum. 2D Assignments § 7
(1963).
6. Cook v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.ad 490 (4th Cir. 1947);
Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 227, 43 N.W. 137, 139 (1889).
7. The requirement that the assignor acquire the property was imposed
in a case involving a chattel mortgage on future crops, where the mortgagor
did not own the land at the time of execution. Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co.,
66 Minn. 344, 69 N.W. 1 (1896). Apparently in other circumstances the beneficial interest may be transferred as soon as the thing comes into being, without first being physically acquired by the assignor. See Wilkie v. Becker, 128
N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1964).
8. See authorities cited notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
9. 128 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1964).
10. The assignment provided:
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existence is not dependent upon a particular form, the parties
must in some fashion clearly manifest their intention to create a
present interest." In determining the existence of such intent, the
Minnesota Court has considered not only the words of the agreement, but also the circumstances of the parties, and particularly
the amount of control retained by the assignor over the future
proceeds. If the parties have not clearly manifested their intent,
or if the assignor has in some fashion retained significant control
over the proceeds of the future sale, no equitable assignment is
found. Rather the attempted transfer is regarded as an executory
agreement, promise, or request to apply the proceeds of the sale
to the debt, which requires a further act of "appropriation" for
the "assignee" to prevail over an intervening garnishor. 2 If intent
to transfer presently is shown, the assignment may be either oral
or in writing.'

The trustee in Wilkie, relying on the earlier Minnesota case
of O'Connor v. Einfeldt,"4 maintained that the purported assignWe hereby assign the sum of $
from the proceeds of our sale
to be held on or about December 15, 1960, to
, Minnesota,
and request that you charge our sale account and remit to the within
named assignee as early as possible after date of sale. This assignment,
however, is subject to existing Mortgage Liens and former assignments.
198 N.W.2d at 705 n.1.
11. Jackson Nat Bank v. Christensen, 146 Minn. 303, 306, 178 N.W.
494, 495 (1920); Union Iron Works Co. v. Kilgore, 65 Minn. 497, 67 N.W.
1017 (1896); Second Nat Bank v. Sproat, 55 Minn. 14, 56 N.W. 254 (1893);
Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 43 N.W. 137 (1889); authorities cited 6
AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 83, at 264 n.9 (1963).
12. Selover v. Selover, 201 Minn. 562, 566, 277 N.W. 205, 207 (1938);
O'Conner v. Einfeldt, 164 Minn. 422, 205 N.W. 268 (1925); Jackson Nat
Bank v. Christensen, supra note 11; Hale v. Dressen, 76 Minn. 183, 78 N.W.
1045 (1899); of. Christmas v. Russel, 5 U.S. (14 Wall.) 69 (1871); Ciccolini v.
United States Trust Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1948); In re Furman's Estate, 358
Pa. 187, 56 A.2d 86 (1948); Sundstrom v. Sundstrom, 15 Wash. 2d 103, 129
P.2d 783 (1942); 6 Am. Jun. 2D Assignments § 83 (1963). See also Pesis v. Burdman, 190 Minn. 563, 252 N.W. 454 (1934). The type of physical act necessary
to provide sufficient "appropriation" is not clearly defined.
13. Jackson Nat'1 Bank v. Christensen, supra note 11; Hurley v. Bendel,
67 Minn. 41, 69 N.W. 477 (1896); authorities cited 6 Am. Jun. 2D Assignments
§ 84, at 266-67 un.1-3, 20 (1963).
14. 164 Minn. 422, 205 N.W. 268 (1925). The circumstances of this case
were similar to Wilkie except that the debtor's bank, which clerked the sale,
held a chattel mortgage on the "greater part" of the property being sold. The
Court decided that the mortgage lien did not extend to the proceeds of the
unmortgaged chattels and then held that the claimed agreement to apply all
the proceeds to the bank debt did not defeat the claim of a garnishor of the
sale proceeds of the unmortgaged chattels, but was effective only, if at all,
as an executory promise requiring a further act of appropriation.
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ments were merely requests by defendant to the garnishee bank
to pay certain sums to the assignee in the future, and as such had
no present effect. He argued that a further act of appropriation
of the fund for the benefit of the purported assignees was required
in order to effectuate a transfer, and that since no action had been
taken at the time of service, his interest as garnishor should prevail. However, the Minnesota Court distinguished O'Connor on
the grounds that the assignor in that case had not clearly manifested an intent presently to transfer his interest and control over
the future proceeds, and that there was not indication in O'Connor
whether the claimed agreement was written or oral. However,
since oral agreements are upheld when clearly executed and
proven," the significant distinction between the cases apparently
is the lack of clear proof in O'Connor of either the existence of an
agreement or a present intent to transfer. Since the written instruments in Wilkie contained unambiguous language of present assignment,"' the Court did not require a further act of appropriation.
Notwithstanding the existence of a present intent to transfer,
a purported assignment may still be invalidated on the ground
that it was not made in good faith,'7 lacked sufficient consideration,' 8 or was void as against public policy. On grounds of public
policy, only limited effect is given to certain types of assignments.
For example, an assignment of future wages, unlimited as to time
and amount, under an existing contract of employment is invalid. 9 However, limited future wage assignments generally have
been upheld.20 Under the facts in Wilkie there would seem to be
15. See note 18 supraand accompanying text.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. See Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 2923, 152 N.W. 265
(1915). In Wilkie the trustee in bankruptcy stipulated out of the case the
issue of fraud and the claim that the assignments were voidable preferences
under the Bankruptcy Act, 64 Stat. 25 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1958).
This aspect of the Wilkie case probably diminishes its practical impact since
most situations in which a debtor might want to use this device will occur
within the four month period prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act and the
assignments will thus be vulnerable to attack as voidable preferences.
18. Normally the consideration is the same as that required to support
a simple contract. See WuisTON, ConrACTs § 142 (1938). The Minnesota
Court has held that an antecedent debt is sufficient consideration to support
such an assignment. Bradley v. Thorne, 67 Minn. 281, 69 N.W. 909 (1897).
19. Lucas v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 207 Minn. 380, 291 N.W. 892 (1939);
Leitch v. Northern Pac. Ry., 95 Minn. 35, 103 N.W. 704, (1905) (dictum);
Mum. STAT. § 181.06 (1961).
20. Dworsky v. Unger Furniture Co., 212 Minn. 244, 3 N.W.2d 393 (1942);
Quigley v. Welter, 95 Minn. 383, 104 N.W. 236 (1905). In Leitch, supra note
19, the Court held that a discharge in bankruptcy releases future wages from
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no valid policy objection to an assignment made in good faith
and for value. Moreover, since theoretically no property interest
would "vest" until a cash fund came into existence, an assignee
has only an expectancy, which is ineffectual as a lien unless and
until a sale of the property is actually held. Thus, a judgment
creditor of the assignor presumably could levy execution on the
property before the sale and defeat the interest of the assignees.
Similarly, a general creditor who anticipates a future sale could
himself secure an assignment of those proceeds. These alternatives
and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 21 would seem to afford
ample protection to creditors; thus the Wilkie rule should have
an adverse impact only on those creditors whose own inaction has
permitted a prior assignment to defeat their right of recovery.
II. ZONING

A.

"HoLD ORDER" OF INDEFINITE DURATION RULED INVALID
BECAUSE UNAUTHORIZED BY ZONING ENABLING ACT
Alexander v. City of Minneapolis1 the Minnesota Court

In

considered the validity of a "hold order" and a subsequent zoning
ordinance amendment. Plaintiff had purchased property zoned
for multiple dwellings to a height of six stories. The Minneapolis
City Council subsequently passed a hold order prohibiting the
issuance of all building permits with respect to the subject property pending adoption of a proposed new comprehensive zoning
ordinance; nine years later plaintiff's application for a building
permit was refused as a result of the hold order. Prior to the plaintiff's application, the surrounding property owners had petitioned
for a rezoning of plaintiff's property, and before trial the city
council had, in accordance with the petition, rezoned an area including plaintiff's property to multiple dwellings limited to a height
of two and one half stories. The trial court invalidated the hold
order, and the zoning ordinance amendment as applied to plaintiff's property. On appeal the Court affirmed, holding (1) that the
a previous assignment. Thus, although given as security for a debt, the Court
did not treat the equitable interest created in the assignee as an existing lien
protected from discharge in bankruptcy. In reaching its result, the Court
used public policy grounds to distinguish wage assignments from other equitable assignments. The policy against allowing a wage earner to assign away
his family's livelihood for the indefinite future is no doubt wise, but the same
considerations would seem to apply, for example, to a farmer mortgaging
future crops. The different economic situation of the farmer and his greater
need of the device of mortgaging future crops as a financing technique may
underlie the Court's attitude.
21. See note 17 supra.
1. 125 N.W.2d 588 (Min. 1968).
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zoning enabling act did not authorize indefinite suspension or
nullification of zoning ordinances by hold orders and (2) that,
for grounds that are unclear, the amendment was also invalid.
The state zoning enabling act applicable to first-class cities
authorizes -the regulation of land use "by ordinance." 2 It was
stipulated in Alexander that the hold order was not an "ordinance,"3 and the Court invalidated it on that ground.' Moreover, the Court intimated that the enabling act did not even
authorize the city council to suspend indefinitely the application
of its zoning ordinances through the passage of an ordinance."
A number of courts have recognized the value of temporary
zoning regulations in preventing the development of potentially
nonconforming uses during the long process of study and deliberation that normally precedes the adoption of comprehensive zoning
2. MINu. STAT. § 462.18 {1961). Moreover, a Minneapolis ordinance requires a person to obtain a permit before erecting or altering a structure. It
requires the issuance of a building permit if the builder's proposed plans
"comply with the Building Code and other ordinances and with the State
laws . . . ." MiNEApoLs, Mmr., CODE OF CTY ORDINANCEs § 11.010 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
3. 125 N.W.ed at 586 n.9.
4. The distinction between a hold order and an ordinance is not described
in either the briefs and record or the opinion of the Alexander case. However,
the Minneapolis Municipal Charter requires that ordinances and resolutions
be enacted by a majority of the City Council. MhNEAPoIs, MrW., CTY
CKARTER ch. 4, § 9 (1960). The same section then requires a waiting period
between the first reading and passage of ordinances, and continues: "When
approved, they shall be recorded by the City Clerk ... and before they shall
be in force they shall be published in the official paper of the city." It is
unclear from the context whether "they" refers to both ordinances and resolutions, or merely the former. However, the Hennepin County District Court
said, in an earlier, unreported decision invalidating a hold order, that "the
result of holding [the order valid] . . . would be uncertainty and chaos. One
would have to comb the minutes of every City Council meeting to know
what law governed." Brief for Respondent, p. 9, Alexander v. City of
Minneapolis, 125 N.W.Qd 583 (Minn. 1963). It may be inferred that a hold
order is properly classifiable as a "resolution," and is not affected by the
waiting period and publication requirements.
5. 125 N.W.2d at 586. The Court relied upon State ex rel. Fairmount
Center Co. v. Arnold, 188 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.ad 777 (1941). In that case,
however, the court recognized that the decisions in other jurisdictions were
conflicting and expressly left open the question of the validity of an interim
ordinance enacted pursuant to the enabling act, which required 30 days
published notice and a public hearing.
Mmx. STAT. § 462.18 (1961) is the zoning enabling act for cities of the
first class only. It contains no express provision for suspending the effect of
or nullifying a zoning ordinance, by an ordinance or any other measure. The
Court apparently chose not to imply one.
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ordinances. 6 Yet, by virtue of their very purpose, such regulations
are of limited value unless they can be adopted without regard to
time-consuming procedural requirements often imposed upon the
adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance itself.' On the
other hand, where, as in Alexander, such temporary regulations
have unreasonably long or indefinite durations, or prohibit any
improvement of the subject property, their relationship to the
comprehensive ordinances becomes tenuous, and serious questions
may arise as to their constitutionality and validity under state
enabling acts."
The Court in the Alexander case seemed troubled by the hold
order for three reasons: the enabling act did not expressly authorize the enactment of zoning regulations by hold orders or other
more expeditious means than ordinances; the regulation in question was of indefinite duration, and in fact was in effect for nine
years; and the regulation prohibited the issuance of any building
permit. Although the invalidation of the hold order seems justifiable on the basis of the latter two grounds, the Court's reliance
on the first is unfortunate. For example, if a hold order were
effective for a limited period prior to passage of a comprehensive
6. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 496, 234 Pac. 381, 388
(1925); Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928); see Downham v.
City Council, 58 Fad 784, 788 (E.D. Va. 1932); Butvinik v. Mayor & Aldermen, 6 NJ. Mise. 803, 142 Atl. 759 (Sup. Ct. 1928). But see Kline v.
Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 452-53, 68 A.2d 182, 189 (1949).
7. Some courts have invalidated interim zoning ordinances for noncompliance with the procedural requirements of the enabling act. City of Somerset v. Weise, 263 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1954); Krajenke Buick Sales v. Kopkowski,
322 Mich. 250, 33 N.W.2d 781 (1948); State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336
Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
8. See Deerfield Realty Co. v. Hague, 8 NJ. Misc. 637, 838, 151 Atl. 373,
374 (Sup. Ct. 1930). But see Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal.
App. 2d 93, 5 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1960). There was a house on the subject property in Alexander which apparently had been constructed prior to the issuance
of the hold order. Testimony indicated that the rent derived from the house
was insufficient to pay for expenses and taxes. Record, p. 62.
Hold orders have long been used extensively in the City of Minneapolis.
In 1959 there were in effect 91 hold orders covering 10 to 15% of the land
area of the city, some dating back 20 years. Planning and Zoning Committee
of the Citizens League of Minneapolis and Hennepin County, Report
(March 25, 1959). The Citizens League Report indicates that hold orders
have been designed to achieve a number of purposes other than preventing
the frustration of pending comprehensive zoning ordinances. Most significantly, they have been used as substitutes for mapped street plans to freeze
,the development of privately owned property which the city expects to
condemn in the future for road building and, in the case of one ward, to
confer upon its alderman a virtual veto power over all building in the ward.
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zoning ordinance, and permitted the issuance of building permits
for some reasonable uses which it was anticipated would be authorized by the new ordinance, it should be upheld as an essential
incident to the enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Instead, the Court chose to construe the enabling act as requiring that all zoning regulation be accomplished through ordinance
as distinguished from resolution. However, this distinction is not
made by state law, but is a creature of the Municipal Charter. 0
Thus the Court need not have written it into the enabling act.
Since it has, it would seem desirable for the legislature explicitly
to authorize expeditious procedures for the enactment of temporary zoning regulations; it has already empowered the boards of
commissioners of counties with less than 300,000 population to
adopt temporary zoning maps or ordinances when contemplating
the adoption of comprehensive plans or official controls, or
amendments, extensions, or additions to either."
9. A resolution or hold order of limited duration was sustained in Hunter
v. Adams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960). A city council had
passed a resolution forbidding issuance of building permits for one year in a
proposed redevelopment area. The court noted only incidental injury to
appellants; there was no finding of deprivation of property or diminution
of property value, aside from the expense of preparing plans and of delay
in erecting the contemplated structure. Analogizing from an earlier zoning
case, the court found the resolution reasonably necessary to serve a public
purpose. See cases cited in note 6 supra and accompanying text.
In addition, the pendency of a subsequently enacted zoning ordinance
has been held sufficient ground for the refusal to issue a building permit. See,
e.g., Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 1033 (1980); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959);
Beverly Bldg. Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567
(1963); A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586
(1954); Gold v. Building Comm., 834 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 867 (1939). Contra, e.g.,
State ex rel. Romero v. Viator, 217 La. 239, 46 So. 2d 256 (1950); Reade v.
Moss, 186 Mise. 156, 58 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The proposed comprehensive rezoning ordinance in Alexander would have rezoned plaintiff's
property to prevent the apartment construction desired, and was submitted
to the city council on October 26, 1962. Record, pp. 8, 21. This new comprehensive ordinance was passed by the city council on May 81, 1963. However,
the permit in Alexander was refused due to the hold order, not the pendency
of the comprehensive rezoning ordinance.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. Mnr. STAT. § 894.34 (1961) provides that if such a
county is conducting, or in good faith intends to conduct studies within
a reasonable time, or has held or is holding a hearing for the purpose
of considering a comprehensive plan or official controls or an amendment, extension, or addition to either, or in (the event new territory for
which no zoning may have been adopted, may be annexed to a municipality, the board in order to protect the public health, safety and general welfare may adopt as an emergency measure a temporary interim
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The lower court invalidated the zoning ordinance amendment
in reliance upon State ex rel. Foster v. City of Minneapolis.' In
that case the "consent clause" of the zoning enabling act for cities
of the first class's was declared an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power where following the purchase of property, written consent to a more restrictive zoning is filed and thereafter the
property is zoned in accordance with the consent so as to divest
it of "all substantial value."' The 1VMinnesota Supreme Court did
not refer to Fosterin its Alexander opinion; however, it noted that
the amendment to the zoning ordinance had reduced the value
of the plaintiff's property from $57,000 to $22,000, and asserted
that "spot zoning ordinances" or amendments to a comprehensive
zoning ordinance which totally or substantially destroy the value
of property constitute unconstitutional deprivations of property. 5
Although a regulation may be so onerous as to constitute a taking
zoning map or temporary interim zoning ordinance, the purpose of
which shall be to classify and regulate uses and related matters as constitutes the emergency. Such interim resolution shall be limited to one
year from the date it becomes effective and to one year to renewal
thereafter.
12. 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273 (1959), 44 MNor. L. REv. 181 (1960).
13. MNr. STAT. &462.18 (1961) contains a "consent clause" which permits a city council to rezone only with the consent of two thirds of the
owners of property within 100 feet of the property to be rezoned. An exception is made, however, when the planning body has made a survey of an
area of at least 40 acres where the change is to be effective and has decided
that written consent is impractical. In this event the planning body must
schedule a public hearing after published notice and submit to the governing
body a written report of its findings and recommendations, including its
opinion as to whether the proposed changes are reasonably related to the
overall needs of the community. Following such action, the governing body
may, after hearing, adopt a new zoning ordinance or amend an existing one
by a twothirds vote without obtaining consent.
14. Specifically, the Court limited its holding to situations where:
(1) at the time of owners' purchase of property it was zoned "commercial"; (2) thereafter adjoining property owners, pursuant to M.S.A.
§ 462.18, filed a "written consent" to have it rezoned from "commercial"
to "residential"- a more restrictive classification; (3) the city council
thereafter rezoned the property "residential" pursuant to the consent
of adjoining property owners; and (4) the property was thereby diversted of all substantialvalue....

255 Minn. at 254, 97 N.W.2d at 276. (Emphasis added.)
15. The Court cited Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115
N.W.2d 734 (1962), and Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118
N.W.2d 659 (1962). See also Golden v. City of St. Louis Park, 266 Minn. 46,
122 N.W.2d 570 (1963); Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205,
81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
While the Court in the Alexander case refers to a "substantial diminution"
of property value, the Court in Foster required a divestiture of "all substan-
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of property,'0 diminution of property value is usually but one consideration in finding an unconstitutional deprivation of property. 7
Since no inquiry was made into the relation of the amendment
to the general welfare or the public interest, the Court's discussion
of this problem appears to be inadequate in that undue weight
was therefore attached to the diminution of property value. Further, spot zoning denotes simply zoning which is not in accordance
with a comprehensive plan' and is invalid no matter what its
effect upon the value of the property involved." Moreover, no
reason appears why diminution in property value should be accorded greater weight in determining the validity of an amendment to a comprehensive zoning ordinance than it is when the
validity of the comprehensive ordinance itself (as applied to the
subject property) is at issue. The amendment should be judged
by the same standard as the comprehensive ordinance.s0
The Court also indicated that the amendment was invalid
because it prohibited the plaintiff from developing the land as
he contemplated, and as the zoning ordinance permitted, when
he purchased it. Yet even the initial zoning of land is retroactive
in the sense that the owner may thereby be deprived of the
tial value." This difference in language may indicate that the Court in
Alexander was not relying upon the Foster rule; however, the lower court,
although noting this disparity between the facts of the two cases, concluded
that Foster was controlling. Record, pp. 172-78.
16. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 893, 413 (1922).
17. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 869 U.S. 590, 592, 594 (1962); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865 (1926). See also Hartung v.
Village of Skokie, 22 Ill. 2d 485, 494, 177 N.E.2d 828, 382 (1961); 8 McQumLAN, MNmcIPAL CORPORATIONs §§ 25.44-.45 (3d ed. 1957); Poo=nr, PLANNING
AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (1961); Note, 13 U. PIrr. L. REV. 365,
875 (1952).
18. E.g., Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 128 A.2d
825 (1956); Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 149 N.E.2d 232
(1958); 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 26-1 (3d ed. 1962).
19. See id. at 26-6.
20. See Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 100, 96 N.E.2d 499, 504
(1951); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 221 NJ. 154, 167, 131 A.2d 1,
8 (.1957).
One jurisdiction required the party seeking validation of amendatory
zoning to show either a mistake in the original zoning or changes in circumstances. Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 172, 177, 126 A.2d
621, 623 (1956). This would seem to be a limitation on the power to rezone.
However, a majority of the states make no reference to the necessity of such
prior proof. 1 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 18, at 27-17. Some states expressly disavow this position. Cohen v. City of Lynn, 833 Mass. 699, 132
NX.E.d 664 (1956); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 App. Div.
2d 701, 174 N.Y.S.ad 283 (1958).
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right to use his property as intended when he purchased it.n
Nonetheless the courts have invalidated only those zoning restrictions conflicting with existing rather than intended use. 2 Thus,
21. Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 102 (1953); Note, 24 U. Prrr. L. REV.
154, 159 (1962); 7 MERcER L. REV. 880 (1956); see Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where the United States Supreme Court sustained an ordinance which reduced the value of certain vacant land from
$10,000 per acre for the industrial uses for which it had been held to $2,500
per acre for the residential uses for which it was zoned.
22. See O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal. App. 2d 849, 146 P.2d 983 (1944); Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n. v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434, 86 A.2d 74 (1952);
Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165, 72 S.E.2d 66 (1952);
1 ANTIAu, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATION LAw § 7.07, at 445 (1964); Anderson,
The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 214, 219 (1959); Katarincic, Elimination of Non-conforming Uses, Buildings, and Structures by Amortization- Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE
U.L. REV. 1, 20 (1963). One rationale advanced for this difference in treatment
is that it encourages the improvement of land. See Note, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
91, 103 (1953).
The eases cited by the Court in Alexander, 125 N.W.2d at 587, would not
support the view that purchase of land alone creates immunity from future
changes in zoning restrictions. In Vine v. Zabriskie, 122 NJ.L. 4, 3 A.2d 886
(Sup. Ct. 1939), the plaintiff was held to be entitled to a permit for an apartment building despite a zoning ordinance amendment prohibiting such use.
The opinion did not indicate whether any expenditures had been made prior
to enactment of the amendment; however, the land was not marketable for
single or two family dwellings, or even business establishments. A zoning
ordinance prohibiting all reasonable use of a parcel of land is confiscatory as
to it. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 922, 15 N.E.2d 587

(1938).

In City of Coldwater v. Williams Oil Co., 288 Mich. 140, 284 N.W. 675
(1939), the court in effect held that rights under a prior ordinance had vested
in the owner because of his expenditures and work preparatory to construction. In so holding, the court distinguished City of Lansing v. Dawley, 247
Mich. 894, 295 N.W. 500 (1929), which rejected the assertion of vested rights
because the property owner had done nothing substantial in reliance on his
right to a particular use.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 581, 84 N.E.2d 825
(1949), contains language to the effect that a purchaser could rely on the
uses permitted when he purchased land, but the ground for the court's
invalidation of the zoning amendment was the absence of a sufficient relation
between it and the public health or welfare.
Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Il. 511, 156 N.E.
778 (1927), held invalid as arbitrary an ordinance which deprived the plaintiff of the only property it had acquired-a lease of land for educational
purposes. The opinion does not make clear whether the invalidity arose from
the expenditures or obligations incurred before enactment of the ordinance
or merely the disallowance of a previously permissible use.
Zoning Comm'n v. New Canaan Bldg. Co., 146 Conn. 170, 148 A.2d
330 (1959), held invalid as not in accordance with a comprehensive plan a
zoning ordinance amendment changing the classification of an area from

116

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:93

substantial expenditures and/or various degrees of construction 3
undertaken in good faith reliance on a building permit,"' or the
likelihood that one will be issued," are generally required to imapartment house to residential. The plaintiff had incurred considerable expenses preparatory to construction of an apartment building before the
effective date of the amendment, 'but the court specifically left undecided
the question of whether the expenditures and extent of construction were
such as to give the plaintiff a vested right to complete the structure.
State ex rel. Schroedel v. Pagels, 257 Wis. 376, 48 N.W.2d 349 (1950),
noted that where the owner had expended over $50,000 preparatory to construction of apartment houses prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance
amendment prohibiting them, he had acquired vested rights to use the property for apartment buildings.
Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960), recognized
the general (and New Jersey) rule that the mere right under existing law
to make a particular use of property at the time of application for a building
permit does not immunize the owner from valid, subsequently-enacted legislation; substantial investment or expenditure is required. The court decided
that it would be unprofitable to attempt to establish a specific amount of
reliance sufficient to raise such a vested right; it thought a balance had to be
struck between the rights and duty of the city and the interests of the
permittee.
Gem Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 341 Mass. 99, 167 N.E.2d 315
(1960), held invalid as to the plaintiff's property an ordinance which, through
right-of-way and size requirements, destroyed all potential value for building
purposes of over an acre of land.
23. E.g., Asquino v. Tobriner, 298 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Nott v.
Wolff, 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960); Fifteen Fifty No. State Bldg.
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 Ill. 2d 408, 155 N.E.2d 97 (1959); Board of
Supervisors v. Paaske, 250 Iowa 1293, 98 N.W.2d 827 (1959); Mayor & City
Council v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A.2d 273 (1947); Expert Steel Co. v. City
of Clawson, 368 Mich. 619, 118 N.W.2d 815 (1962); Bonan Realty Corp. v.
Young, 16 Misc. 2d 119, 182 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Stowe v. Burke,
255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961); Lower Merion Township v. Frankel,
358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948).
This is the rule in most jurisdictions. See 8 McQuar&r, op. cit. .supra note
17, § 25.157, at 360; 2 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 18, at 57-6 to -7.
The Washington Supreme Court does not follow this rule. It holds that a
right to construct a building vests when the permit is applied for if the permit
is later issued, preferring this standard because it is more practical to administer than the majority rule, which forces the court to inquire into the moves
and counter-moves of the parties. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d
856 (1958); State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.ad 899
(1954).
24. Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 874 (1961).
25. The Illinois rule confers immunity where there are substantial expenditures in reliance upon the probability that a permit will issue. See Cos Corp.
v. City of Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570, 190 N.E.2d 364 (1963); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959).
One authority applauds this rule as recognizing that permit requirements
can be so strict that even the application for a permit may involve substantial

1964]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

117

munize property from a subsequently enacted zoning ordinance."
Mere purchase of land with the intent to use it for a then perexpenditures. 2 RATHKoPF, op. cit. supra note 18, at 57-10.
MnmrWAPOIs, MMIN., CODE OF ORDNNCEs § 11.010 (1960) (Building
Code), entitled "Permit Procedure," requires the filing of three complete sets
of plans and specifications, prepared and signed by a registered architect or
registered professional engineer, with a building permit application for a
structure to cost over $10,000, other than a single or two family dwelling.
Thus, although excavation prior to issuance of a building permit is prohibited,
compliance with these requirements usually would entail some expenditures.

The plaintiff in Alexander prepared final plans for the foundation and preliminary plans for the building itself. The foundation plan was approved but
no permit was issued due to the hold order. Record, p. 156.
26. Minnesota law is unclear as to the degree of development necessary
to entitle property to the status of a nonconforming use. State ex rel. Berndt
v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366 (1960), and Kiges v. City of St. Paul,

240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363 (1953), indicate that the substantial expenditures view may prevail in this State. Dicta in Olsen v. City of Minneapolis,
263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962), and in Foster, cast doubt on this
conclusion.
In Berndt, supra, the Court said that Kiges, supra, "held that where a
building permit was acquired but construction proceeded no further than
excavation, no vested rights to use the premises for the purposes planned
existed which could not be cut off by a subsequent amendment of the ordinance." 259 Minn. at 81, 106 N.W.2d at 369. The Court in Berndt went on to
say with respect to its own facts:
Where a part of the property -constituting less than half of the total
consideration - was purchased prior to the submission of an official
application for a permit and in reliance upon statements of the village
clerk and the village attorney; where an option to purchase the balance

of the property was not exercised until subsequent to a denial of the
application; and where no building permits were applied for, nor actual
construction begun, before the denial of the application, no vested
rights were acquired in the ordinance....
Ibid.

In Foster the Court quoted from Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 16 F.
Supp. 101, 106 (D. Minn. 1936): "When zones are established, citizens buy and
improve property relying on the restrictions provided by law. They have a
right to the permanency and security that the law should afford." 255 Minn.
at 253, 97 N.W.2d at 276. If emphasis is placed on "and improve," the state-

ment is fully in accord with the view enunciated in Kiges, supra.
The Olsen Court noted that
while it is true that a number of courts have held that the issuance
of a permit to erect a structure for a permitted use under a zoning ordinance does not create a vested right that cannot be cut off by subsequent amendment . . . we feel that in justice the better rule is to give
full accord to the rights of property owners based upon interests therein
arising out of comprehensive zoning ordinances.
263 Minn. at 12, 115 N.W.2d at 742. The Court added that the Kiges case
had not determined whether plaintiff had vested rights under the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance. Id. n.2.
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mitted use is insufficient 27 Consequently, if invalidation of the
amendment in Alexander is based on the theory that purchase
with the intent to use property for a currently permitted use
creates a vested right to implement that use, the decision would
seem to undercut the entire theory and practice of zoning.
On the other hand, the Court may have tacitly applied the
Foster rule. Foster seems to require the coincidence of two ordinarily independent grounds to invalidate a zoning measure: an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional confiscation of property. However, there appears
to be no logical relation between these two grounds. The question
of whether legislative power has been unconstitutionally delegated would seem to have little bearing on whether an ordinance
so diminishes the value of property as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of it, and vice versa. Moreover, neither of the two
seems properly applicable to the facts of the Alexander case. The
delegation question is not properly before the court where, as in
Foster and Alexander, the "consent clause" has been complied
with and does not require the council to rezone pursuant to the
consent of the surrounding property owners 28 In neither of these
cases was there an attempt to restrain the council from rezoning
on the ground that the requisite consent was withheld, or to
compel rezoning because consent was granted. In both, consent
was given and was not alleged to amount to more than a petition
for a more restrictive zoning which the council in its discretion
might effectuate by ordinance. Diminution of property value, on
the other hand, is an improper ground for invalidating a zoning
regulation without considering it in the context of the particular
public interest sought to be achieved by adoption of the regulation, as was not done in this case?" Thus, any reliance upon
Foster, or either of its constituent elements, would appear to be
inappropriate in the Alexander case.so
However, the Court may have recognized that its decision in
27. See note 22 supra and accompanying text; 8 McQuMAX, op. cit. supra
note 17, § 95.188, at 486. This view implicitly recognizes that nonconforming
uses are contrary to the spirit of zoning because they prevent the full realization of the zoning plan. See generally id. § 25.188; 2 RATHKOPF, op. cit. Supra
note 18, at 62-1.
28. See Record, pp. 166-70, Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 125 N.W.2d
588 (Minn. 1963).
29. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
30. In any event, application of Foster to the Alexander case would require a modification of the Foster requirement that "all substantial value" be
destroyed -to one requiring merely "substantial diminution." See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
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Fosterwas inappropriate on the facts presented in that case, and
that application of the Foster reasoning would likewise be improper in the instant one.3 ' Its failure even to mention Foster,
though the lower court relied wholly upon it, supports this view.
Instead, the Court may have tacitly adopted one or a combination of two positions. First, it may have felt that fairness required
it to regard as done that which ought to have been done. Since
the plaintiff's application for a building permit was denied solely
because of the invalid hold order, the Court might have decided
to apply the amendment to the plaintiff's property as if the permit
had been granted when it was refused. It might then have found
a vested right to build the proposed structure, either by following
the Washington rule that the right to build vests upon application
for a subsequently granted permit,3 3 or by theorizing that plaintiff
would probably have made substantial expenditures before the
adoption of the amendment had it not been for the denial of his
application." Second, the Court might well have reasoned that
invalidating the zoning amendment as applied to the plaintiff's
land was necessary to give practical effect to its invalidation of
the hold order. Had the plaintiff's property been held subject to
31. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
82. It was stipulated that the City Building Inspector would have been
required to issue the permit but for the hold order, and that the hold
order was the only reason for his refusal to issue the permit. Record, pp. 12-18.
Plaintiff's application for the building permit, and its denial, occurred on
November 2, 1962. The plans submitted were final only as to the foundation
and the desired permit was to be just for the foundation. Record, pp. 11, 63,
160. Six weeks later, on December 14, 1962, the zoning amendment was
passed. Record, p. 13.
83. The Washington rule is discussed in note 23 supra.
84. Gramaton Hills Manor, Inc., v. Manganiello, 30 Mise. 2d 117, 213
N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1961), held that though a city had no power to suspend permit issuance by an interim ordinance, the mere filing of the application conferred no right; New York law required a commencement of construction or the like before any vested right accrued.
Further, it has been contended that no vested right can exist without the
issuance of a permit, because there is no opportunity to rely to one's detriment. Price v. Schwafel, 92 Cal. App. 2d 77, 88, 206 P.2d 683, 687 (1949).
However, vested rights have been held to exist if a permit should have
been issued. See Vine v. Zabriskie, 122 N.JL. 4, 3 A.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1989);
Dubow v. Ross, 175 Misc. 219, 22 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
Thus, it would not be necessary to adopt the Washington position discussed in note 23 supra, to hold that the plaintiff had a vested right in the
prior ordinance. It could reasonably be held that while the making of substantial expenditures is ordinarily required, an exception to this rule will be
made where invalid governmental action effectively prevents the owner from
undertaking such expenditures. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park
Ridge, 16 Ill. App. 2d 555, 566, 149 N.E.2d 844, 350 (1958).
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the amendment, the city would have been permitted to reach the
objective of the hold order, notwithstanding its invalidity. The
plaintiff would have won a Pyrrhic victory with respect to the
hold order, and property owners generally would have been deprived of an effective remedy to overcome such illegal procedures.
In view of these considerations the invalidation of the amendment
as it affects plaintiff is desirable and proper on at least one of
several grounds. However, the reasons given by the Court for
doing so are unacceptable, at least without further explanation,
and are likely to lead to confusion in subsequent zoning litigation.
III. EVIDENCE
A.

EFFECT OF

WITNESS'S

SELF INCRImINATION

IN

PRIVILEGE
CRIVINAL TRIAL

INVOCATION OF

AGAINST

During a murder trial, the State called as a witness an alleged
accomplice who invoked the fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination and declined to answer all questions. Upon
conviction for murder in the third degree,' the defendant appealed
claiming prejudicial error on the ground that the prosecuting
attorney knew that a claim of immunity would be asserted and
had called the witness merely to discredit defendant. The Minnesota Court, finding this contention unfounded, affirmed the conviction and held in State v. MitchelP that where it is established
that the prosecutor has called a witness with knowledge that the
privilege will be invoked and for the purpose of prejudicing defendant, his conduct constitutes reversible error per se, but that
in the absence of such wrongful conduct the judgment will be
reversed only upon a finding of actual prejudice.
While an accomplice or codefendant is a competent witness,4
his refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds does not permit
an inference of what his testimony would have been5 since the
1. Defendant was charged with violation of Mmx. STAT. § 619.10 (1961).
2. 180 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1964).
3. The defendant apparently made no claim at trial that he would be
prejudiced if the witness claimed immunity. 180 N.W.2d at 182. Therefore,
the Court could have dismissed this branch of the appeal in reliance on the
rule that only those grounds of objection which were presented to the trial
court will be considered on appeal. State v. Soward, 262 Minn. 265, 114
N.W.2d 276 (1962); McNab v. Jeppesen, 258 Minn. 15, 102 N.W.2d 709
(1960); Hendrickson v. Bannits, 194 Minn. 528, 261 N.W. 189 (1985).
4. Barr v. People, 80 Colo. 522, 71 Pac. 399 (1908); State v. Barrows, 76
Me. 401 (1884); People v. Schultz, 210 Mich. 297, 178 N.W. 89 (1920); State
v. Dee, 14 Minn. 35 (1869); Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 81 (1876); 2 WIGMORE,
EvmENcE § 526, 580 (3d ed. 1940).
5. United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (9d Cir. 1959); State v. Indiana
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presumed answer lacks the sanction of oath and affords the accused no opportunity to cross-examine. Nevertheless, there is a
strong probability that a witness's invocation of the fifth amendment will be used by the jury for evidentiary purposes.7 Mitchell
raises for the first time in Minnesota the question of what consequences flow from this potentially prejudicial circumstance.
In cases where the privilege is invoked by a witness, one or
both of two reasons may exist for granting the defendant a
remedy: to protect him from prejudice," and to deter the prosecution from attempting to produce it.' To determine whether the
latter reason is applicable it must be established in each case
whether the prosecution knew when the witness was called that
he would invoke the privilege. If the prosecutor lacked knowledge, the only purpose for granting a remedy is to protect the
defendant's rights. Normally the prejudice is considered cured
by a cautionary admonition by the trial judge to the jury not
to use the witness's refusal as evidence of what his answer would
have been.' 0 However, an instruction to the jury to disregard an
inference is often futile because of the difficulty jurors may experience in disregarding material placed before them during trial.
Furthermore, such instruction might emphasize matter that
otherwise would have been ignored and also might suggest to
members of the jury inferences that had not previously occurred
to them." Thus, when the rights of the accused have in fact been
Mfrs. of Dairy Prods., 198 Ind. 288, 153 N.E. 499 (1926); June Fabrics v.

Teri Sue Fashions, 194 Misc. 267, 81 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
6. United States v. Maloney, supra note 5, at 537. See also 8 WiGMoRE,
EviENCE § 9272 n.9 (McNaughton rev. 1961): "If the witness's testimony,
rather than silence, were offered against the party, deprivation of an opportunity to cross-examine would entitle the party to have the testimony struck;
a similar result should follow 'when it is the witness' silence which is offered
probatively against the party."
7. United States v. Maloney, supra note 5.
8. Ibid.

.

9. The Mitchell Court said:
[Where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing
the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will
claim immunity, reversible error results. This must be so even though
it cannot be established that prejudice results. The objectionable conduct tends to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and
vitiates the conviction.
130 N.W.2d at 131. See also United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d
Cir. 1959); DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961).
10. United States v. Five Cases, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950); United
States v. Maloney, supra note 9, at 538.

11. "It is well enough to contrive artificial fictions for use by lawyers, but
to attempt to enlist the layman in the process of nullifying his own reason-

ing powers is merely futile, and tends toward confusion and a disrespect for
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substantially prejudiced, a cautionary instruction by the judge
would seem to be insufficient to remove the error, and a reversal
of the conviction ought to be required. 2
If it is found that the prosecutor did have pre-trial knowledge
that the witness would claim immunity, however, it becomes
relevant to determine the purpose for which the witness was
called. If the prosecutor has called the witness for an "offensive
purpose," i.e., to prejudice the defendant's case, reversible error
automatically results; this is necessary to deter prosecutors from
attempting to influence juries against defendants by such clearly
unwarranted means. 3 If, however, the prosecutor has called the
witness for a "defensive purpose," i.e., for some purpose other
than to arouse prejudice, a balance must be struck between the
interests of the State and those of the defendant.
One such "defensive" reason for calling the witness is that
failure to do so might cause the jury to infer that the witness's
testimony would have favored the accused.' In such case either
calling or failing to call the witness inevitably results in prejudice to one side or the other.'5 It would seem that in this situation the interest of the accused should prevail over that of the
prosecution. Hence, if the prosecution calls the witness solely
because of a fear that not to do so would give rise to an adverse
inference, the conviction should be reversed."'
The prosecutor also might wish to call the witness because
he fears that otherwise the defense will argue to the jury that
the failure to do so indicates that the testimony would have
favored the defense. In this case the State is tempted to act
solely in anticipation of the defense's attempt deliberately to
prejudice the State's case. In the federal courts and in all States
other than Minnesota this problem is easily solved. Since these
jurisdictions grant the prosecution the final word to the jury,"
the law's reasonableness." 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2272 (McNaughton rev.
1961). A cautionary instruction is neither necessary nor proper when not
requested by the defendant; the defendant should be permitted to waive the
instruction if he believes that the instruction may harm his case. United
States v. Maloney, supra note 9, at 539 (dissenting opinion).
12. Of. State v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 114 N.W.2d 267 (1962); State
v. Eames, 163 Minn. 249, 203 N.W. 769 (1925).
13. United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950); DeGesualdo v.
People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961). See the statement on this point
by the Court in Mitchell, quoted in note 9 supra.
14. United States v. Maloney, 262 F.d 535 (d Cir. 1959).

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

17. See Kunkel & Geis, Order of Final Argument in Minnesota Criminal
Trials, 42 Mum. L. REV. 549 (1958).
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it will always be possible to rebut any specious defense argument
as to the reasons for the State's failure to call the witness." In
Minnesota, however, the problem is complicated by the fact
that the defendant makes the final argument to the jury;" consequently the State is unable to rebut innuendos by the defense
in its closing argument. Hence, it would seem that in Minnesota
it is only fair to permit the prosecution to call the witness unless
some assurance can be given that defendant will not abuse his
procedural privilege.
There are at least two possible means by which this assurance
might be given. One is a pre-trial agreement between opposing
counsel2 0 in which the prosecution promises not to call the witness, and the defense in return agrees not to suggest to the jury
that the failure to call the witness indicates that his testimony
would be unfavorable to the prosecution. If opposing counsel fail
to reach such an agreement and defendant suggests in his closing
argument that the witness's testimony would have favored him,
or if agreement is reached and then breached by defendant
during his closing argument, the judge might still reveal to the
jury at the close of the trial that the witness was not called
because of pre-trial knowledge that he would claim the privilege
against self incrimination. 2 '
It would seem that, by means of a pre-trial agreement between opposing counsel or a post-trial instruction from the judge,
the prosecution can be given assurance that it will not be prejudiced by a reference in the defendant's closing argument to its
failure to call a witness. Hence, if the prosecutor, notwithstanding the availability of these devices, calls a witness with knowledge that he will probably invoke the fifth amendment, he could
not reasonably argue that his conduct was not designed to prejudice the defendant. Thus, the prosecutor would have created
reversible error per se within the Mitchell rule, notwithstanding
Minnesota's unusual criminal trial procedure.
18. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959).
19. MINN. STAT. § 631.07 (1961); see Kunkel & Geis, supra note 17, at
558.
20. This procedure was suggested by the Court in Mitchell. 130 N.W.2d
at 131-32.
21. See State v. Kline, 168 Minn. 263, 268, 209 N.W. 881, 882-83 (1926),
where the Court held that the trial judge's conduct in stopping a defendant's
line of argument based on a fallacious proposition was proper because "it is
the duty of the court not only to hold counsel in his argument to the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences therefrom, but also to an
accurate statement of the law upon which he wishes the jury to act."
(Emphasis supplied.) See also Kunkel & Geis, supra note 17.
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Ipsa Loquitur TO MUNICIPAL

In Quigley v. Village of Hibbing' the Minnesota Court held
that the trial judge must instruct the jury on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquiturwhere a municipality is sued for damages to abutting
private property caused by water escaping from a premature
break in a municipal water line. Plaintiffs' subbasement was
flooded by water escaping from the "service line" connecting the
water main to their building. The line consisted of a four inch
cast iron pipe laid in a municipal street approximately 40 years
prior to the break. Testimony indicated that the normal life
expectancy of such lines is 100 years, but there was no evidence
relating to the cause of the break.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur- "things speak for themselves" -originated in a casual phrase of Baron Pollock during
argument with counsel a century ago in a case in which a barrel
of flour rolled out of a warehouse window and fell upon a passing
pedestrian? Although it has since become the source of much
judicial confusion, it is essentially a species of circumstantial
evidence.3 Ordinarily the doctrine requires proof of three facts
from which the fact finder may infer that the defendant's negligence caused the damages in question: (1) the instrumentality
responsible for the damage was one which ordinarily does not
cause injury without negligence; (2) the defendant controlled it
when the alleged negligence occurred; and (3) the plaintiff was
not contributorily negligent.
The Court held that these three requisites had been established
in the Quigley case as a matter of law., It seems clear that this
was true with respect to the third; there was no indication that
plaintiff caused the damage.6 However, the propriety of the
Court's holding is much less obvious with respect to the first and
second. When these two elements are read together their purpose
seems evident; it is to require plaintiff to prove that occurrences
such as that in issue are ordinarily caused by the negligence of
parties in the position of defendant. Yet, the Court's discussion
of the second element in Quigley focused on the fact that the
city owned the street in which the pipe was laid and hence con1. 129 N.W.2d 765 (Minn. 1964).
2. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 729, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 216-17 (3d ed. 1964).
4. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (3d ed.
1964).

5. 19 N.W.2d at 768.

6. Id. at 769
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trolled access to the pipe.7 The Court emphasized that this
control vested power in the city to determine whether the pipe
should be uncovered in a search for evidence of the cause of the
break. It has frequently been said, although rarely held, that
greater accessibility of evidence to the defendant than the plaintiff is a requisite for the application of res ipsa.9 While the
plaintiff's relative ignorance of the cause of the injury in the
typical res ipsa case probably constitutes an argument for the
desirability of the doctrine, and undoubtedly has contributed to
the willingness of the courts to apply it, this factor should not
be given controlling significance.'o If the facts do not give rise
to a reasonable inference that defendant was negligent, "a plaintiff who has the burden of proof ... could scarcely make out a
case merely by proving that he knew less about the matter than
his adversary."" The better position, previously upheld by the
Minnesota Court,' is that the function of the second element of
res ipsa is not to determine the locus of physical "control," but
whether "the apparent cause of the accident [is] .

.

. such that

the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected
with it."" In Quigley, control in the latter sense seems absent.
For example, it is entirely possible that the break resulted from
negligence in the manufacture of the pipe which would not be
detectable by reasonable inspection 4 or from negligent transfers
of earth in the area which created a settlement problem.'
Evidence of the first element of res ipsa - that accidents of
this kind are likely to occur as a result of someone's negligence
- is even less clear in Quigley. The Court dealt with this matter
very summarily, simply pointing out that the pipe had broken
after the expiration of only 40 per cent of its normal life expectancy and surmising that this would not have occurred without
7. Id. at 768-69.
8. See id. at 769.
9. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 229 (3d ed. 1964).
10. Id. at 929-30.
11. Id. at 229.
12. The prerequisite of exclusive control seems to be based on the reason
that it precludes an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant
where the injury could have, with equal probability, been due to the
negligent conduct of the plaintiff or third parties.
Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 17, 99 N.W.2d 779,
781 (1959).
13. PROSSER, TORTS § 39, at 225 (3d ed. 1964).
14. Of. Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Kansas City, 316 S.W.2d 594, 600-01
(1o. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
15. There was some evidence "that fill used in the area where plaintiffs'
hotel was located and other soil conditions created a settlement problem."
129 N.W.2d at 770.
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the application of some "extraordinary force" or negligence."
Where the instrumentality and the manner in which it causes
damage are relatively simple and commonplace, such as a falling
object, the jury is permitted to rely on experience and common
sense and understanding in determining whether the event in
question is unlikely to occur without negligence.?7 However,
where the instrumentality and event are complex and beyond
the understanding of the ordinary man, expert testimony ordinarily must be introduced by the plaintiff to prove satisfaction
of this element of the doctrine."' Yet some courts have found it
to be satisfied without expert testimony in relatively complex
cases where it would seem to be essential. 9 Two authorities suggest that this liberalization reflects a trend toward strict liability,
a judicial belief that technological improvement has made methods and machinery "foolproof" when handled with care, and a
feeling on the part of judges that they possess special technical
competence.2 o
A water main break is a more complex and unfamiliar matter
16. 129 N.W.2d at 768.
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 221 (Sd ed. 1964). For example, it is a matter
of common knowledge that more often than not the swerving of a car off
the highway is attributable to negligence, Worsham v. Duke, 220 F.2d 506
(6th Cir. 1955), and that human toes do not get into chewing tobacco unless
someone has been negligent in the process of preparation or packaging, Pillars
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 865 (1918).
18. Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1962) (medical); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522
(1949) (beer bottle exploded); Baker v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d
221, 252 P.2d 24 (1958) (tire exploded while being mounted); Buffums' v.
City of Long Beach, Ill Cal. App. 327, 295 Pac. 540 (1931) (broken water
main); Hanaman v. New York Tel. Co., 278 App. Div. 875, 104 N.Y.S.ed
315, appeal denied, 278 App. Div. 986, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1951) (escape of
current from telephone); Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. City of Portland, 34 Ore.
282, 55 Pac. 961 (1899) (broken water main); McCray v. Galveston, H. &
S.A. Ry., 89 Tex. 168, 34 S.W. 95 (1896) (steel rails falling off); Fehrman v.
Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255, rehearing denied, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 122
N.W.2d 439 (1963) (medical); see Fricke, The Use of Expert Evidence in Res
Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 5 Vmrx. L. REV. 59 (1959); Note, 106 U. PA. L. REV.
731 (1958).
19. See 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTs § 19.5, at 1079-82 (1956); Fricke, supra
note 18, at 60; of. Morris, Res Ipsa Loquiturin Texas, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 257,
260 (1948). However, it remains true that a court is more likely to assume the
postulate in a simple case where most people would have common knowledge
on the subject (such as falling objects) than it would in a technical case
where ordinarily only an expert would have the necessary knowledge. See
Morris, supra at 262.
20. 2 HAPER & JAAm, ToRTs § 19.5, at 1080 & n.17 (1956). The Court
in Quigley considered the rule of absolute liability for the release of collected
waters, though plaintiffs had not urged its application to this case. It con-
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than the falling of a barrel from a window. It seems inconceivable
that, without the aid of expert testimony, a lay jury would possess such familiarity with water mains and the hazards to which
they are exposed to be sufficiently competent to infer from a
break that it was caused by the negligence of a municipality.
Hence, to reach the jury on a res ipsa theory, the plaintiffs in
Quigley should have been required to produce testimony tending
to show that premature breaks are more often than not caused
by municipal negligence. 21
It is true that the Court was able to cite other cases which
have applied res ipsa to water main breaks? 2 However, in two
of these cases there was expert testimony as to the probability
that injury arose from the defendant's negligence?" The other
decisions would appear to be unwise. If, as seems likely, the
ordinary man knows little or nothing of water pipe or its installation, it is absurd to permit him to infer from the fact that a
municipal water pipe breaks long before the end of its anticipated
useful life that the break resulted from the negligence of the municipality?' If the Court intends to require a showing of negligence
cluded that it was "not now prepared to extend the doctrine of absolute
liability for escaping waters" to cases in which the escape was not from a
reservoir or a principal main so connected to the reservoir as to be "in effect,
a part of the reservoir itself." 129 N.W.2d at 767.
21. In the following cases such expert testimony was introduced: E.g.,
Ford v. District of Columbia, 190 A.2d 905 (D.C. 1963); Goldman v. City of
Boston, 274 Mass. 329, 174, N.E. 686 (1931); Fanning v. Town of Montclair,
81 NJ. Super. 481, 196 A.d 18 (App. Div. 1963); Republic Light & Furniture
Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 97 Ohio App. 532, 127 N.E.2d 767 (1954).
22. The Court cited Buffums' v. City of Long Beach, iII Cal. App. 327,
295 Pac. 540 (1931); Fine v. Mayor & -Council, 47 Del. 539, 94 A.2d 393 (1953);
C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corp., 84 Idaho 355, 372 P.2d 752
(1962); George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d
455 (1941); Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. City of Portland, 34 Ore. 282, 55 Pac.
961 (1899); Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 69 S.D. 343, 10 N.W.2d 701
(1943); Kind v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 485, 312 P.d 811 (1957); see
Quigley, 199 N.W.2d at 769 n.3.
23. Buffums' v. City of Long Beach, and C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v.
Boise Water Corp., supra note 22.
24. It is even arguable that where a break occurs after the expiration of
40 per cent of the anticipated useful life, the likelihood of its being caused by
the municipality's negligence is at a minimum. The fact that the pipe has
lasted so long may indicate that the break was not due to an original defect
which would have been discovered by a reasonable inspection before the pipe
was laid, or to the manner in which the pipe was laid. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.
v. Kansas City, 316 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Mo. 1958) (dissenting opinion). On
the other hand, the fact that pipe is quite young relative to its life expectancy
indicates that the city was under no duty to uncover and inspect it in the
absence of some warning that it had shifted or deteriorated. Ibid.
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to obtain recovery,"- it ought, in matters as complex as these, to
impose upon plaintiffs an obligation to supply evidence tending
to establish the likelihood that the events are caused by the defendant's negligence. To do otherwise is to give the jury a free
rein for speculation.

IV. FAMILY LAW
A.

DIVORCED
ABSENCE
RIGHTS

PARENT'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION REQUIRED IN
OF TOTAL EXTINGUISHMENT OF HIS PARENTAL

The adoption of a child ordinarily requires the consent of his
natural parents.' However, the Minnesota adoption statute provides that consent is not required of a parent who has "lost
custody" of the child through a divorce decree? Taken literally
this exception seems to evidence a clear legislative intent to dispense with consent to adoption of all cases involving a preferential
award of custody. However, the Minnesota Court in In re Parks'
refused to equate "loss of custody" with deprivation of preferential custody, seemingly because such a construction would conflict
with basic policies underling custody and adoption.
In Parks, the divorced parents had stipulated to a custody
agreement, which was then incorporated into the divorce decree.
The agreement provided that the father was to have custody of
the child subject to the right of the mother to have him two
days a month until he reached school age, and thereafter, in
addition, to "have him in her custody" for one month a year during summer vacations.4 Both parents subsequently remarried
and the child's stepmother, with the father's consent, initiated
these adoption proceedings. The natural mother sought to veto
the adoption by withholding her consent. The juvenile court
ruled, however, that the divorce decree granted the mother only
"visitation rights," with the result that she had lost custody
within the meaning of the statute and consequently was powerless to prevent the adoption by withholding her consent. On appeal, the Minnesota Court reversed, holding that the statute
dispenses with the necessity of parental consent only in those
cases where custody is granted exclusively to one parent and the
right of custody in the other parent is "lost, forfeited or extinguished."
25. Compare note 20 supra.
1. Mar. STAT. 5 259.24 (1961).
2. MaNN. STAT. & 259.24(1)(b) (1961).
8. 127 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1964).
4. Id. at 551.
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Conceivably Parks could have been decided solely on the basis
of the express provision in the custody stipulation for partial
custody in the child's mother. This provision would seem to have
negated any contention that the parties intended to terminate
the mother's parental rights. However, the Court also thought
it necessary to determine whether the mother's conduct subsequent to the divorce evidenced parental unfitness.5 Since she had
in no way neglected or mistreated the child," the Court held that
no forfeiture of her right to withhold consent had occurred and,
therefore, consent to adoption was still required.7
The difficulty with the Parks holding is that it manifests judicial disregard for the apparent meaning of the statute.8 The
5. Parental unfitness would result, in most instances, from a showing of
abandonment or practical abandonment because of a failure to exercise visitation rights, maltreatment of the child during visitation rights, or similar action
or inaction evidencing an abuse or neglect of parental rights and obligations.
See, e.g., In re Jordet, 248 Minn. 443, 80 N.W.2d 642 (1957); In re Jaren, 223
Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947).
6. Not only was there no imputation of unfitness, maltreatment, or neglect
of the child on the part of the mother, 'but at one point she went to the
extreme of procurring a court order requiring her ex-husband's mother to
permit visitation. 127 N.W.2d at 555 & n.12.
7. The Court cited two earlier Minnesota cases as examples of situations
in which the conduct of the non-custodial parent, subsequent to divorce,
terminated his power to veto adoption. In In re Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 27
N.W.2d 656 (1947), the father died when the child was an infant, and the
child was adopted by her stepfather. Upon the divorce of the mother and
stepfather, the -former was found to be unfit and custody was granted to the
latter. After the divorce the mother and stepfather continued to cohabit and
at their final separation the stepfather voluntarily yielded custody to the
mother. Subsequently the Court found that both parents were unfit, and the
child was placed in the legal custody of her paternal aunt and uncle. In In
re Jordet, 248 Minn. 433, 80 N.W.2d 642 (1957), the child's parents had been
divorced and custody of the child granted to the father. Subsequently they
remarried and again were divorced and the mother was granted custody of
the child while the father was given the right of visitation and required to
make support payments. The Court found that the father had failed to exercise his right of visitation or make his support payments regularly.
The Court in Parks explained Jaren as a case in which the father's right
to custody had been extinguished or lost through a modification of the divorce
decree, and Jordet as an example of the rule that a parent may forfeit his
right to custody by misconduct subsequent to divorce, even though the
decree granting visitation rights is not modified prior to the adoption proceedings. 127 N.W.2d at 552-53.
8. But see In re Jordet, supra note 7 (Thomas Gallagher, J., dissenting):
A reasonable construction of § 259.24, subd. 1(b), [the statutory
provision dispensing with the consent of a parent who has "lost custody" through a divorce decree] would not seem to require a determination that, when there has been an award of a child's custody to
one parent in a divorce proceeding, and such award has been made
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legislative history of the provision, dispensing with the consent
to adoption of a parent who has lost custody through a divorce
decree, reveals that it was re-enacted despite the recommendation
of an interim legislative commission to delete it, and thereby
require the consent of the natural parents, not otherwise incapacitated, in all cases except abandonment.9 Thus it is evident
that the legislature intended, at the very least, to dispense with
the necessity of consent in some circumstances arising out of
divorce. Giving the statute its broadest interpretation, it is arguable that it intended that a mere preferential award of custody
to one parent would effect a "loss of custody" in the other, notwithstanding the reservation of certain parental rights in the
latter. This construction would favor the strengthening of the
stepparent-child relationship by facilitating its transformation
into a new parent-child relationship and thereby solidifying the
new family unit.' In addition, in the majority of divorce cases
the father is the non-custodial parent," and his reserved parental
rights will commonly be forfeited by his failure to exercise them.'Therefore, permitting adoption without his consent would frustrate the use of his veto power to bargain for the reduction or
elimination of his alimony payments. 3
However, the Court in Parks rejected this broad interpretation on the basis of a consideration of the nature of a custody
contingent upon reasonable visitation rights being accorded to the other
parent, such award is absolute to the extent of compelling a finding
that thereafter the necessity of obtaining the written consent of the
latter parent in subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child
was thereby eliminated. To hold thus is to effectuate a means whereby
a parent, bearing a deep love for a child and without serious fault,
is forever cut off from the child merely because of an act of compromise or kindness, consent has been given to an award of the child's
custody to the other parent. I do not believe the legislature intended
that § 259.24, subd. 1(b), he given fsuch a harsh and arbitrary effect.
This seems to be particularly true when it is recalled that by virtue
of § 518.18 an award of custody in divorce proceedings is never regarded as final and may at any time be modified when a child's best
interest would so require.
9. MINN. INTERIM CoMlM'N ON DOMESTIC RELATIONs PROBLEArs, REPORT
37-38 (1951).
10. Adoption would permit the child to have the same surname as the
family with which he resides. It would also render the child eligible to inherit
from the former stepparent, should the latter die intestate. Most important,
perhaps, adoption would place full responsibility for the child's well being
and upbringing on the adults with whom he resides, rather than leaving him
somewhat dependent upon the absent parent.
11. GOODE, AFTER

12. Id. at 165.
is. Id. at 162.

DivoRcE

311-12 (1956).
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decree. Ordinarily a preferential award of custody reflects solely
a determination of which parent can better care for the child.?'
It is a rare case where a parent is found unfit to retain his parental
rights. In any event, however, the custody decree is effective only
as between the parents" and is always subject to subsequent
modification or revision to promote the best interests of the
child.'6 Therefore, a preferential award of custody, without more,
does not operate to extinguish all parental rights of the noncustodial parent.17 This result is consistent with the traditional
view that a parent has an inherent right to the services and companionship of his child unless he is shown to be unfit.' 8 It is this
basic policy which led the Parks Court to construe the statute
narrowly and to hold that where the non-custodial parent was
not stripped of all his parental rights and did not forfeit them by
subsequent action or inaction demonstrating unfitness, the legislature did not intend that these rights be extinguished without
his consent."'
This interpretation of the legislative intent virtually nullifies
any policy favoring the availability of adoption to stepparents.
Nevertheless, the Parks Court did not abuse its power in reaching
this result. The legislature failed to define adequately "loss of
custody," or to articulate a distinction between "custody" and
parental rights, if such distinction was contemplatedVo In addition, the other provisions of the statute dispensing with the necessity of parental consent arguably require a practical severance
14. In re Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 569, 27 N.W.2d 656, 661 (1947). See also
In re Anderson, 235 Minn. 192, 50 N.W.2d 278 (1951).
15. Kienlen v. Kienlen, 297 Minn. 137, 34 N.W.2d 351 (1948).
16. Mmiw. STAT. § 518.18 (1961).
17. A custody decree, therefore, must be distinguished from an adoption
decree, where the result is conclusive and operates to divest a natural parent
of all parental rights. In re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816 (1918).
18. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); In re Anderson,
235 Minn. 192, 50 N.W.2d 278 (1951); Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188
N.W. 613 (1922). In Parks, the Court stated that "where there is a failure
of expression or an ambiguity of expression, it is reasonable that construction
favor the preservation of parental rights inherent in the parent-child relationship." 197 N.W.2d at 554.
19. For a thorough compilation of cases in other jurisdictions which have
reached a similar result, and their reasons for doing so, see Simpson, The

Unfit Parent. Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without
the Consent of His Parent,39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962).
20. The consent provision is based on the talismanic word "custody."
However, there is no adequate definition of this word by the legislature. In
order to have any meaningful effect with regard to the consent statute, the
legislature must elucidate whether "custody" requires continuous possession
of the child and for what period of time, i.e., a day and a night per month,
a week, three months, etc.
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of all parental rights' Finally, the paramount consideration of
a court in any adoption proceeding is to resolve any conflict in
such a manner as to advance the best interests of the child." Due
to the unique circumstances of each case, it is necessary that the
Court be free to employ judicial discretion in order to promote
the child's welfare. In Parks, for instance, the Court was
aware that the child's father was unemployed, had four
other children, was totally disabled by a malignant brain
tumor,2 3 and that his death was imminent. Upon his death the
custody of the child would automatically revert to the remaining
natural parent, unless unfit?' As a result, if the Court had held
that the mother had lost the right to veto adoption, it would
have effectively severed the child's relationship with both of his
natural parents. Because of the vagueness of the statute the
Court was able to render a decision which it believed was in the
best interest of the child.
V. INSURANCE

A.

LOADING AND UNLOADING CLAUSES IN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE PoLIcIEs Givaw BROAD CONSTRUCTION

In State Auto. & Cas. Underwritersv. Casualty Underwriters,
Inc.,' the Minnesota Court determined that the unloading of a
truck, for purposes of automobile liability insurance coverage
under a "loading and unloading" clause,2 does not cease until the
truckdriver turns over the merchandise to someone else or commences an operation separate and distinct from the ordinary
incidents of unloading?

21. MmA. STAT. § 259.24 (1961) abrogates the necessity of parental consent in several situations: where the adoptee is an adult, subd. 4; where the
parent is the father of an illegitimate child, subd. 1(a); where the parent
is adjudged insane or incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, subd.
1(d); and where the parent has lost custody of the child through a prior
adoption decree or through a final commitment by the juvenile court declaring the child neglected or dependant, subd. 1(c).
2. See Simpson, supra note 19, at 380.
23. 127 N.W.2d at 551 n.2.
24. See Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 84 N.W.2d 351 (1948).
1. 266 Minn. 536, 124 N.W.ed 185 (1963).
2. "Loading and unloading" clauses generally provide that the loading
and unloading of the insured's vehicle shall be deemed a "use" of it. The
policy insures against liability for injury arising from "use" of the vehicle.
3. This test was subsequently applied to loading situations in Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M.R.R. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 129 N.W.2d 777
(Minn. 1964). The Court there stated that "the pertinent question is whether
the cause of the accident was a hazard occasioned while . . . [the truckdriverl
was in control of the crate incident to loading it onto the truck." Id. at 785.
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The truckdriver had parked and entered the consignee cafe
to inform the owner of the arrival of his shipment. The owner
instructed an employee to unlock a trapdoor in the sidewalk to
receive the merchandise. While the truckdriver rearranged the
merchandise intended for the cafe, the employee attempted to
open the trapdoor from below, although this was normally done
by the driver from above.' As a result a woman walking over the
trapdoor fell and was injured. On appeal from a declaratory judgment that the accident was not covered by the policy, the Court
reversed, holding that plaintiff, the trucking company's insurer,
was liable under the loading and unloading clause.
Generally the cases dealing with loading and unloading clauses
have been categorized as adopting either the "coming to rest"
or the "complete operation" doctrine.6 Under the generally disfavored coming to rest doctrine, unloading continues until the
goods are set down outside the vehicle. Under the complete operation doctrine, unloading continues until the goods are delivered
to the intended party.7 A finding of liability under either theory'
4. According to the testimony of the truck driver in -the instant case,
. the chutes are never opened from below. The driver always opened the
chute from the top, never from below." 266 Minn. at 588, 124 N.W.2d at 186.
5. Annot., 95 AL.R.ad 1122, 1126 & n.14 (1964); Annot., 160 AL.R. 1259,
1264-72 (1946); see Risjord, Loading and Unloading, 13 VAxm. L. REv. 903
(1960) (an evaluation and comparison of the cases arising in this area).
6. It appears that this doctrine first arose in Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226
Wis. 348, 976 N.W. 629 (1937). The court there stated:
When the goods have been taken off the automobile and have actually
come to rest, when the automobile itself is no longer connected with
the process of unloading, and when the material which has been
unloaded from the automobile has plainly started on its course to be
delivered by other power and lorces independent of the automobile
and the actual method of unloading, the -automobile then may be said
to be no longer in use.
Id. at 352-53, 276 N.W. at 631.
For related definitions of this doctrine and for a discussion of cases invoking
this doctrine, see Magarick, Loading and Unloading Under the Standard
Automobile Policy, 67 DICK. L. REv. 257, 258-59 (1963); 13 SYRAcusE L. REV.
573 (1962); Annot., 95 AL.R. 2d 1122 (1964); Annot., 160 AL.R. 1259 (1946).
7. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 161
P.2d 423 (1945). For further definitions and illustrations of this doctrine see
the authorities cited in note 6 supra.
8. It has been suggested that some cases do not readily fall into these
two categories. However, courts 'have increasingly found liability under the
loading and unloading clauses by extending the complete operation doctrine
beyond its natural boundaries. "It is now popular to embrace the entire
'completed operation,' even if quite removed from the vehicle itself." 7 APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW Am PRAcTIcE § 4322, at 162 (1963). In Raffel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Conn. 389, 106 A.2d 716 (1954), a large roll of linoleum had
been deposited on a customer's front porch. The customer was to use as
..
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requires that the accident in question have some causal connection with the "unloading" as defined by that theory.'
Though the Court rejected the "coming to rest" doctrine,"o
the facts may not have required it to do so. Certainly unloading
had commenced." If this doctrine represents an attempt to limit
liability to accidents resulting from the act of taking goods from
a vehicle, its application would not have resulted in liability in
the Casualty Underwriterscase, and the Court would have needed
to reject it to reach its result. However, no case has been found
that construes the doctrine this restrictively. 2 On the other hand
the doctrine may establish a strict time limit for liability. Thus,
liability would exist when the accident results from any hazard
created by the unloading process and occurs no later than the
moment at which the goods are set down, as in Casualty Underwriters.' If so, the Court's repudiation of it was unnecessary.
The Court, however, appears to view the coming to rest doctrine
as establishing liability in accidents caused by activities necessary
to get the goods to the point where they would normally be set
much of the linoleum as needed and the rest was to have been picked up by
the insured. A child was injured when the linoleum fell off the porch. The
court held there was liability under the loading and unloading clause, although
as a theoretical matter ". . . . even under the 'complete operation' doctrine,

the unloading ceased when the linoleum was turned over to the customer the next step with respect to it was . . . [the customer's]." Brown & Risjord,
Loading and Unloading: The Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29
INs. CouNsEm J. 197, 201 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Red Ball Motor Freight v. Employers Mut., 189 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1951); Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1948).
An injury resulting from faulty premises rather than the unloading operation
lacks the requisite causal relation. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.
Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 43, 181 N.E.2d 191 (1962). It was held that there
was no liability under a loading and unloading clause where a boy was struck
by a foul ball at a picnic while waiting in line to get ice cream from one of
the insured's trucks. Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wash. 2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941).
See generally Magarick, supra note 6, at 260; Witherspoon, What Protection
Is Afforded Under Loading and Unloading Clauses? 59 Com. L.J. (1954).
10. 266 Minn. at 544, 194 N.W.2d at 190. In the subsequent case of St.
P. & S. Ste. M.R.R. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 199 N.W.2d 777, 785
(Minn. 1964), the Court stated that "in State Auto & Cas. Underwriters v.
Casualty Underwriters . .. we expressly rejected the so-called 'at rest' doctrine
as a standard for determining whether an unloading operation was ceased."
11. The Court stated that "... unloading had commenced when . .. [the
truckdriver] stopped his truck and began the necessary preparations of physically moving the merchandise." 266 Minn. at 539, 124 N.W.2d at 187.
12. See Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500,
504, 161 P.2d 423, 425 (1945); Annot., 160 AL.R. 1259, 1264 (1946).
18. Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W. 629 (1937).
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down. ' In applying this view of the coming to rest doctrine to
the facts in the Casualty Underwriterscase, liability would turn
on whether the nature of the goods required that they be set down
before they reached the trapdoor." Since the opinion does not
indicate the type of goods involved, it is impossible to determine
whether the Court's rejection of the coming to rest doctrine is
dictum. In any event, the Court's position concerning the coming
to rest doctrine is clear. If Minnesota followed it in the past and the Court denies it did -it will not do so in the future.' 6
Though the Court clearly intended to give a broad interpretation to the loading and unloading clause, it did not explicitly
adopt the "complete operation" doctrine. Instead, it said that
liability would not be found if the accident occurred after the
driver commenced an act ". . . separate and apart from that ordinarily incident to the process of unloading... ."' Thus, the Court

indicates that in some situations "unloading" may cease before
delivery, which is not possible under the complete operation doctrine.'8
The Court discussed Franklin Co-op. Creamery Ass'n v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.'9 and St. PaulMercury Indem. Co. v.
StandardAce. Ins. Coo to illustrate the meaning of an act "separate and apart" from unloading. In Franklin Co-op. a milkman
injured an occupant of the building in which he was making his
rounds. The Court found no liability under a loading and unloading clause on the ground that the accident occurred after the
milkman had ceased unloading and had begun the distinct process
14. The Court stated, in rejecting the coming to rest doctrine, that "the
weight and nature of the article and the probability that it may momentarily
be rested on the ground before final delivery are circumstances which are too
tenuous to form the basis of liability." 966 Minn. at 544, 124 N.W.2d at 190.
15. If the goods were of a nature that require being set down, no liability
would arise from collateral activities, such as the opening of the sidewalk
trapdoor.
16. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 216 Minn.
103, 11 N.W.2d 794 (1948); Franklin Co-op. Creamery Ass'n v. Employers'
Liab. Assur. Corp., 200 Minn. 930, 278 N.W. 809 (1937). The Court in the
former case pointed out that "the goods . . . were first brought to rest by
depositing them on the sidewalk . . . ." 216 Minn. at 109, 11 N.W.2d at
796-97. This would seem to indicate that the Court, at least previously, had
leaned toward acceptance of the coming to rest doctrine rather than the
complete operation doctrine notwithstanding its disavowals in the instant
case. See 266 Minn. at 542, 124 N.W.2d at 189.
17. Id. at 544, 124 N.W.2d at 190.
18. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
19. 200 Minn. 280, 278 N.W. 809 (1937).
20. 216 Minn. 108, 11 N.W.2d 794 (1943).
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of retail distribution?1 In St. PaulMercury the accident occurred
after drivers had turned over office furniture to a separate crew
charged with taking the goods into the building. No liability was
found because the accident resulted from "delivery subsequent
to unloading." 22
The Court's rejection of both the orthodox doctrines would
seem to be proper. Generally, interpretation of a loading and
unloading clause involves the allocation of the various risks of
commercial activity among insurers. The problem of allocating
risk is more directly confronted by seeking to determine if the
accident resulted from something fairly characterized as "unloading" in light of the parties' intent and normal business practice.2
The artificial lines drawn by the "coming to rest" and "complete
operation" doctrines serve only to divert attention from this task.
The negligence causing the accident in Casualty Underwriters
appears to have been attributable to the cafe employee. Thus, to
find plaintiff liable the Court should have found that the cafe
employee was an additional insured under the policy. However,
once it determined that the accident resulted from unloading,
the Court did not deal explicitly with the question whether the
cafe employee was covered by the policy. It merely concluded
that it was immaterial whether the truck driver or the cafe employee opened the trapdoor. Therefore, the Court must have
found that the cafe employee was covered by the policy, possibly
because of the presence of an omnibus clause. Thus, the decision
indicates that incorporation of a loading and unloading clause
in an automobile liability insurance policy may expand the scope
of risks covered by the policy beyond those arising from the
operation of the truck and the conduct of its driver?'
21. Arguably, the delivery had been completed when the milkman loaded
his milk container to enter the -building. Under this analysis the recipient
would be the milkman, who delivered to himself as a retail distributor. Thus
there would be no liability even under the "complete operation" doctrine.
22. 216 Minn. at 110, 11 N.W.2d at 797. It is arguable that unloading
and delivery had both been completed under any theory as the accident did
not take place until the goods involved had been turned over from the truck
crew to a different crew. However, the St. Paul Mercury Court did not find
that delivery had been completed.
2s. Note, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 102, 104 (1964).
24. The Court stated that the liability of the automobile insurer was not
avoided because the trapdoor was opened by the cafe employee rather than
the truckdriver. 266 Minn. at 544, 124 N.W.2d at 190. In support of this
proposition it cited Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp.
197 (D. Minn. 1954). The court pointed out in Bituminous that by defining
"use" to include loading and unloading, and incorporating an omnibus clause
defining the "insured" to include any person "using" the vehicle with the
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If compensation of the injured party were dependent on the
outcome, liberal construction of the loading and unloading clause
might be justified as ipso facto socially desirable. However, when
the construction of the clause determines only which insurer
should recompense the injured party, the considerations may be
different. A superficial glance might indicate that injuries caused
by cafe employees ought to be allocated to the cafe business,
and consequently that unloading ought to receive a narrow construction. The difficulty, as the Court indicates, is that it was
not entirely clear whether the cafe owner's general liability policy
covered the cafe employees as additional insureds." Thus, a contrary decision might have deprived the cafe employee of insurance
coverage to protect him from an indemnity claim brought against
him by his employer's general liability insurer. Therefore, because
of the less comprehensive coverage afforded by general liability
policies, the Court's decision seems desirable as a means of maximizing the insurance coverage of employees. Since the expanded
burden to be assumed by automobile liability insurers has been
made clear, they may seek to induce the general liability insurers
to assume this burden by deleting the loading and unloading
clause, or to shift it to its insureds by making rate adjustments.
VI. TORTS
A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN AcTIoN
SE WITHoUT PRoor oF AcTuAL DAMAGES

FoR

LiBEL PER

In a libel action, after being instructed by the trial court that
the publication was libelous per se, the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff, assessing actual damages at "$0" and exemplary
damages at $5,000. The trial court then granted defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, apparently on
owner's consent, the policy coverage is extended to persons causing injury
in the course of participation in loading and unloading of the vehicle even
though there is no causal relation between the truck or its operator and the
injury. Id. at -00. Thus, the Minnesota Court seems to suggest in Casualty
Underwriters that there was an omnibus clause in the automobile liability
insurance policy which, in conjunction with the loading and unloading clause,
extended the protection of the policy to anyone who incurs liability for his
negligence during the unloading process.
These results seem to constitute a departure from the suggestion of one
writer that ". . . the 'loading and unloading' clause made for good reading
in selling policies to the public but . .. [was intended to add] nothing to the
coverage." Mauts, The Loading and Unloading Clause, 27 Ixs. CouNsEL J.
150 (1960).
25. 266 Minn. at 538, 124 N.W.2d at 187.
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the ground that punitive damages are not recoverable in the
absence of actual damages. The Minnesota Court reversed and
held in Loftsgaarden v. Reiling that in actions for libel per se
punitive damages are recoverable without proof of actual
damages.
At common law any libel was presumed injurious; hence the
plaintiff did not need to plead or prove special damages to sustain
his action.? On the other hand, the plaintiff was relieved of this
burden with respect to only certain types of slander, denominated
slander per se? Although a few states4 and the Restatement of
Torts' have adhered to the law in this form, most American jurisdictions have modified it. Generally, where the libel is defamatory
on its face, special damages still need not be proved. However,
where a showing of extrinsic facts is necessary to prove libel, special damages must be pleaded and proved unless the content of the
libel is within, one of the four categories of slander per se.' The
result of this development is a new creature of the law - "libel
per se" - which refers both to words defamatory on their face
and,to words within the four categories of slander per se.T
It has generally been held that some finding of actual damages
is necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages." However,
courts have permitted recovery of substantial punitive damages
where compensatory or actual damages were only nominal,9 particularly in defamation actions.0 o This position has found support
1. 126 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1964), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L. WEE= 8129 (US.
Oct. 13, 1964), 40 N.D.L. REv. 834 (1964).
2. ODGERS, LIBEL & SNrmmEw 9, 377 (5th ed. 1911); PoLocK, ToRTS 178
(15th ed. 1951).
3. Id. at 177-78. Slander per se includes words that (1) impute the commission of a crime; (2) impute a loathsome disease; .(3) disparage the manner
of conducting a trade, profession, or business; or (4) impute unchastity to a
woman. ODGERs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2, 877.
4. Jurisdictions which continue to adhere to this rule are the United
States, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Texas. See Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rav. 839, 847-48 (1960).
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 569 (1989).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. See I HARPER & JABES, TORTs § 5.9, at 378-74 n.9 (1956); PRosSRm,
ToRTs J 107, at 782 (3d ed. 1964); Henn, Libel by Extrinsic Fact,47 CoRNEiL
L.Q. 14 (1961); Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 18 Mmx.
L. REv. 21, 26 (1928).
8. PRoSsER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 2, at 13; 17 AIL.R.9d 527 (1951).
9. See cases cited id. at 542-44. Contra, cases cited id. at 544-45.
10. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (1954), aff'd, 223 F.d 429 (1955)
'($175,000 exemplary, $1 actual); Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. Rd 161, 217
P.Sd 19 (1950); Hess v. News Syndicate Co., 180 Misc. 298, 42 N.Y.S.2d 297
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among legal scholars," who have argued that one of the objectives
of punitive damages is to provide incentive for plaintiffs to seek
judicial redress for "a long array of petty cases of outrage and oppression."12 Since these are precisely the cases where actual damages are likely to be nominal, it seems logical to permit punitive
damages to accompany nominal actual damages."
A number of courts have suggested that punitive damages are
recoverable without proof of actual damages in actions founded
on libel per se because of the presumption in such cases that the
plaintiff has been injured.' 4 The present case, however, appears
to be virtually unprecedented in allowing an award of punitive
damages where the jury has made an explicit finding of no actual
damage. 5
(Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 267 App. Div. 886, 47 N.Y.S.ed 584 (1943)
($12,000 exemplary, six cents actual); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore.
482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941). Perhaps one reason for this result is that often the
plaintiff, in protecting himself against the defense of truth, must point to his
character in such glowing colors that the jury concludes that no libel could
possibly injure him. This was recognized in Reynolds v. Pegler, supra, where
the court said that limiting punitive damages in a libel action to an amount
approximating actual damages "would require punitive damages to be determined in inverse ratio to the reputation of the one defamed." 123 F. Supp.
at 88. At the same time, the more irreproachable the plaintiffs reputation
becomes in the eyes of the jury, the more heinous the defendant's libel appears,
and hence the greater the award of punitive damages. For a graphic illustration
of this phenomenon, see the account by the plaintiff's counsel in the Reynolds
case, supra,in NIZER, My LiFE DT COURT (1961).
11. McCoRMucK, DAMAGEs § 83, at 293 (1935); PRossER, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 2, at 13; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 908 (1939).
12. PRossER, op. cit. supranote 7, § 2, at 11.
18. Id. at 13.
14. See cases cited in Annot., 17 AL.R.2d 527, 545-46 (1951).
15. A number of non-libel cases have denied the recovery of punitive
damages where the absence of actual damage has explicitly been found. E.g.,
Mother Cobb's Chicken Turnovers, Inc. v. Fox, 10 Cal. 2d 203, 73 P.2d 1185
(1937) (unfair competition); Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 730, 48 P.2d
709 (1935) (slander); Livingston v. Utah-Colorado Land & Livestock Co.,
106 Colo. 278, 103 P.2d 684 (1940) (trespass); Behymer v. Millgrain Food
Stores, Inc., 151 Kan. 921, 101 P.2d 912 (1940) (assault and battery); Gilham
v. Devereaux, 67 Mont. 75, 214 Pac. 606 (1923) (criminal conversation and
alienation of affections).
In several jurisdictions holdings or dicta in accord with the Loftsgaarden
case have been contradicted by later decisions. Compare Purifoy v. Central
of Georgia Ry., 218 Ala. 11, 117 So. 466 (1928) (damages for failure of train
to pick up passengers), with Mobile Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Odom, 232 Ala.
19, 166 So. 698 (1936) (fraud). Compare Scalise v. National Util. Serv., Inc.,
120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941) (unfair competition) (applying Florida law), with
McClain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So. 2d 221 (1943) (assault
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The implications of Loftsgaarden are beclouded by the uncertain meaning of "libel per se" under Minnesota law. Most of
the cases indicate that it refers to words which are defamatory
on their face." A few indicate that it means libel which falls
within the four categories of slander per se.1r In either case it is
actionable without proof of special damages. However, Minnesota also appears to be one of the few states following the
common-law-Restatement rule that all libel is actionable without
such proof.'5
The language of the opinion suggests that the basis for holding that punitive damages are recoverable in libel per se cases
no matter what the jury finds with respect to actual damages
may be the existence in such actions of a conclusive presumption
of actual damages. 9 Since Minnesota has traditionally held that
any action for libel may be sustained without proof of special
and battery). Compare Gaines v. Gaines, 109 Ill. App. 226 (1903) (libel), sith
Reeda v. Tribune Co., 218 Ill. App. 45 (1920) (action for omission of candidate's name from sample ballot).
In Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512 (1930) (conversion),
often cited for the proposition that punitive damages can be awarded in the
absence of actual damages, replevin and nominal actual damages had already
been awarded in a prior action.
In Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420 (1949) (action
for malicious prosecution), an award of exemplary damages was sustained
where the jury found no actual damages, but the decision is based on the
court's belief that this was merely an error in form by a jury that had never
been instructed as to the difference between compensatory and punitive
damages. In accord with the Fauver case is Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279,
9 Pahd 505 (1939) (libel; actual damages in blank), cited by the Court in the
instant case.
16. Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Ass'n, 286 Minn. 507, 53 N.W.ad
230 (1952); Morey v. Barnes, 212 Minn. 153, 2 N.W.2d 829 (1942); Echternacht v. King, 194 Minn. 92, 259 N.W. 684 (1935); Ten Broeck v. Journal
Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N.W. 497 (1926).
17. See Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 115 N.W.ad 259, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41, 14 N.W.
62 (1882), 32 Minn. 217, 18 N.W. 836 (1884), 35 Minn. 251, 28 N.W. 708
(1886).
18. Gaare v. Melbostad, 186 Minn. 96, 242 N.W. 466 (1932) (dictum);
Larson v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931) (dictum);
Byram v. Aiken, 65 Minn. 87, 67 N.W. 807 (1896); PRossER, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 107, at 780-81. There is no recent, well-considered decision on this
point.
19. The Court quoted the following passage from Clark v. McClurg, 215
Cal. 279, 284, 9 P.ad 505, 507 (1932), in support of its decision: "[W]here
. . . the publication is . . . libelous per se . . . a cause of action for actual or

compensatory damages is conclusively established."
If this is what the Court in Loftsgaarden meant to imply, its holding is
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damages, this rationale would raise the question whether the
Court has intended to distinguish libel per se from other forms
of libel, or to distinguish cases which carry a presumption of
actual damages from those which do not. It may be that the
Court intends to restrict its holding as to the availability of
punitive damages to libel per se. Thus, the holding may even
forecast a future departure from prior Minnesota decisions to
follow the majority rule that pleading and proof of special damages is necessary to sustain any libel action other than libel
per se. Alternatively the Court's reliance on the existence of a
conclusive presumption of actual damages may indicate an
intention to adhere to the common-law-Restatement rule raising
such a presumption in all libel cases, and to apply the Loftsgaarden rule with respect to the availability of punitive damages
to all libel cases.
On the other hand, the Court may have meant to say, not
that actual damages are conclusively presumed in a libel per se
action, but that they are not essential to the recovery of punitive
damages in such an action. Clearly the policy arguments advanced by the Court in support of its decision reflect more than
the technical consideration that actual damages are conclusively
presumed in cases of this kind. Instead the opinion concentrates
on the utility of punitive damages in deterring defamation
whether; or not the victim can show actual pecuniary damage.
However, if this is the basis of the decision there seems to be no
reason why actual damages should be a prerequisite to the award
of punitive damages in any libel action. Such an extension of the
holding would not be unreasonable, for to condition punitive
damages upon a finding of nominal actual damages would seem
to place form before substance. 20
The American constitutional tradition of free speech has
tended to make defamation an unfavored action,21 and there is
some danger that the present decision may frustrate this tradition
by encouraging suits arising from harmless insults. It is also true
that the frequently inflammatory issues in defamation actions"
quite similar to that in Clark, where the court interpreted a verdict of actual
damages in blank as a product of an error by the jury in apportioning
damages.
20. McComiRcx, op. cit. supra note 11, § 83.
21. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 TJ.S. 254 (1964).
22.

Of. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv.

L. REv. 1281, 1283 (1952): "A political libel suit is the modern substitute
for ordeal by battle. It is the means which society has chosen to induce bitter
partisans to wager money instead of exchanging bloody noses."
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may prejudice juries into awarding excessive punitive damages?*
These, however, are dangers which would be present even if
nominal actual damages were retained as a fictional prerequisite.
Moreover, excessive punitive damages are easily cured by
remittitur.
If the decision is based upon elimination of the fiction of
nominal compensatory damages as a prerequisite to recovery of
punitive damages, it is commendable for recognizing that the
purpose of punitive damages in defamation actions is to deter
false or malicious attacks on reputation and to soothe the immeasurable and intangible harm resulting from such attacks?'
It may be hoped that this line of reasoning will be extended to
defamation actions otler than libel per se. If, on the other hand,
the decision is founded upon the existence of a presumption of
actual damage in libel per se actions, the scope of its application
will depend largely upon whether the Minnesota Court continues
to follow the common-law-Restatement rule that proof of special
damage is not required in any libel action, and whether it treats
Loftsgaarden as based primarily upon the existence of a presumption of actual damage or the fact that the case involved
libel per se.
B.

THE DUTY

OF MUNICIPAITIES TO SUPERVIsE ACTIVITIES AT

PUBLIc RECREATIONAL FAcInTIEs

Diker v. City of St. Louis Park' raised the question of the
extent to which a municipality is bound to supervise activities at
its recreational facilities. The 10-year-old plaintiff was injured by
a flying hockey puck while playing goalie in an unsupervised
practice game. Although the city provided referees and coaches
for regularly scheduled games, practice games were not supervised. The trial court instructed the jury that a municipality is
required to provide "reasonable supervision" of its recreational
facilities.? On appeal from a verdict for plaintiff, the Minnesota
23. See Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 35 Mise. 2d 302, 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1962) ($1,000,000 compensatory, $2,500,000 punitive), modified, 19 App.
Div. 2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963), appeal granted, 14 N.Y.2d 719, 199
N.E.2d 163, 250 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1964).
24. 126 N.W.2d at 154-55.
1. 130 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1964).
2. 130 N.W.ed at 116. The injury occurred in 1959. The defendant was
protected by liability insurance which had been purchased pursuant to Mimn.
Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 87, § 1. That statute authorized cities to procure insurance against liability for wrongful acts and omissions of themselves and
their employees or officers, whether the acts or omissions related to proprie-
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Court reversed and held that although a municipality must exercise "due care under the circumstances," this standard does not
require supervision of those playing games on skating rinks which
it makes available to the public without charge.s
The Court has long recognized that a private recreational
facility operated for profit must provide reasonable supervision
tary or governmental functions. It also provided that insofar as the insurance
related to governmental functions the policy should contain a provision by
which the insurance company agreed to waive the defense of governmental
immunity "unless the city .. . consents to the assertion of that defense."
The Court in Diker recognized that the operation of a municipal skating
rink open to the public without charge was a governmental function, but
held that the city had failed to effect a proper consent to the assertion of
that defense. 180 N.W.2d at 115-16.
Subsequent to the accident in Diker, the Minnesota Court prospectively
overruled the common-law doctrine of sovereign tort immunity as applied
to governmental functions of subdivisions of the State. Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), 47 Mrm. L. REv.
1124 (1963). In its next session, the Minnesota Legislature enacted legislation
retaining immunity in certain respects, among them being claims "based
upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." Mmx. STAT. ANr.
§ 466.03(6) (1963). However, the statute also authorizes municipalities to procure insurance covering discretionary acts, and "the procurement of such insurance constitutes a waiver of the defense of governmental immunity to the extent
of the liability stated in the policy but has no effect on the liability of the
municipality beyond the coverage so provided." Mnm. STAT. Amr. § 466.06
(1963). For a discussion of this legislation, see Note, 48 MrmN. L. REV. 119,
198-203 (1968).

Since the city failed to consent to reliance upon the defense of governmental immunity in Diker, the Court's discussion is directed to the scope of
municipal duty rather than immunity. Neither the Spanel decision, supra,
nor the 1963 legislation dealt with municipal duty. The legislation apparently
did not affect the overruling in Spanel of immunity for injury arising from
causes such as the failure adequately to supervise municipal recreation facilities unless that failure could be ascribed to a discretionary decision of the
municipality. Even if it could, the purchase of insurance would preclude
immunity on the ground of discretionary act to the extent of the liability
stated in the policy. Thus, the reasoning and holding in Diker would seem
to be unaffected by the intervening decision and legislation except as to uninsured liability arising from discretionary acts. Since the legislation severely
circumscribed the scope of governmental tort immunity, and made its waiver
mandatory rather than optional where the municipality is insured, the discussion of municipal duty in Diker is likely to be applicable to an even greater
volume of cases as a result of its enactment than would otherwise have been
true.
S. 130 N.W.2d at 117. The city did, however, provide some equipment,
and the Court held, in granting a new trial, that the city could be held
liable if it was negligent in failing to provide face masks as part of the
equipment.
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for the protection of its patrons.4 In some jurisdictions private
persons providing recreational facilities to the public gratuitously
have been required to exercise reasonable care to protect those
invited onto their property.' Analogously, those jurisdictions
where the defense of governmental tort immunity has been abolished have required municipalities to exercise reasonable care in
the operation of their recreational facilities. "Reasonable care"
in this instance has been construed to include the duty of reasonable supervision. A distinction has been drawn, however, between
"general" and "specific" supervision. Thus, the supervision of a
particular activity need not always be specific and direct, but
there must be at least a general superintendence over the recreational activities at each facility.7 Hence, specific supervision has
4. Christianson v. Hager, 242 Minn. 41, 64 N.W.2d 35 (1954); Johnson
v. Amphitheatre Corp., 206 Minn. 282, 288 N.W. 886 (1939).
5. See PRossER, TORTs 399 & n.4 (3d ed. 1964). The RESTATEMENT (SECowN), ToRTs §§ 332, 343, comment (a), adopts the "economic benefit theory"
to the effect that an owner of property made available to others gratuitously
for recreational purposes would be bound only to warn them of defects known
to him.
6. E.g., City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000
(1927); Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441
(1952); Clark v. City of Buffalo, 288 N.Y. 62, 41 N.E.2d 459 (1942); Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.Qd 792 (1938); Fritz v. City
of Buffalo, 277 N.Y. 710, 14 N.E.2d 815 (1938); Curcio v. City of New York,
275 N.Y. 20, 9 N.E.2d 760 (1937); Peterson v. City of New York, 267 N.Y.
204, 196 N.E. 27 (1935); Monell v. City of New York, 5 Misc. 2d 321, 160
N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957); Styer v. City of Reading, 360 Pa. 212, 61
A.2d 382 (1948). In Caldwell, supra, the court said:
Where a municipality undertakes to maintain an area for recreation
in general some degree of supervision ought to be exercised to assure
that the area is reasonably fit for that purpose. Under ordinary circumstances, the necessary degree of supervision of such an area may
well be slight and may require no more than casual or periodic inspection.
304 N.Y. at 274-75, 107 N.Ead at 444.
7. See Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 20 So. 2d 484 (1945);
Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, supra note 6; Curcio v. City of New York,
supra note 6; Peterson v. City of New York, supra note 6; Lopez v. City of
New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 48, 168 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 738,
148 N.E.2d 909, 171 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1958); Lane v. City of Buffalo, 232 App.
Div. 334, 250 N.Y.Supp. 579 (1931); Nestor v. City of New York, 28 Misc.
2d 70, 211 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1961); Riaf v. State of New York, 16 Misc. 2d 132,
184 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1959).
In many cases where specific supervision was not required, non-liability
was also premised on a finding of no proximate cause between the injury
sustained and the lack of supervision. Turano v. City of New York, 17 App.
Div. 2d 191, 23 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1962); Dolan v. City of New York, 5 App.
Div. 2d 300, 171 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1958); Monell v. City of New York, 5 Misc.
2d 321, 160 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1957); see Kerby v. Elk Grove Union High School
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"monkey bars,"9

stickball games conducted in public parks,'o and baseball diamonds." However, where an activity involves a high risk of injury
and injuries resulting from it are often serious, close supervision
has been required.'
The Diker Court held that the duty of a municipality and
that of a private enterprise to supervise the use of recreational
facilities operated by them are measured by a general standard due care under the circumstances. But it concluded that one of
the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a
municipality has exercised due care is that its "responsible authorities," when allocating public funds, "must balance the need
for extending and maintaining recreational facilities against the
need of guarding against foreseeable dangers to those using ...
them. . . .""2 Thus, the Court apparently is reluctant to impose

upon the municipality a financial burden that must be borne
either through heavier taxation or the curtailment of municipal
programs. It distinguishes the burden of supervising privately
operated facilities on the ground that they can adjust their prices
to spread the cost of supervision among those using the facilities.
However, this distinction ignores the fact that the total burden
to the community is the same in either case. If the cost of operating private facilities rises, in all likelihood prices will also rise,
and the resulting decline in demand will reduce the number of
available recreational facilities. Thus, a distinction between private and public facilities on the basis of who is to pay the cost
of supervision is not persuasive. 4
Dist., 1 Cal. App. 2d 246, 86 P.2d 431 (1934). Similarly, the doctrine of
assumption of risk has often precluded a fnding of liability since the courts
have noted that those participating in certain recreational activities may
voluntarily subject themselves to the possibilities of injury while in the
pursuit of pleasure. See Annot., 7 A.LR.2d 704 (1949). The Court in Diker
recognizes that this doctrine may vary with the age of the participant.
8. Lopez v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 603, 152 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 48, 163 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1957), aff'd,

4 N.Y.2d 738, 148 N.E.2d 909, 171 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1958).
9. Dolan v. City of New York, 5 App. Div. 2d 300, 171 N.Y.S.2d 724
(1958).
10. Turano v. City of New York, 17 App. Div. 2d 191, 233 N.Y.S.2d 330

(1962).
11. Monell v. City of New York, 5 Misc. 2d 321, 160 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1957).
1. See City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000
(1927); DeSimone v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 137, 110 A.2d 431 (1955).
13. I3O N.W.2d at 117.
14. For an exhaustive breakdown of the costs of tort liability to municipalities and other public entities, see CALrroRnwA SENATE FACT FINDiNG COMMITTEE ON JuDIcIARY, GovncmNTAL TORT LIABmiTY (1963). See also Warp,
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The Court does seem to say, however, that since "responsible
authorities" are involved in the allocation of public funds, their
decisions not to provide supervision of a facility ought to be
accorded greater weight than would a similar decision by a
private person. The Court does not articulate any reasons for
this deference to public decision-making other than the dubious
distinction based on the source of funds used to maintain supervision. However, there may be other factors which can provide
more substantial support for this result. The private entrepreneur
is presumably motivated by self-interest rather than a desire to
reach a decision that maximizes the public welfare. Political
bodies, on the other hand, must make choices in the light of many
competing public interests. If the courts were to be denied power
to judge the propriety of the acts or omissions of private entrepreneurs, the latter would be enabled to act without regard to
public welfare; presumably, however, a public body of "responsible
authorities" will carefully weigh all the competing interests before
reaching a decision on the allocation of public funds. The decision may differ from community to community. Thus, in those
communities with inadequate recreational facilities, the decision
may be to provide more parks and playgrounds; in communities
with adequate facilities, it may be to increase the degree of supervision at existing facilities 5 As part of their governing function,
the responsible authorities evaluate the risks of a particular course
of action and balance those risks against the necessity and desirability of undertaking it. 6
The 1963 Minnesota legislation17 governing the tort liability
of state subdivisions specifically recognizes the continuation of
governmental immunity for discretionary acts not covered by
Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 LAW AND

CONTEMP. rROB.

363 (1942) and authorities cited therein. Warp concludes that the financial
burden to municipalities from tort liability is not as great as some courts
think it is.
15. See CAwouRnA LAW REVISION CoMM'N, A Snmu RELATING TO
SOVEREIGN ILMMUNIT 494 (196). The Study concludes that the concept of
reasonableness would preclude many claims since it would be absurd to
require supervision over all the areas within a vast public park system.
Id. at 510.
16. For an interesting discussion of how this process might work in connection with mass medical screening, see Franklin, Medical Mass Screening
Programs:A Legal Appraisal, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 205 (1962). The author suggests that courts would make the final determination whether reasonable
men would have undertaken the screening program as it was done. Id. at
213 n.44.
17. MAr. STAT. ANN. § 466 (1963).
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insurance."s The Diker decision was not under this legislation,9
and neither the legislation nor the decision indicates what is
meant by a discretionary act. The statutory language is virtually
identical to that of the Federal Tort Claims Act,20 however, which
exempts the federal government from liability for discretionary
functions. Tinder the latter act, the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to draw a line between discretionary and nondiscretionary acts based on a distinction between decisions taken
at "planning" and "operational" levels respectively,2 ' but the
criteria to be used in applying this distinction remain unclear.F
It is reasonably clear, however, that decisions involving policy
choices made at fairly high levels of Government are exempted
from liability. 3 But beneath these levels the mode of carrying
out those policy decisions may subject the Government to liability.?' Thus, where a government agency pursues a policy of giving
as much freedom to psychologically disturbed patients as is consistent with their condition, the decision to grant some quantum
of freedom to a particular patient is "operational."" But where
an agency operates an irrigation project and decides to dredge
the canals, this is a discretionary function 6
18. Mmxa. STAT. ANN. § 466.08(6) (1968) (quoted supra note 2).
19. See note 2 supra.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1958).
21. Dalehite v. United States, 846 U.S. 15, 49 (1953).
922.
There is, apparently, a rather nebulous area of liability at the socalled "operational level" of even a "discretionary function." . . . The
distinction between immunized abuse of discretion and liability for
negligent or wrongful acts at the "operational level" has -not been
drawn with any degree of clarity, though it has been suggested that
it should not involve anything "so fnespun and capricious as to be
... incapable of ... adequate formulation."

United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir. 1962) (Murrah, C.J.).
23. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (cabinet-level decision);
Goddard v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (manner in which Agency carried out condemnation pro.
gram); Weinstein v. United States, 244 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1957) (regulations
of Internal Revenue Service); Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th
Cir. 1952) (decision of SEC to release certain information about corporation).
24. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
25. White v. United States, 317 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1968); Fair v. United
States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956). But cf. Smart v. United States, 207
Fd 841 (10th Cir. 1953).
26. United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962); of. Cooley
v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 385 (D.S.D. 1959). But ef. Jemison v. The
Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
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This method of case-to-case adjudication,2 7 of course, gives the
courts a major role in determining proper and improper areas for
governmental liability, making it possible for them to fulfill their
function of applying vague legislative language to specific situations?"
If the Minnesota Court decides that a particular act is discretionary within the meaning of the statute, the question of negligence is irrelevant to the extent defendant is uninsured since in
such cases the municipality is immune from liability to that
extent. However, if it is decided that the act does not come within
the exception for discretionary acts, the problem of determining
the proper weight to be given the decision of the responsible authorities remains. Some writers maintain that the decision at this
point should be governed by normal tort rules and procedures'o
- in effect, that the decision of the municipality should be given
no weight whatsoever. Yet it is not altogether clear that a jury
will balance extent of risk, seriousness of injury, and value of
interests sacrificed better than the politically responsible body
that made the original decision.o Thus, it may well be that where
injury arises from a decision made by a municipal governing body,
there is justification for requiring, as a prerequisite to liability,
a finding that the decision constituted negligence as a matter of
law. This would mitigate the possible harshness of precluding
recovery for injuries arising from the grossest miscalculations of
public bodies without permitting juries to "second guess" the
determinations of politically responsible bodies.
C.

Loss or SERVICES AND EARNINGS OF MINOR CHILD HELD
"INJURY TO PROPERTY" UNDER

CIVII

DAMAGE AcT

The Minnesota Civil Damage Act provides that specified
persons may recover for injuries to person, property, or means
e7. This method was suggested as appropriate for this area in Davis, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Mus. L. REV. 751, 800 (1956).
28. See Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MxNr. L. REv. 885,
890 (1964), where it is suggested that vagueness imports flexibility into legal
language and facilitates avoidance of the almost "impossible task of minute
specification of what is and what is not to be permitted."
In Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort
Law, 48 Mum. L. REv. 265, 295 (1963), it is suggested that "courts can
remain creative even while working within a statutory scheme," particularly
where the statute creates only a framework in which the courts are permitted
to evolve a system of principles.
29. 2 HARPER & JAaSES, ToRTs § 29.6, at 1625 (1956).
S0. See the discussion by Judge Learned Hand in Sinram v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1932L
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of support resulting from an illegal sale of liquor.' In Herbes v.
Village of Holdingford,2 the Minnesota Court broadly construed
the phrase "injury to property" to allow parents to recover certain financial losses caused by the death of their minor child.
Plaintiffs' 18-year-old son was killed in a collision with a motorist intoxicated as a result of an illegal sale of liquor by defendant.
Plaintiffs thereupon brought this action under the Civil Damage
Act, and the jury returned a verdict in their favor for 30,000 dollars.' On appeal defendant contended that the verdict was excessive. The Minnesota Court reversed, ordered a new trial on the issue
of damages, and held that although plaintiffs had not shown
"injury to means of support," the loss of their son's services and
earnings and their outlays for funeral expenses were compensable
injuries to property under the Civil Damage Act.
In Bundy v. City of Fridley,' the Minnesota Court recently
refused to construe "injury to means of support" as encompassing
the loss of aid, society, and comfort of a deceased minor child,
and limited recovery under that provision to situations where
the plaintiff's standard of living is reduced by the wrongful
conduct.' Consequently, a parent will have sustained no injury
1. Mmn. STAT. § 340.95 (1961). The act reads, in part:
Every ... parent ... who is injured in person or property, or means
of support, by any intoxicated person ... has a right of action ...
against any person who, by illegally selling .. . intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained ....
See generally, Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46
Mum. L. REv. 169 (1961); Annot., 6 AL.R.2d 798 (1949) (defining elements
of "injury to person" or "property" within civil damage statutes).
2. 267 Minn. 75, 125 N.W.2d 426 (1963).
3. The verdict was reduced to $21,000 since plaintiffs had already received
$9,000 pursuant to a settlement with the estate of the intoxicated driver. 125
N.W.2d at 428.
4. A new trial on this issue was necessary not only because of the Court's
holding, which established a new measure of damages, but also because the
lower court's instructions relative to damages were erroneous. The trial court's
instructions were, according to the Court, more appropriate for a wrongful
death action than for a Civil Damage Act suit. 125 N.W.2d at 433. For a
discussion of the distinction between these statutes, see footnote 15 infra
and subsequent text.
5. 265 Minn. 549, 192 N.W.2d 585 (1963), 48 Mus. L. REv. 135.
6. The plaintiffs in Bundy did not argue that loss of means of support
included loss of the child's anticipated future earnings during his minority.
It is arguable, that the inclusion of such a loss within "means of support"
is required by the plain meaning of the statute. Note, 48 Mnfx. L. REv. 119,
140 (1963). However, Bundy excluded from the scope of "loss of means of
support" not only deprivation of society, aid, and comfort, 'but also any loss
of the child's future income which is not reflected in a reduction in the plaintiff's standard of living. 265 Minn. at 553, 122 N.W.2d at 588-89.
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to his means of support under the Civil Damage Act unless he
had actually received financial contributions from his child which
were sufficiently substantial that their deprivation by reason of
the child's death will require a reduction in his standard of
living.7

In Herbes, the plaintiffs derived their livelihood from a farm
operated without assistance from their deceased son, who was
employed in the city. Their income was approximately the same
before and after the accident. Although the son had made gifts
to his parents and, allegedly, eventually intended to return to
full-time work on the farm, the Court concluded that these factors did not demonstrate a reduction in plaintiffs' standard of
living as a result of their son's death, and hence that they had not
suffered injury to means of support.
Nevertheless, the Herbes decision did construe the phrase
"injury to property" to cover the loss of earnings and services of
a minor child. Relying on the North Dakota decision of lezler v.
Jorda8 the Court reasoned that a minor child is obligated to
render his services and earnings to his parents and that the
parents have a corresponding right to "own, possess, enjoy and
dispose of" these services and earnings.P These parental prerogatives were viewed as property rights. Unlike the North Dakota
court, which relied upon a statute providing that a parent is
entitled to the earnings and services of an unmarried minor
child,"o the Minnesota Court cited no direct statutory authority
to support its rationale. There is, however, a Minnesota statute
which indirectly recognizes the right of a parent to claim a minor
child's wages." Nonetheless, it is questionable whether parents
7. Bundy v. City of Fridley, supra note 5; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 880, 122 N.W.2d 86 (1963); accord, McClure
v. Lence, 345 Ill. App. 158, 102 N.E2d 546 (1951); Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d
665 (N.D. 1957).
8. Supra note 7. The North Dakota statute, N.D. Cma. Comu § 5-01-21

(1959), like that of Minnesota, limits actionable injuries to those suffered to

person, property or means of support. The only material difference between

these statutes is that the North Dakota provision permits recovery of exemplary damages while the Minnesota Civil Damage Act does not. But cf. Mms.
STAT. § 340.12 (1961).
9. 125 N.W.2d at 433.
10. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-09-04 (1960).
11. See MmN. STAT. § 181.01 (1961):
Any parent or guardian claiming the wages of a minor in service shall
so notify his employer and, if he fail so to do, payment to the minor
of wages so earned shall be valid.

While this statute was obviously enacted for the benefit of employers, it does
lend credence to the Court's reasoning, since it empowers a parent to claim
a minor's wages.
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could assert that right in a situation such as Herbes, where the
minor is emancipated and the parents apparently have relinquished control over his earnings and services. Despite these
difficulties, Herbes seems a reasonable compromise between allowing recovery under the Civil Damage Act for the non-economic
loss of the aid, comfort, and companionship of a minor child and
the alternative of completely denying recovery.
It would seem from reading Bundy and Herbes together that
their net effect is to hold that while deprivation of a child's
anticipated future earnings during minority is not recoverable as
injury to means of support, where the loss does not reduce the
family's former standard of living, the same loss may be recovered as an injury to property. It is arguable that the legislature
did not intend that "injury to property" be given more expansive
interpretation than "injury to means of support." However the
legislature gave no specific aids to construction of the Civil
Damage Act, so that any attempted reliance on legislative intent
becomes largely a matter of conjecture. Nonetheless, it would
seem that the term "property" is a more elastic concept than
"means of support"' 3 and if the legislature had intended to limit
the applicability of the phrase to injuries to real or tangible personal property, it could easily have specified this.
Moreover Herbes did not abolish all distinctions between the
Civil Damage Act and the Wrongful Death Act' which the
Court insisted upon maintaining in Bundy. These statutes are
distinguishable in several particulars; that which is relevant to
Herbes is the standard by which damages are to be measured.15
The Wrongful Death Act permits recovery for all "pecuniary
losses." In Bundy the Court specifically rejected the argument
that this standard is synonymous with the "means-of-support"
12. The Court in Bundy 'had expressly left open the question whether
the loss of future earnings was an injury to property. 265 Minn. at 553 n.4,
122 N.W.2d at 588 n.4.
18. Of. Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th
Cir. 1961), in which the Eighth Circuit held that an intoxicated person's
employer and the employer's insurer have been injured in property under
the Minnesota Civil Damage Act where the insurer had to settle claims with
persons injured by the employee's intoxication and the employer's insurance
premiums were increased as a result.
14. MA. STAT. § 573.02 (1961).
15. In order to recover under the Wrongful Death Act, plaintiff must
demonstrate defendant's negligence; however, contributory negligence is a
defense. Neither of these are factors in a Civil Damage Act suit. In addition,
the Wrongful Death Act limits damages to a maximum of $25,000, while
the Civil Damage Act has no such restriction.
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standard of the Civil Damage Act." Herbes does not equate "injury to property" with "pecuniary loss." This would seem to be the
reasonable implication of Glaesemannv. Village of New Brighton,
decided shortly after the instant case, where the Court reaffirmed
its decision in Herbes,'s but refused to construe the term "injury
to property" to include sums paid by the plaintiffs for the care,
maintenance, and education of their deceased minor child on the
ground that a child is not the property of his parents. While Herbes
does permit the recovery of funeral expenses as an injury to property, these are distinguishable from the expense of raising a child.
While all funeral expenses are not legally obligatory, they do
constitute an "out-of-pocket" cost occasioned by an illegal sale
of liquor, and hence would fall within the narrowest definition
of loss of property. 9 However, if a minor child is not regarded
as his parent's property, the expense of his care, maintenance, and
education can hardly be regarded as losses emanating from the
illegal sale.
Although the broad limitations on the Herbes measure of
damages are therefore reasonably clear, the opinion did not
clearly indicate how the plaintiffs' damages should be computed
at the new trial. At one point the Court's opinion seems to suggest a recovery based upon the total value of the minor's pros16. The Court refused to construe "injury to means of support" to encompass loss of a child's companionship on the ground that it would do
violence to the ordinary understanding of the statutory language. It rejected
the argument that since "pecuniary loss" had been construed under the
Wrongful Death Act to encompass such loss, Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn.
347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961), 47 Ma~w. L. REv. 323 (1962), a construction of
the Civil Damage Act to bring such loss within "injury to means of support"
would not be unduly expansive. It would seem, however, that one construction is as valid as the other. See Note, 48 Mur L. REv. 119, 141 (1963).
17. 130 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1964).
18. The defendant in Glaesemann urged the Court to reconsider its decision in Herbes, relying on several cases from Illinois. In Howlett v. Doglio,
402 Ill. 811, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949), the Illinois court held that injury to
property under the dram shop act contemplated injury to tangible real or
personal property, and that a parent therefore could not recover for the
death of a minor child based upon injury to property. However, subsequent
cases have weakened the authority of Howlett insofar as it limited the scope
of "property" to tangible property. See Fortner v. Norris, 19 Ill. App. 9d 212,
158 N.E.2d 483 (1958). See also Lausberg, Dram Shop: Injury to Property,
51 IR,. BJ. 810 (1963).
19. Analogously, it has been held that payment of medical expenses by
one other than the intoxicated, is injury to property recoverable under civil
damage acts. See Fortner v. Norris, supra note 18. Village of Brooten v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961), indicates that "out-ofpocket" losses are injury to property under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act.
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pective net earnings and services as a farm hando At another
it suggests a recovery limited to that portion of the child's earnings and services which might have been received by his parents'
The better result would be to permit recovery to the full extent of
the combined value of the child's net earnings and services. Since,
in most cases, a minor will not have acquired any substantial
earning capacity, Herbes would not become a vehicle for gigantic
recoveries. Moreover, this approach furnishes an objective standard which does not require the jury to speculate concerning the
child's generosity.
A final question presented by the Glaesemann case is whether
parents may recover the anticipated value of future financial
contributions when the minor was not a wage earner at the time
of his death.22 There would seem to be no reason for denying
recovery in such a case, based upon what the child might have
earned during the remainder of his minority given his age and
capabilities at the time of death? 3 In any event the Court will
undoubtedly be required to define this standard further as future
cases presenting these problems arise. Despite these difficulties,
both decisions represent a desirable effectuation of a policy requiring lucrative commercial enterprises to bear the risk of losses
concomitant with their illegal operation.

D.

CARRIER-LESSEE NOT LiABLE FOR TORTS OF OwNmOPERATOR BEYOND SCOPE OF EMPLOY1VENT

Plaintiff sued defendant carrier-lessee to recover for personal
injuries arising from the negligence of defendant owner-lessor in
operating a truck. Persuant to federal and state regulations, the
20. "[Plaintiffs] are entitled to recover . .. damages for the loss of [their
son's] ... services and earnings up to the time he would have attained his
majority as an injury to property." 125 N.W.2d at 433.
21. The plaintiffs were entitled to recover "damages based on the earnings and services which might reasonably have been furnished plaintiffs by
(their son] ... during his minority. . . ." Ibid.

22. Glaesemanm was decided on defendant's appeal from a denial of its
motion for summary judgment and the opinion does not contain facts sufficient to determine whether the deceased daughter was a wage earner, or
what type of services, if any, she rendered to her parents. The plaintiffs'
depositions indicated that their daughter was a college student and that all
her educational expenses were paid by them. It may be inferred, therefore,
that she was not employed. 130 N.W.2d at 44.
23. The Minnesota Court has refused to distinguish between cases where
a child was and was not employed at the time of death in permitting recovery for loss of future earnings as pecuniary loss under the Wrongful Death
Act. See Schroht v. Voll, 245 Minn. 114, 71 N.W.2d 843 (1955). See also
Note, 48 MINN. L. REv. 119, 140 (1963).
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lease provided that the vehicle was in the "exclusive possession,
control, and use" of the carrier, and that the carrier assumed full
responsibility to the public for its operation' The trial court,
finding that the lease created a master-servant relationship between the carrier and the owner but that the owner's negligence
did not occur in the scope of his employment, directed a verdict
for the carrier. Plaintiff argued on appeal, by analogy to the Safety
Responsibility Act,2 that the effect of the regulations and lease was
to make the carrier liable for injuries arising from the negligence
of the owner while operating the truck with the carrier's consent,
whether or not in the scope of employment. The Court rejected
this argument and, affirming the trial court, held in Gackstetter 'v.
1. The Interstate Commerce Commission regulations provide that a carrier lease "shall provide for the exclusive possession, control, and use of the
equipment, and for the complete assumption of responsibility in respect
thereto, by the lessee. . . ." 49 C.F.R. § 207.4(4) (Rev. 1964). The regulations
of the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission, Motor Bus and
Truck Division, provide:
2. The leased vehicle shall be under the exclusive control of, and its
operation the sole responsibility of, the lessee.
S.. . . [I~f the owner-lessor is to be the driver or is to furnish the
driver, such driver shall be as an employee of the lessee, ... and the
lessee shall assume the same responsibility with reference to such
owner-driver as lessee does or would to any other employee.
Minn. Regs., tit. IX, 9015(c), 9027(k) (1960 ed.).
Pursuant to these provisions, the lease in this case provided that the
leased equipment should be "in the exclusive possession, control, and use of
the authorized carrier, Lessee, and that the said Lessee assumes full responsibility in respect to the equipment it is operating, to the public... ." Gackstetter v. Dart Transit Co., 180 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1964).
2. MuNw. STAT. §§ 170.21-.58 (1961). The relevant portions of the act in
this case are §§ 170.21(9) and 170.54. Section 170.21(9) provides:
"Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle,
or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the
conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or
in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then
such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the
owner for the purposes of this chapter.
Section 170.54 provides:
Whenever any motor vehicle . .. shall be operated upon any public
street or highway of this state, by any person other than the owner,
with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof
shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such
motor vehicle in the operation thereof.
The act is designed to promote safe driving and to protect the public
from recdess and financially irresponsible drivers. Note, 21 MNr. L. REV.
823, 824-95 (1937); So MuRm. L. REV. 636 (1946).
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Dart Transit Co.3 that a lessee who is granted exclusive possession and control of a vehicle is not an "owner" within the meaning
of the Safety Responsibility Act and therefore is not liable for
torts committed by one operating the vehicle with consent but
outside the scope of employment, notwithstanding the provisions
of the regulations and lease.
The leasing arrangement involved in this case is a phenomenon
of comparatively recent origin in the motor transportation industry.4 Its original advantages to carriers lay in the minimization
of necessary capital investment and the shifting of responsibility
for torts occurring during operation of the trucks to the ownerlessors as independent contractors. Recognizing that the owners,
who frequently owned just one truck, were often financially irresponsible," Congress passed legislation authorizing the Interstate
Commerce Commission to regulate the possession of and responsibility for non-owned equipment.6 The ICC and the Minnesota
Railroad and Warehouse Commission have promulgated regulations to protect the public by requiring leases of substantial duration to vest in the carrier full responsibility for and control over
the leased vehicles.7 The courts have treated such provisions as
creating a common law master-servant relationship between lessee
and driver." The net effect of the regulations is thus to impose
upon the economically dominant party a responsibility to insure
3. 10 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1964).
4. The practice has been common only for the past two decades. Sloan,
Liability of Carriers for Independent Contractors' Negligent Operation of
Leased Motor Trucks, 43 IowA L. Rav. 531 (1958).
5. The record in the Gackstetter case suggested that the defendant operator
(owner-lessor) would be unable to respond in damages. 130 N.W.2d at 329.
6. Motor Carrier Act of 1935 § 204, 70 Stat. 983 (1956), 49 U.S.C. §
304(e)(1)-(2) (1958). See generally O'Brien, Twenty-Five Years of Federal
Motor CarrierLicensing- The Private versus For-Hire Carrier Problems, 35
N.Y.U.L. RuV. 1150 (1960); Note, Federal Motor CarrierAct, 36 CoLn. L.
REV. 945 (1936).

7. See note I supra. The duration of the lease is a significant factor in
determining whether the owner is regarded as a "private" or a "for-hire"
lessor. A "private" lessor leases his equipment for relatively short periods, is
regarded as an independent contractor, and usually provides his own insurance
coverage. The ICC regulations affect only the lessor holding himself out as
being "for-hire." There is a presumption favoring the existence of a "for-hire"
status in leasing arrangements. See Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C.
403, 410 (1959).
For an analysis of the factors considered in reaching a conclusion as to
status, see Matthews, Truck Leasing by Shippers and the Problem of the
Dangling Instrumentalities,27 ICC PRAc. J. 370 (1960); Sloan, supra note 4.
8. 130 N.W.2d at 329 & n.3.
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the careful maintenance and operation of the vehicles used in its
business.
The Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act seems grounded on
policy considerations very similar to those underlying the federal
and state trucking regulations. The act evinces an intent to impose liability upon the party better able to protect himself either by refusing to consent to the use of the vehicle under his
control or by purchasing insurance.' Gackstetter argued that since
the regulations and lease vest control of the vehicle in the lessee,
and since the Safety Responsibility Act manifests a purpose to
impose liability on persons possessing such control for injury arising from the negligent operation of such vehicles with their consent, liability ought to be imposed upon the carrier. In rejecting
this line of reasoning, the Court reasoned that since the regulations and the lease did not prohibit the carrier from permitting a
noncommercial use of the vehicle, they should not be construed
to supersede the common law by imposing liability for torts committed while the vehicle was driven outside the scope of employment.10
The Court's conclusion that the regulations and lease vested
responsibility in the carrier only to the extent of creating a masterservant relationship between it and the owner reflects the limited
objectives of motor carrier legislation. The liability provisions
were apparently designed to place carriers who own and those
who lease trucks on an equal footing with respect to their common
law liability to the public ," i.e., to require classification of an
owner-operator as a servant rather than an independent contractor. Thus, it would not seem that the federal and state regulations were intended to broaden the legislative definition of
"owner" applicable to safety responsibility acts in states which
have them. Therefore, if a carrier owning its own trucks would not
have been liable in Gackstetter under common law, it was proper
to reach the same result with respect to a carrier which leases its
trucks. 3
9. See Note, 21 MeN. L. REV. 823, 887 (1937). The act is quoted in part
in note 2 supra.
10. Other jurisdictions confronted with this question have reached the
same result. See authorities cited by the Court, 180 N.W.2d at 829 n.S.
11. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
12. 180 N.W.2d at 830. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text.
18. Plaintiff apparently argued that the conferral by the regulations and
lease of the salient incidents of ownership-possession, control, and useupon the lessee manifested an intent to make the lessee liable for torts committed during the operation of a vehicle to the same extent as would an
owner under applicable state law. Thus, in those States with safety responsi-
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A carrier which owned its trucks, however, would be liable
under the Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act. But, notwithstanding the desirability of treating owning and leasing carriers
alike, the Court in Gackstetter declined to hold that the lessee
was an "owner" within the meaning of the act. Instead it held
that the definition of "owner" contained in the act' does not encompass "one who was granted exclusive possession and control
of a vehicle under a lease."" The result of this construction of the
act is, as the Court itself intimates,"e unfortunate. Nevertheless, it
is true that the act defines "owner" with great specificity, and includes in that category a lessee with an option to buy, but not a
mere lessee. Also, this definition is a revision of a broader one contained in an earlier act, which would have encompassed the lessee
in the Gackstetter case.? Thus the Court's refusal to include the
carrier-lessee within the scope of the act was inevitable. Nonetheless, the result demands legislative revision.
The evident objective of the federal and Minnesota trucking
regulations is at least to narrow any distinction between owning
bility acts the regulations and lease would make the expanded liability
provisions of the acts applicable to carrier-lessees. The result would be to
equate the liability of leasing and owning carriers in a given jurisdiction.
However, since the language of the regulations and lease does not specify
that lessees are to be treated as owners, but vests only possession, control,
and use in them, the Court was probably correct in holding that this language
was intended to impose liability upon the lessee only to the extent that one
possessing these attributes would be liable under governing state law. Although they would seem to be the essential elements of ownership for the
purposes of the safety responsibility acts, see note 2 supra, the Minnesota act
clearly was not designed to encompass everyone possessing these attributes.
See nlmn. STAT. § 170.21(9) (1961), quoted in note 2 supra. Thus, the failure
of state law to impose a uniform liability upon those who control the use of
vehicles through ownership and lease is not overcome by the presently applicable regulations and lease.
14. See note 2 supra.
15. 130 N.W.2d at 380.

16. The Court stated: "However much we may dislike the result, the
problem of broadening the provisions of that act to cover the facts presented
is for the legislature." 130 N.W.2d at 830.
17. Minn. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 344, § 1, at 552, [Mason's Minn. Stat. § 2672
(Supp. 1940)] contained the definition of "owner" formerly applicable to the
Safety Responsibility Act: "Any person, firm, association or corporation
owning or renting a motor vehicle, or having the exclusive use thereof, under
a lease or otherwise, for a period of greater than 30 days."
Michigan and New York have similarly worded statutes. Mrcn. Comce.
LAws § 257.37 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. VEHIcr AND TRAFFIc LAW § 128. The
Iowa statute contains a provision similar to the present Minnesota definition.
IowA CODE § 321.1(36) (1962). The California statute, by similar specificity,
seems to exclude a lessee. CA,. VEHICLE CODE § 460.
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and leasing carriers as to their responsibility for the operation of
their vehicles. To this end the lease in Gackstetter vests in the
lessee exclusive control and possession of the leased vehicle. These
are the salient attributes of ownership as defined in the Safety
Responsibility Act. Thus, there is no reason why an injured party
should be more successful in an action against a carrier which
owns its own fleet of trucks than one which leases its vehicles.1s
To distinguish between carriers which own trucks and those which
lease is to ignore the realities of the leasing arrangements and to
that extent impair realization of the presumptive objective of the
Safety Responsibility Act - to impose liability for wrongful
operation of motor vehicles upon those who control their use.

E.

DEGREE OF
AiLITY TO

CAlm OwED CHm
ColwPREHEND RISK

LIcENSEE

RIEFIcOTS

His

Negligence has been defined as an act or omission giving rise
to an injury which would not have occurred if due care had been
exercised.' The law defines "due care" as that which a man of
ordinary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 2 The degree of care required by this standard obviously is not constant, but varies with the hazards inherent in
the situation and the individuals involved? Thus, when children
are or may reasonably be expected to be present, a higher degree
of vigilance must be exercised than in those situations involving
only adults, even though the same standard -

due care -

is ap-

plicable in both instances.'
The question of what constitutes due care in the presence of
children was recently presented to the Minnesota Court in Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, where plaintiff's two and one half-year-old
son was injured when scalding coffee fell on him while a guest at
the home of defendant, his grandmother. At the time of the accident the child was "helping" his grandmother in the kitchen while
his parents were in another room. A percolator containing heated
18. Though it may be argued that a carrier which owns its vehicles is in
a better position to assure maintenance standards, that is unlikely in view
of the economic control that the carrier will inevitably be in a position to
exert over the owner.
1. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947), and cases
cited therein.
2. Ahistrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 9, 68
N.W.2d 873, 879 (1955).
3. Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 147 N.W. 710 (1914).
4. Knox v. City of Granite Falls, 245 Minn. 11, 17-18, 72 N.W.2d 67, 72
(1955).
5. 198 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1964).
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coffee had been placed on a table with its cord looped down in a
space between the table and the wall. The child was standing
on a chair near the table and either fell or stepped into the area
where the cord was hanging, hitting it and bringing the coffee
down upon him. The trial court submitted the issue of defendant's
negligence to the jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. On
appeal defendant argued that there was an absence of actionable
negligence as a matter of law. The Court affirmed, holding that
the question of defendant's negligence was properly submitted
to the jury since it could reasonably find that defendant knew or
had reason to know, bearing in mind the characteristics of a two
and one half-year-old child, that a hazard existed which could
easily have been avoided by proper precaution.
In general one entering upon the land of another with permission may be classified as either an invitee or a licensee. Social
guests, such as the child in Paulson, have normally been afforded
the status of licensees, while the term "invitee" has typically been
applied only to business visitors.' The legal distinction between
the invitor-invitee and licensor-licensee relationships lies in the
duty of care required of the occupier of the land. Thus, an invitor,
in return for the economic benefit he expects to derive from the
presence of the visitor is required to exercise affirmative care to
make his premises safe.7 On the other hand, the licensor is liable
for injury sustained by a licensee only if the licensor knowingly
maintains conditions on his property which create an unreasonable risk of harm without warning the licensee, 8 or negligently
conducts active operations without giving warning.9
Defendant apparently argued that since the percolation of
coffee was an ordinary household practice, a lower standard of
care was required.o The Paulson Court rejected this contention,
stating that a potential hazard must be evaluated "bearing in
mind the characteristics of children of this age."" The identical
6. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 60-61 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Id. § 61, at 396. See Page v. Murphy, 194 Minn. 607, 261 N.W. 443
(1935).

8. See Glenn v. Munson, 259 Minn. 180, 106 N.W.2d 551 (1960); Dishington v. A. W. Kuettel & Sons, Inc., 255 Minn. 325, 96 N.W.2d 684 (1959);
Meyer v. Mitchell, 248 Minn. 397, 80 N.W.2d 450 (1957); Malmquist v. Leeds,
245 Minn. 130, 71 N.W.2d 863 (1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 342 (1934).
9. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 388-89 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §
341 (1934).
10. 128 N.W.2d at 765 n.S. Defendant relied upon Putney v. Keith, 98
Ill. App. 285 (1900), which seemingly was overruled by Hallis v. Stover Co.,
275 Ill. App. 44 (1934).
11. 128 N.W.2d at 765.
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consideration is involved in the doctrine of attractive nuisance,
under which one who maintains an artificial condition on land
where children are likely to be present, and knows or should know
that it presents an unreasonable risk of serious injury, is liable for
any resulting injury to child licensees or trespassers.12 However,
this doctrine has been restricted to those situations involving
unattended conditions where the risk of serious injury is great 3
and therefore is not applicable to the Paulsoncase.
Instead the Paulson Court quite properly evaluated the apparent risk of injury afforded by the household operation in comparison to the burden that would probably have to have been
assumed by the licensor to avoid such risk. It concluded that the
burden imposed was slight as compared to the risk of injury to
the child.' 4 While the duty of care is often fulfilled by disclosure
to the licensee of the potentially dangerous activity or condition,
such disclosure would have been ineffectual in Paulson due to the
child's inability to comprehend the risk - the condition would
have been a "hidden defect" as to the child even if he were warned.
Therefore, the Court would seem to have correctly reasoned that
other precautions, such as moving the table against the wall, removing the percolator from the table, or closer supervision of the
child were required."'

VII. PROCEDURE
A.

CounT EXPREssEs RENEWED DIssATIsFAcTION WITH RuLa
PRECLUDING RELITIGATION oF ExoNERATED DEFEDANT'S
LIABmITy IN SUBSEQUENT CONTRIBUTION AcTIoN

In Anderson v. Gabrielson' the Minnesota Court expressed
renewed dissatisfaction with the rule enunciated in American
12. Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 220-24, 89 N.W.ed
712, 716-18 (1958); Knox v. City of Granite Falls, 245 Minn. 11, 14-17, 72
N.W.2d 67, 70-71 (1955); Ewing v. George Benz & Sons, 224 Minn. 508,
510-16, 28 N.W.2d 733, 734-37 (1947), S2 Mu. L. REV. 526 (1948); see
RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 339 (Supp. 1948). See generally Duwxmm, MINTESOTA
DIGEST § 6989 (1962).
13. See PROSSER, TORTs § 59, at 378 (3d ed. 1964).

14. Of. Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 848 (1921):
The decisions show an effort to hammer out . . . a compromise between
the interest of society in preserving the safety of its children and the
legitimate interest of landowners to use their land for their own purposes with reasonable freedom, and so are naturally in a state of flux
and motion.
15. 128 N.W.2d at 765.
1. 126 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. 1964).
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Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen2 -that an unsuccessful tort defendant may not relitigate an exonerated defendant's liability to a
common plaintifE in a subsequent contribution action, even
though the two had never assumed adversary positions on the
issue. In Anderson a verdict was rendered against two nonadversary codefendants, one of whom sought and obtained an
order granting a new trial. The Court held that the order was
not appealable3 and alternatively that the unsuccessful defendant
lacked standing to appeal as an "aggrieved party" because he
remained at liberty either to intervene in the new trial or to bring
a separate action for contribution.4 It indicated, however, that
where a verdict or judgment finally exonerated one defendant, an
unsuccessful codefendant might be an "aggrieved party" unless
Vigen were overruled "at long last," since such a verdict or judgment would otherwise preclude him from securing contribution.5
2. 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942). This case expressly overruled
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Anderson, 191 Minn. 158, 253 N.W. 374 (1934).

Prior to Anderson v. Gabrielson, supra note 1, the Minnesota Court had
questioned the propriety of Vigen in several dicta: Radmacher v. Cardinal,
264 Minn. 79, 117 N.W.2d 738 (1962); Mocuik v. Svoboda, 253 Minn. 562,
9S N.W.2d 547 (1958); Muggenburg v. Leighton, 240 Minn. 21, 60 N.W.ad
9 (1953); Bocchi v. Karnstedt, 238 Minn. 257, 56 N.W.2d 628 (1953); Bunge v.

Yager, 286 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952).
3. Mum. STAT. ANN. § 605.09(d) (Supp. 1963) provides for appeals to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, inter alia, "from .

.

. an order granting a new

trial if the court expressly states therein . . . that the order is based excluIsively upon errors of law occurring at the trial, and upon no other ground
. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) In Anderson the trial court granted a new trial

"in the interests of justice" and because "the evidence did not sustain the
verdict and was contrary to law." Hence the order granting a new trial was
not appealable as such. See Poynter v. Albrecht, 266 Minn. 245, 123 N.W.2d
355 (1963); Block v. Hall, 263 Minn. 582, 116 N.W.2d 505 (1962); Kelsey v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 262 Minn. 219, 114 N.W.2d 90 (1962); Kubinski v.
Speckman, 261 Minn. 475, 113 N.W.2d 173 (1962); Satter v. Turner, 257
Minn. 145, 100 N.W.2d 660 (1960); Smith v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 244 Minn.
52, 68 N.W.2d 638 (1955); Thompson v. Mann, 202 Minn. 318, 978 N.W.
153 (1938); Cunningham, Appealable Orders in Minnesota, 37 Mmw. L. REV.
309, 341-44 (1953).
4. Appellant had relied in the alternative upon Minn. Sess. Laws 1945, ch.
463, § 1, at 887 (repealed by Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 806, 1 8), which
authorized an "aggrieved party" to appeal "from a judgment .. . and upon
such appeal the court may review any intermediate order involving the
merits or necessarily affecting the judgment appealed from . .. ," and upon
Foster v. Herbison Const. Co., 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915 (1962), which
held that an order vacating a judgment was appealable. However the Court
held that the order in question did not affect the judgment against appellant
and did not constitute an order vacating judgment. 126 N.W.2d at 240-41.
5. Id. at 241. See also Mocuik v. Svoboda, 253 Minn. 562, 93 N.W.2d

547 (1958); Muggenburg v. Leighton,

240 Minn. 21, 60 N.W.2d 9 (1953);
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Courts have almost unanimously held that a judgment does
not conclude parties who are not adversaries under the pleadings
as to their rights inter se upon matters which they did not litigate
between themselves.6 Under this rule an exonerated defendant is
not immune from contribution to an unsuccessful defendant
where the two did not assume an adversary relation.7 The adoption by Minnesota of a contrary rule in Vigen has been widely
and frequently criticized as binding non-adverse parties to
adjudications.s
Bocchi v. Karnstedt, 238 Minn. 257, 56 N.W.2d 628 (1958).
The Court suggested in Muggenburg v. Leighton, 240 Mimi. at 24 n.2,
60 N.W.2d at 10 n.1, that even without the Vigen rule, the interest of an
unsuccessful defendant in using the summary procedure for enforcing contribution under Mum. STAT. § 548.19 (1961) would give him standing to
appeal from a final judgment exonerating another defendant.
6. Chiketas v. American Buslines, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 762 (ED. Pa. 1960);
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, 193 Cal. App. 2d 483, 14 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1961);
Buhler v. Villec, 117 So. 2d 286 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Creighton v. Ruark, 280
Md. 145, 186 A.2d 208 (1962); Boston & M.R.R. v. Sargent, 72 N.H. 455,
57 Atl. 688 (1904); Kraemer v. Gallagher, 18 App. Div. 2d 676, 235 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1962); Ordway v. White, 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1961);
Gunter v. Winders, 253 N.C. 782, 117 S.E.2d 787 (1961); Kinard v. Polk, 241
S.C. 555, 129 S.E.2d 597 (1963); Gammage v. Weinberg, 355 S.W.2d 788
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc., 196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.ed
864 (1955); Alaska Pac. S.S. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., 107 Wash. 545, 182
Pac. 634 (1919); Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (1918);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942).
This rule also applies in Minnesota with respect to issues other than
contribution and indemnity. E.g., Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d
446 (1952); Pioneer Say. & Loan Co. v. Bartsch, 51 Minn. 474, 53 N.W. 764
(1892); cf. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeVries, 185 F. Supp. 383 (D. Minn.
1960).
It would appear that Illinois is the only State which does not follow the
general rule. See, e.g., Francisey v. Jordan, 43 Ill. App. 2d 344, 193 N.E.2d
219 (1963); cf. Stangle v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 295 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1961)
(applying Illinois law). In Creighton v. Ruark, 230 Md. 145, 150, 186 A.2d
208, 210 (1962), the court stated that Illinois is the only jurisdiction departing
from the general rule. But see Remus v. Schwass, 406 Ill. 68, 92 N.E.2d 127

(1950).
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82, comment b (1942), provides the following
illustration of the general rule:
A and B are driving automobiles, which collide. C, a passenger in B's
car, sues A and B. Whether the judgment is in favor of or against C
as to either or both A and B, the issues as to negligence or other element of the cause of action are not res judicata in a subsequent action
by A against B for damage to his car.
7. Note, 37 MInu. L. REv. 470, 478 & n.64 (1953); Note, 27 MINm. L.
REv. 519, 528 & n.20, 525 & n.28 (1943).

8. E.g., Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 Mumr. L. REV. 580, 595 & n.63 (1959); Note, 87 MIm. L. REv. 470
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The right to secure contribution in Minnesota depends upon
payment of a disproportionate share of "common liability."9 The
Court reasoned in Vigen that since liability for litigated tort
claims is determined solely by the adjudication between the
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party,'o an adjudication which
(1953); Note, 27 MIm. L. REv. 519 (1943); 12 ALA. L. REV. 208 (1959); 56
(1942). The Court itself has

HARv. L. REv. 477 (1942); 41 MICH. L. REv. 508

frequently questioned its holding in Vigen. See note 2 supra.
9. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d
847 (1953). It has been suggested that participation in wrongful conduct,
even that which could not give rise to legal liability to the injured party,
should replace "common liability" as a condition precedent to recovery of
contribution. In MAolling, supra, the Court specifically rejected this suggestion
on the ground that it believed that the duty to contribute is based upon the
equity of requiring a person to pay for being relieved of a potential or existing legal obligation, not upon the equity of requiring persons to share the
consequences of their wrongful conduct, whether or not such conduct gives
rise to legal liability. This difference is critical where a person has participated
in wrongful conduct but has a personal defense against the injured party,
such as marital immunity. See Note, 37 MmN. L. REv. 470 (1953).
10. The Court distinguished 'between tort and contract claims:
It is quite true that the right to contribution arises out of the relationship of the parties to an original transaction. In contract cases the
common liability arises out of the relationship created by the original
agreement ...

; but in tort cases the original common liability must

be established in some way-in contested cases by adjudication of
such liability as between the injured person and the alleged tortfeasor.
213 Minn. at 126, 5 N.W.2d at 400. This distinction is patently erroneous;
liability in both tort and contract actions arises at the time of the original
transaction. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBTION iw NEGLIGENCE
AcTIoNs 12 (1986); Note, 27 MmN. L. REv. 519, 530 &n.44 (1943).
In tort cases which have not gone to judgment, the question of "common
liability" is still open and may be determined in an action for contribution.
Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 286 N.W. 766 (1931).
If the Court had defined "common liability" to mean "a common obligation imposed by a court of law" rather than "conduct which could give rise
to a common obligation imposed by a court of law," it would have been
correct in stating that liability for litigated tort claims is determined solely
by the litigation between the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party. But
then the Court's statement that "common liability" in contract actions is
determined by the relationship arising from the original agreement would
be wrong. Also, if the former meaning were used, a defendant would not be
able to secure contribution until the injured party obtained a judgment
against both parties. This is not the law in Minnesota, Duluth, M. & N. Ry.
v. McCarthy, supra, though it is in New York. New York requires "joint
judgment liability" as a prerequisite to contribution. GREGORY, Op. Cit. 38pra
at 27.
Hence the Court either defined common liability in terms of a judgment
in litigated tort cases and not in contract cases and unlitigated tort cases,
or defined it in terms of conduct in all cases, but precluded an unsuccessful
defendant from showing the true nature of a successful defendant's conduct
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exonerates an alleged tortfeasor logically precludes him from
sharing a "common liability" to the injured party which might
give rise to a right of contribution." Thus the Court held in effect
that the determination of nonliability in the action between the
injured party and the exonerated defendant is res judicata as
between the latter and the unsuccessful codefendant.' 2 This determination, however, ignores the fact that the adjudication
between the injured party and the exonerated tortfeasor shows
through an improper application of the doctrine of res judicata.
Most of the critics of Vigen have assumed that the Court did the latter
and have roundly criticized it for misapplying the doctrine of res judicata. See
note 8 supra.That assumption is supported by the Vigen Court's statement that
the former adjudication between the injured party and the defendant is "res
judicata" on any essential element of a claim subsequently brought by one of
the codefendants against the other. 218 Minn. at 127, 5 N.W.2d at 401. But
in Bunge v. Yager, 286 Minn. 245, 252, 52 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1952), the Court
denied that the doctrine of res judicata was involved in Vigen, stating that
the case was based on the absence of "common liability" to the injured
party. This would suggest that the Court intended to define "common
liability" in terms of legal obligation rather than conduct. However helpful
Bunge was in limiting the application of Vigen to contribution and indemnity
cases, 36 MN. L. REv. 983 (1952), its analysis would impute to the Vigen
Court the use of two meanings for the same term and is not supported by
the language of Vigen, 218 Minn. at 197, 5 N.W.2d at 401.
11. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82, comment b (1942), apparently reflects the "common liability" theory underlying Vigen:
[WJhere a person is injured by the concurrent negligence of two tortfeasors who are joined in one action, the fact that each of them
attempts to show that the other was solely responsible for the accident or that the other alone was negligent does not make the issue
of negligence res judicata in subsequent proceedings between them,
where the liability of one to the other does not depend upon his
liability to the injured person .... (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the Court's reasoning in Vigen applies not only
to codefendants, but also where the alleged tortfeasors are sued separately.
Thus the Anderson Court posed the following hypothetical situation as an
"extreme example of the injustice which is theoretically possible" under the
Vigen rule:
[A]ssume that A is injured in a collision between B and 0, and A sues
B alone without C's knowledge. B is exonerated and the time to appeal
expires. If A subsequently sues C and obtains a judgment, under the
Vigen rule 0 is barred from recovering contribution against B, although C had neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard in the
litigation which foreclosed his rights.
126 N.W.2d at 242 n.9.
12. See also GREGORy, op. cit. supra note 10, at 18; note 10 supra.
"The doctrine of res judicata precludes the parties from showing what is
or may be the truth." Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 H.xuv. L.
REv. 1 (1942). The doctrine is designed to achieve the three-fold objective
of conserving the courts' time, protecting persons from repeated litigation,
and promoting peace and quiet in the community through the creation of
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merely that the former failed to prove liability, not that the
elements of liability do not exist.'s
Whether or not the Vigen rule is technically premised upon
res judicata, the Court recognized in Anderson that all of the
policy considerations advanced for confining the doctrine of res
judicata to adverse parties 4 obtain in contribution actions to
which the rule is applied.'5 The injured party may, either by conscious choice or inept prosecution, present a weak case against
one defendant and a strong case against another, thereby fixing
the rights between the codefendants without an opportunity for
either to protect himself.' Moreover, where the injured party
does not sue all of the alleged tortfeasors in one action, those
not sued may be barred by exoneration of those who are, even
though they had neither notice nor opportunity to be heard.'
Even if notice is given, the potential contribution claimant may
be required to make an unhappy choice between forefeiting his
claim and litigating it in an inconvenient forum where he may
expose himself to other causes of action as well as the very cause
of action in question.
The Vigen rule prevents relitigation of the liability of a party
from whom contribution is sought where he has been found liable
to the injured person as well as where he has been exonerated,
since the prior adjudication conclusively determines his relationship to the original transaction. 8 Although the reasoning of Vigen
is questionable, it would seem both unwise and unfortunate if
Minnesota were to permit such a person to deny his liability to
the injured party in a contribution action, since the objections
to Vigen are largely inapplicable where the party from whom
contribution is sought has had full opportunity to vindicate himself with notice of the financial consequences of his failure to do
so.' 9 However, an unsuccessful defendant sued for contribution
certainty in the relationships between men. Moschisker, Res Judicata, 88
YALE L.J. 299-300 (1929). If a person has not litigated a claim the last two

reasons are inapplicable and the first unreasonable.
13. Kraemer v. Gallagher, 18 App. Div. 2d 676, 235 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1962);
see note 10 supra.
14. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82, comment a (1942).
15. 126 N.W.2d at 242. See also Note, 27 MmsN. L. Rnv. 519, 526 (1943).
16. 126 N.W.2d at 242.
17. See note 11 supra. This may constitute a denial of due process. Note,
27 MIN. L. REv. 519, 531 & n.49 (1943).

18. Coble v. Lacey, 257 Minn. 352, 360, 101 N.W.2d 594, 600 (1960); In
re Estate of Moebius, 231 Minn. 219, 228, 43 N.W.2d 104, 111 (1950). See
notes 10 & 11 supra and accompanying text.

19. Radmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 117 N.W.2d 738 (1962); accord,
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 225, 210 N.W. 822 (1926). But see Ohio Cas. Ins.
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should not be precluded from relitigating the liability of those
seeking contribution or the amount of damages awarded in separate actions if he has not previously had an opportunity to assume
an adversary position on those issues.Fo
The Court suggested in Anderson that even though the Vigen
rule may encourage the use of cross-claims and intervention,"

and thus facilitate the more expeditious handling of claims for
Co. v. Gordon, 95 F.d 605 (10th Cir. 1938); Kinard v. Polk, 241 S.C. 555,
129 S.E.2d 527 (1963).
The judgment obtained by the injured party has been said to be the
best evidence of liability to him. GREGORY, op. cit. S.upra note 10, at 16; see
Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis.

L. REV. 865, 387.
MNr. STAT. § 548.19 (1961) lends support to this result by providing a
summary method for enforcing the right to contribution when a judgment
is rendered against both defendants, whether or not they have assumed
adversary positions.
However, the reasoning supporting this result would seem to apply with
just as much force in an action brought by the injured party where the defendant has been found liable in a prior contribution action. Yet in that
situation even the Vigen rule would permit the defendant to assert his nonliability to the injured party.
20. The reasoning in Vigen would seem to preclude such relitigation in
litigated tort actions since the prior judgment conclusively determines the
claimant's relationship to the injured party. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. But the overruling of Vigen would change that result. See notes
10 &11 supra and accompanying text.
The possibility that a defendant will raise the question of the claimant's
liability to the injured party is slight, however, and would normally occur
only when the claimant failed to plead an obvious defense in the injured
party's action which did not also apply to the defendant. GREGORY, Op. Cit.
supra note 10, at 18; see City of Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N.C. 106, 25 S.E.2d
407 (1943) (complaint in contribution action stated facts showing claimant's
nonliability to injured party).
The issue of damages should be treated the same as liability with the
qualification that the defendant in the contribution action should be estopped
from claiming that the damages were less than the amount awarded against
him.
Even under the Vigen rule a defendant may show that the person seeking
contribution acted willfully and therefore is precluded from recovering
contribution. Coble v. Lacey, 257 Minn. 352, 101 N.W.2d 594 (1960); In re
Estate of Moebius, 231 Minn. 219, 4s N.W.2d 104 (1950); Kemerer v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N.W. 928 (1937); cf. Merrill
v. St. Paul City Ry., 170 Minn. 332, 212 N.W. 533 (1927).
21. Even though cross-claims are only permissive, "the possibility [which
exists under the Vigen rule] that a verdict for the codefendant will become
the law of the case, or show an absence of common liability, will probably
be enough to compel a defendant, for his own protection, to file a cross-claim
where he has any notion of later seeking contribution or indemnity." Wright,
supra note 8, at 595.
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contribution, this goal could be accomplished more surely and
equitably by amending the Rules of Civil Porcedure to provide
for compulsory cross-claims between codefendants." This suggestion has merit. Compulsory cross-claims would not be subject to
any of the objections to the Vigen rule discussed above, yet would
insure that the issue of contribution would be determined between
the codefendants, 3 and that a single jury would consider the
same evidence for all purposes. 4 However, no jurisdiction has
provided for compulsory cross-claims. Proposals for doing so
The Vigen rule probably does not greatly encourage third party practice.
A defendant's failure to bring in potential third party defendants would not
prejudice the defendant, but only the third parties, in the event the former
were exonerated. If the potential third party defendants -have received
favorable judgments in prior actions brought by the injured party, the Vigen
rule would make their presence pointless from the defendant's point of view.
However, the possibility that the defendant will be unsuccessful and that
potential third party defendants will subsequently secure a favorable judgment in an action of which the unsuccessful defendant lacked notice may
influence the latter to utilize third party practice.
22. 126 N.W.2d at 241-42 &n.7. The Court cited MnN. R. Civ. P. 14.01,
which deals with third party practice. Presumably it intended to refer to
MiNr. R. Czv. P. 13.07, which relates to cross-claims. Under these rules both
third party practice and cross-claims are presently permissive. 1 YOUNGQUIST
&BLAcur, MnaEsoTA Ruzzs PRACTicE 81, 89 (Supp. 1962).
Presumably the mandatory cross-claim provision would apply to actions
other than contribution and indemnity. The question of whether it should
is beyond the scope of this Note, but one objection to extending it to other
actions would be that the damages for which a defendant would be required
to sue his codefendant might not be ascertainable at the time of trial. See
note SO, infra.
It is arguable that the Vigen rule, notwithstanding its occasional ineffi-

ciencies and injustices, should be retained unless the Rules of Civil Procedure
are amended to provide for compulsory cross-claims. See Wright, supra note
8, at 596 n.64: "I would favor making cross-claims compulsory, in order to
prevent multiplicity of suits in the situations where the substantive doctrines
[e.g., the Vigen rule] do not provide the needed measure of compulsion .... "
2S. Vigen accomplishes this goal to the extent that it encourages crossclaims, but to the extent that it fails to do so unsuccessful condefendants may
become involved in subsequent litigation inter se over elements of contribution other than "common liability," thereby requiring considerable additional
effort, expense, and delay. GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 90. An example
of this problem is presented in Coble v. Lacey, 257 Minn. 352, 101 N.W.2d
594 (1960). The Court there held that although the tortfeasors had been
found liable to the injured party and not to each other for mutually inflicted
damage, it had not been established whether the conduct of either was intentional or knowingly wrongful so as to preclude contribution. Hence the party
from whom contribution was sought was held entitled to an order restraining
execution under the summary contribution statute, MrN. STAT. S 548.19
(1961), pending resolution of this issue.
24. GREGORY, op. cit. oupra note 10, at 20.
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have been criticized as extreme and unnecessary.25 They would
require unwilling codefendants to aid the plaintiff in establishing
each other's negligence, thereby assisting the plaintiff in discharging his burden of proof.26 A compulsory cross-claim provision would also contravene the generally accepted rule that a
person has the right to choose whom and when he shall sue;27
however "a law-suit is not a game, but is a serious attempt to
administer justice," and the general convenience of all is worth
a good deal more than merely an individual's advantage? 8 Finally,
it has been argued that compulsory cross-claims are probably
unnecessary because the defendant's self-interest would prompt
him to claim for contribution in the vast majority of cases."29
These objections to the Court's proposal to make cross-claims
compulsory are not compelling. The only real objection would
be that it does not go far enough. Unlike Vigen the proposal would
not encourage a potential defendant to intervene, since without
the Vigen rule the adjudication would not preclude him from
securing contribution in a subsequent action. If the Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended to provide for compulsory third party
25. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 19, at 887:
If the procedural ideal underlying cross-litigation and third-party practice is to be fully achieved, however, more drastic sanctions [than foreclosing the right to maintain an action for contribution if a motion for
contribution is not made in an action against both tortfeasors after
payment is made to the original plaintiff] seem desirable. Suppose P
sues A and B as codefendants and A refuses to file a cross-complaint
for contribution against B when he might easily have done so. Then if
A alone is found liable to P, it seems absurd and wasteful to permit A
by a separate action for contribution to reopen the issue of B's liability to
P. This could be avoided by requiring one in A's position either to crossclaim for contribution against his codefendant and litigate it during the
trial of the main action or lose a subsequent opportunity to bring a
separate action therefor. This measure, however, was omitted from the
proposed Uniform Act as being, perhaps, rather extreme and from a
practical point of view probably unnecessary in most cases, since it was
felt that the defendants' self-interest would prompt them to cross-claim
for contribution.
26. Id. at 381. This is also true of the Vigen rule to the extent that it
induces parties to cross-claim.
27. Compulsory cross-claims would require the defendant to become a
plaintiff, which would contravene the "common-law tradition that the plaintiff is 'lord of his action' and may manipulate its progress, within the rules of
the game, as he sees fit." Gregory, supra note 19, at 884 (discussing third
party practice). Also, an adversary system does not function well where a
plaintiff does not want to be one. However this is also true of Vigen to the
extent that it induces cross-claims.
28. Ibid.
29. See note 25 supra; Gregory, supra note 19, at 384.
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practice in addition to compulsory cross-claims, subsequent actions for contribution could be avoided in most casesYo However,
this suggestion is subject to the same objections as those advanced against the proposal for compulsory cross-claims.' Moreover, the fact that an unsuccessful defendant had waived his
right to contribution by not joining a third party would not
prevent the latter from subsequently securing contribution from
the former.
An alternative to making third party practice compulsory
might be a procedure similar to that of "vouching in."32 The
30. It is not clear whether a third party defendant would be required to
assert a counter-claim for contribution under Mium. R. CIV. P. 13.01,
which requires that the claim arise out of the same "transaction," since that
term does not include torts. 1 YOUNGQUIST & BLAce, MNNESOTA RULES
PRACTICE 428 (1951). But a contribution action is not considered to be a tort
action despite the fact that it grows out of tort. Bard v. Bemidji Bottle Gas
Co., 23 F.R.D. 299, 301-02 (D. Minn. 1958). However, the action arises only
upon the payment of more than an equitable share of common liability, id. at
302, and therefore may be considered to arise out of a subsequent transaction.
But since the purpose of excepting tort claims from the compulsory counterclaim provision was to permit subsequent litigation of claims arising from
latent injuries which remain undiscovered until after the plaintiffs action for
damages has been tried, and to avoid litigating defendant's claims in an action
where he is represented by his insurance company's lawyer, I YovNQUIST &
BLkca, op. cit. supra, and neither of these reasons applies to counter-claims
for contribution, they should be compulsory. Whether or not the third party
defendant is required to assert a counter-claim for contribution, an adjudication of the defendant's claim for contribution will ar the third party defendant from subsequently asserting a claim for contribution. See Radmacher v.
Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 117 N.W.2d 738 (1962).
Presumably the proposed amendment would not, however, preclude the
defendant from bringing a subsequent contribution action where a potential
third party defendant cannot be found after a reasonable search or if he is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the forum.
Since all of the defendants (including the third party defendants) would be
required to litigate their liability to the plaintiff inter se, it would not seem
unfair to require the plaintiff to amend his pleadings and assert all of his
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence against the third party
defendants by amending Rule 14.01.
31. Since Rule 14.01 permits indemnitors to be brought in, the proposed
change would require that insurers, employers, and others be made third
party defendants. See INSTrrUTE ON FEDERAL RULEs, A.B.A., RuLEs OF CIVI
PRocEDuRE AmNPRocEEDINGs 250-54 (Cleveland 1938); Wright, supra note 8,
at 611. Because indemnity often presents quite dissimilar issues and defenses,
a proposal for compulsory third party practice should be limited to contribution actions.
32. "Vouching in" is a method by which a party who is sued on a cause
of action for which he has a remedy over against a third party for indemnity,
whether by contract or implication of law, may, by giving notice of suit to
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defendant would be required 3 to send notice to all third parties
who are or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim in the event that he is held liable. Failure to intervene
would make all matters necessarily included in the adjudication
binding on such third parties." An advantage of this procedure
over compulsory third party practice is that under the former a
situation could not arise where only one of two joint tortfeasors
has a right of contribution. And unlike Vigen this procedure would
not conclude persons who have not received notice and, properly
limited," would not bind persons having notice who are not
subject to the forum's jurisdiction.
the person ultimately liable and requesting him to defend, make all matters
necessarily included in the adjudication binding on such person. However,
the procedure of "vouching in" is not conclusive on the question of whether
the person served with notice is in such a relation to the vouching defendant
as to be liable over to him. Principles of res judicata are not involved. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J. C. Penny Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. App. 1964);
Karas v. Snell, 11 Ill. 2d 283, 142 N.E.2d 46 (1957); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
Wood, 9 App. Div. 2d 201, 193 N.Y.S.ad 147 (1959). "Vouching in" has been
largely supplanted by modern third party practice, but has not thereby been
eliminated. United States Wire & Cable Corp. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J. 121,
167 A.2d 638 (1961).
The American Law Institute has included a similar provision in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-607(5) provides in part:
Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation
for which his seller is answerable over (a) he may give his seller written
notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the seller may come
in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in
any action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact
common to the two litigations, then unless the seller after seasonable
receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound.
33. No sanction would be provided to compel the defendant to send
notice since it would normally be to his advantage to do so. Failure to send
notice will permit others to relitigate his liability, whether or not he was
successful, and to question the amount of damages if he was not successful.
If notice is sent and those persons receiving notice do not intervene, he is
benefited to the extent that they are bound by the adjudication. He could be
harmed only to the extent that persons receiving notice intervene because of
the notice and somehow adversely affect his defense.
34. Consequently, in a subsequent contribution action, a claimant having
notice could question neither the liability of an exonerated defendant nor
the amount of damages recovered against an unsuccessful defendant. Whether
the same result should obtain if it can be established that a claimant had
actual notice from other sources is not within the scope of this note.
If a claimant did intervene, the compulsory cross-claim provision would
require him to assert his claim for contribution.
35. The notice should be limited so that it would not affect the rights of
persons who are not subject to the forum's jurisdiction. See text following
note 17 upra.
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However, it would not encourage litigation of contribution
claims to the extent that compulsory third party practice would.
Under the latter failure to bring in a third party would bar the
defendant from securing contribution if he were unsuccessful
and permit others to relitigate his liability if he were exonerated;
and failure of a third person with notice to intervene would merely
bar his right to secure contribution in the event that the defendant is exonerated and prevent the third party from contesting
the liability of the defendant and the amount of damages recovered against him in the event that he is found liable.
The only important difference between these alternatives
would seem to be the degree to which they compel litigation of
contribution claims in a single action. Therefore a decision to
adopt one or the other will depend on the purpose of the reform.
If it is to provide the same degree of compulsion as exists under
the Vigen rule without its disadvantages, the notice provision
should be adopted. But if the purpose is to provide a greater
degree of compulsion, the compulsory third party practice provision should be adopted.8 8

B.

DAMAGE TO REPUTATION AND CoIATERAL LEGAL DIsABILITns As BASES FOR APPEAL OF CRnmINAL CONVIcTIoN

In State v. Zeche? the Minnesota Court considered whether
expiration of 1a criminal sentence rendered the conviction moot
so as to preclude an appeal. Appellant had been convicted of abortion, given a suspended sentence, and placed on probation. Subsequently she was discharged from probation and, pursuant to
statute, restored to "all ... [her] civil rights and to full citizenship,
with full right to vote and hold office, the same as if such conviction had not taken place . . . ."* On appeal, although the State had

not raised the question in its brief, the Court held that the discharge did not render the appeal moot. In doing so the -Court
declined to determine definitively the extent to which the restoration statute erases legal disabilities collateral to criminal conviction. Apparently, however, it rested its decision on the likelihood
that some such disabilities would burden appellant,4 as well as
36. The compulsory cross-claim provision should of course be adopted
regardless of which alternative is chosen.
1. 128 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1964).
2. Appellant was convicted under Mum. STAT. § 617.18 (1961).
3. Mmw. STAT. ANN. § 609.165 (1) (1964) (superseding Minn. Sess. Laws
1919, ch. 290, §§ 1-4; Minn. Sess. Laws 1907, ch. 34, §§ 1-2, ch. 187, §§ 1-2).
4. The Court pointed out that it was not clear whether the restoration
statute, Mum. STAT. AmN. § 609.165 (1964) (see note 8 supra), would exempt
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on the, damage to appellant's reputation by conviction of a crime
of this nature.The United States Supreme Court has held that where a criminal sentence has been fully executed, moral stigma or damage to
reputation arising from conviction is insufficient by itself to present a case or controversy for appellate review. Instead, the appellant must show "that under either state or federal law further
penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the
judgment ... ."' The latter rule was followed in Fiwick v. United
States,7 where appeal was allowed from a conviction which made
the appellant liable to deportation as an alien and diminished his
chance of acquiring citizenship; and in United States v. Morgan,
where the conviction appealed from had resulted in the application of a recidivist statute to lengthen a subsequent sentence
which the appellant was servingat the time of his appeal. Although the opinions in Fiswick and Morgan emphasized the
presence or probable imminence of specific burdens arising from
disabilities, both contain language indicating that it is enough
that the disabilities may damage appellant in the indefinite
future.9
a convicted criminal from Mum. STAT. § 43.14 (1961), which gives a civil
service examiner discretion to exclude applicants with criminal convictions.
It has been held that restoration does not bar the operation of a recidivist
statute. State ex rel. Stout v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 503, 90 N.W.2d 910, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958). See generally Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon,
88 U. PA. L. REv. 177 (1939); Note, 14 Mum. L. REv. 293 (1930). Even if
the pardon is recognized by the State in which the conviction took place as
barring application of the recidivist statute, other jurisdictions are not bound
to extend the same treatment. Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 614 (1939). The effect of restoration upon the application of municipal criminal registration statutes is not clear. See Note, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 60, 69 (1954). Moreover, it has been suggested that such
restoration does not qualify one for jury service. Ors. ATT'Y GEN. 260 A-11
(Minn. Oct. 8, 1959).
5. The Court emphasized in Zecher the adverse effect of conviction upon
appellant's opportunity to obtain private employment. 128 N.W.2d at 87.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Court has mentioned previously that a felony
conviction may be used to impeach a witness even though his civil rights
have been restored. State v. Stem, 210 Minn. 107, 297 N.W. 321 (1941).
6. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943).
7. 329 U.S. 211, 220-23 (1946).
8. 346 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1954).
9. In Fiswick the Supreme Court noted that regardless of the consequences
of conviction upon his deportation and naturalization rights, the convict would
"carry through life the disability of a felon; and by reason of that fact he
might lose certain civil rights. Thus [he] has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed
on him. In no practical sense, therefore, can [his] case be said to be moot." 829
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This broader language is also evident in the Supreme Court's
more recent decision in Pollard v. United States,o where a sentence entered subsequent to revocation of probation was appealed
on the ground that it was invalid. The petitioner had been released, and the sentence had expired before argument of the case. In
holding that the appeal was not moot, the Supreme Court failed to
cite any particular collateral burden arising from the sentence, but
noted simply that the possibility of consequences collateral to the
imposition of sentence was "sufficiently substantial" to support
an appeal." The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Rothl 2 may create some doubt as to the propriety of this broad construction of the Supreme Court's language.
In Roth the appeal was held moot because "no showing [was]
made that the existence of the conviction affects [appellant's]
present legal rights. . . ."12 The court distinguished Morgan on
the basis that appellant had not, as in Morgan, already been subjected to penalties under a recidivist statute. Yet it seems to have
overlooked the danger that appellant might subsequently be sentenced under a recidivist statute after his appeal time had expired,
or that other burdens might be imposed upon him because of his
conviction.' 4 In any event, the same court has subsequently used
language which manifests adherence to a broader construction
of the Supreme Court cases. 5
U.S. at 222. In Morgan the Supreme Court, citing Fiswick, said that "although
the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent
convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights may be affected." 346
U.S. at 512-13.
10. 852 U.S. 354, 358 (1957).
11. Ibid. The Supreme Court cited Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955),
without comment, in which it was indicated that revocation of sentence precluded the use of the conviction for a deportation order. See also Note, 74
HAnv. L. REv. 1615 (1961).
12. 283 F.Rd 765 (2d Cir. 1960).
13. 283 F.2d at 766. (Emphasis added.)
14. See notes 4 &5 supra.
15. United States v. Galante, 298 F.ad 72 (2d Cir. 1962), involved a contempt conviction. The court indicated in that case that since criminal contempt is not a felony, United States v. DeSimone, 267 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959), it will not affect application of recidivist
statutes. See, e.g., Mm. STAT. ANN. § 609.155 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
1941. Moreover, since the appellant had had at least one prior felony conviction it was unlikely that the contempt conviction would produce any additional loss of civil rights. Thus, the court's conclusion that the contempt
conviction would have no "collateral effects" of a legal nature was probably
accurate. More important for present purposes is the implicit recognition that
the possibility of future burden is sufficient to sustain an appeal.
If this interpretation is correct, it appears that both the rule in the federal
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The views of state courts as to when a criminal case becomes
moot often are not clearly defined because of the failure of some
jurisdictions to distinguish between moot cases and those in which
the defendant is deemed to have waived his right of appeal. The
Minnesota Court, for example, has held that voluntary payment
of a fine' constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal 7 However,
the concept of mootness is apparently the crucial consideration
in such cases since the fine could not be recovered even in the
event of a successful appeal,' and in addition, because the Minnesota Court does not apply the rule where a substantial portion of
the judgment, apart from the fine, remains unexecuted.19 A true
waiver would have been binding regardless of whether the judgment was subsequently executed 0 Conversely, appeals have been
dismissed as moot in cases where the real basis of decision appears
to have been a determination that the appellants, by voluntary
act or failure to act, had waived their right of appeal.'
Even where the state courts have considered cases involving
the question of mootness and treated them as such, they have
failed to evolve a single meaning for the term. There is some support for the view that a defendant appealing from an executed
courts and that announced by the Minnesota Court in Zecher will almost
always result in allowing the appeal, even though the former is based on
legal consequences and the latter partly on moral stigma attending the conviction. Some legally sanctioned disabilities almost inevitably follow a felony
conviction. See notes 4 & 5 supra. Thus, under the federal rule only in the
rare instance where such is not the case will the appeal be dismissed as moot.
The Zecher rule, in addition to the cases covered by the federal rule, would
permit appeal in all cases except those involving convictions for crimes whose
nature will not create a burden on defendant's reputation. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
16. Voluntary payment of fine occurs when defendant fails to avail himself
of the benefits of a stay of execution. State v. Peoples Ice Co., 127 Minn. 252,
254-55, 149 N.W. 286, 287 (1914).
17. State v. Boulton, 229 Minn. 576, 40 N.W.2d 417 (1949); State v.
People's Ice Co., 127 Minn. 252, 149 N.W. 286 (1914). But see State v.
Prickett, 217 Minn. 629, 15 N.W.2d 95 (1944), where, defendant having
appealed before the fine was paid, the Court allowed withdrawal of a guilty
plea made in justice court.
18. State v. People's Ice Co., supra note 17.
19. State v. Kuluver, 123 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1964).
20. Of. Engstron v. Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 308, 41
N.W.2d 422 (1950).
21. Powell v. State, 41 Ala. App. 569, 141 So. 2d 209 (1962) (acceptance
of probation); Manlove v. State, 153 Ind. 80, 53 N.E. 385 (1899) (acceptance
of a pardon); State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 201 Pac. 1027 (1921) (failure to
obtain stay of execution); Tropp v. State, 17 Okla. Crim. 702, 186 Pac. 737
(1920) (alternative holdings, mootness and failure to perfect appeal within
statutory time).
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judgment must show present or imminent impairment of a specific
legal interest by the conviction. 2 Other courts have dismissed
appeals without discussion of the effect the conviction would have
on the defendant's reputation or legal interests.23 One court has
indicated that the possibility that a conviction may burden the
defendant's legal interests in the future will sustain an appeal 4
Finally, a substantial number of jurisdictions have agreed with
the Minnesota Court that injury to reputation and moral stigma
resulting from a conviction constitute a sufficient basis for appeal,
or have rejected suggestions that the case was moot without comment. 5 However, none of these cases indicate that the crime involved must be of a particularly serious nature,26 as required by
the Minnesota Court.
The decision in the Zecher case seems well attuned to modem
realities. It is arguable that the State lacks sufficient interest in a
damaged reputation or the burdens arising from collateral legal
disabilities to justify the cost of a new trial when the sole purpose
is vindication of the same. However, this argument assumes that
the State bears no responsibility for or interest in the treatment
of convicted criminals after expiration of their sentences. It ignores the inherent tie between the conviction and its consequences; in a sense, a besmirched reputation and collateral legal
92. State v. Zisch, 248 Wis. 175, 9 N.W.2d 625 (1943). In McCarthy v.
Wayne County Circuit Judge, 294 Mich. 368, 293 N.W. 683 (1940), the court
refused to review the conviction of defendant who was dismissed from the
municipal police force because of a contempt conviction on the ground that
the record did not properly state that his reinstatement depended on reversal.
See also State v. Smiley, 98 Mo. 605, 19 S.W. 247 (1889), which held that
the desire to remove voting disqualification and prohibition from holding
office was sufficient to sustain the appeal. It did not indicate, however, that
the appeal would have been dismissed absent such collateral consequences.
But see Roby v. State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897), which held interest
in reputation to be a sufficient basis for an appeal if the writ of error is prosecuted before execution of the sentence.
23. People v. Brown, 845 Ill. App. 610, 104 N.E.2d 333 (1959); State v.
Westfall, 37 Iowa 575 (1873); Lantz v. State, 90 Olda. Crim. 379, 214 P.ed
451 (1950); Carey v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 272, 217 Pac. 895 (1923).
24. State v. Jacobson, 848 Mo. 258, 152 S.W.2d 1061 (1941). The court
indicated that the possibility that the defendant might be subjected in the
future to a habitual offender statute influenced its holding that the case was
not moot even though the defendant had received a pardon.
25. State es rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 297, 174 N.E. 808 (1931);
Commonwealth v. Flechner, 167 Mass. 1, 44 N.E. 1053 (1896); State v.
Jacobson, supra note 24; Bower v. State, 135 N.J.L. 564, 58 A.2d 857 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Gallagher v. O'Neil, 3 N.Y. Supp. 126 (City Ct. 1888); Roby v.
State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897).
26. Indeed, Bower v. State, supra note 25, involved a disorderly conduct
conviction and Gallagher v. O'Neil, supra note 25, a minor contempt conviction.
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disabilities are as much a part of the punishment as the sentence
itself. Certainly they play a substantial role in the deterrence of
crime.? Even more important, a denial of the right of appeal in
these circumstances would deprive a wrongfully convicted individual of an opportunity to obtain redress from the only available
source, the judicial system which created his predicament. In light
of these considerations it seems only fair to impose upon the public the cost of vindicating a victim of a miscarriage of public
justice.
However, the scope of this argument limits its application. The
Zecher Court itself recognized the importance of considering the
nature of the crime in determining whether the conviction would
constitute a burden on reputation so as to support an appeal on
that ground alone? 8 Moreover, while it does not seem practical
to require an appellant to show that a legal disability does or is
certain to burden him," he should be required to show that such
disabilities can adversely affect himo

C.

HABEAS CORPUs AVAILABLE AS A REMEDY FOR CRUEL AND
UNUsUAL PUNISHMENT

In State ex rel. Cole v. Tahash, the Minnesota Court reviewed
the availability to a prisoner of the writ of habeas corpus to obtain a hearing to determine whether he had suffered cruel and
unusual punishment during his incarceration. Following his conviction for robbery petitioner was sentenced to the State Reformatory at St. Cloud. Subsequently he was transferred to the
State Prison at Stillwater and then to the Security Hospital at
St. Peter. His family employed a psychiatrist who found him sane,
and he was later returned to Stillwater. Petitioner then sought a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the transfers were wrongful
and that he had been treated cruelly while at St. Peter. The Court
affirmed denial of the petition without prejudice, indicating that
the writ would issue if the petition were supported by a prima
facie showing of a course of cruel and unusual treatment occurring
at a time and place and under circumstances giving rise to the
inference that such treatment would continue in the absence of
judicial intervention.
27. See Judge George H. Baldt, A.B.A. SECTION CIUM. L., 1962 PRoCEEDINGS 49.

28. 128 N.W.ed at 83.
29. See the list of possible disabilities discussed in notes 4 & 5 supra.
80. Cf. quotation from St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1948),
in text accompanying note 6 supra; United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72
(2d Cir. 1962).
1. 129 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. 1964).
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Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment? Moreover the
federal provision is binding upon the States through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment The availability of
habeas corpus to secure protection against cruel and unusual
punishment has frequently occasioned controversy among both
state and federal courts' since the writ traditionally issued only
to release one "illegally" or "unlawfully" restrained,' and courts
consistently defined an "illegal" or "unlawful" restraint as one
imposed by a court that lacked proper jurisdiction.6 However,
2. U.S. CoNn. amend. VIII; Mm. CONST. art. 1, § 5 ("[N]or shall cruel
or unusual punishments be inflicted.").
3. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
However, it is not easy to define cruel and unusual punishment during a
valid incarceration. The courts have apparently applied a standard of reasonableness to judge the constitutionality of the acts of prison officials. See
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962), in which the
court used as a standard the physical, mental, and emotional background of
the prisoner, as well as the nature of the punishment. See also Gordon v.
Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948); Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237
Pac. 203 (1925). Thus disciplinary beatings by hand or by rubber hose have
been held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Jones,
207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953); Gordon v. Garrson, supra. On the other hand,
solitary confinement and dietary restrictions, Matter of Candito, 31 Hawaii
982, 995 (1931) (dictum), and segregation of troublesome prisoners, McBride
v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 AAd 881 (App. Div. 1957), have been
upheld. Of. The John and Winthrop, 182 Fed. 380 (9th Cir. 1910). Necessary medical tests do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In re
Berry, 118 Cal. App. 2d 613, 248 P.2d 420 (1952). In addition, claims that
punishment itself was cruel and unusual have been rejected. Rosenberg v.
Carrol, 99 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
4. Compare Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 864 (1949) (writ will issue to test punishment inflicted
following valid conviction), and Coffin v. Reichard, 148 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945), with Williams v. Steele, 194 R2d 32
(8th Cir. 1952), 36 Miar. L. REv. 974, and Morrison v. Meyers, 174 F. Supp.
818 (E.D. Pa. 1959), and Hodge v. Heinze, 165 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1958),
and Thorpe v. Clark, 67 F. Supp. 703 (D.N.H. 1946) (writ will not issue).
The state courts are also split. Compare In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372
P.ed 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962) (habeas corpus may be used both to test
jurisdiction and to protect a prisoner's basic constitutional rights), and People
ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44
(1961) (writ will issue), with Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194
Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 925 (1961) (writ will not issue to test treatment
following valid conviction), and Smith v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 66, 362 P.2d 581
(1961). See also Kostal v. Tinsley, 381 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1963) (sole question
was whether convicting court had jurisdiction); Mennelli v. Raines, 341 P.2d
921 (Okla. 1959) (question of cruel and unusual punishment should have been
raised on appeal).
5. JENKs, A SHoRT HrsToR or LAW 342 (1912).
6. See Note, 61 HAsv. L. REv. 657, 658 (1948).
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this concept has gradually been expanded,7 and jurisdictions
taking a more modem view now grant the writ to test alleged
constitutional violations even though the sentencing court had
jurisdiction.' In Minnesota the availability of the writ is governed by both constitutional and statutory provisions, and in
construing the statute the Minnesota Court had previously held
that habeas corpus would not issue to test cruel and unusual
punishment during a lawful incarceration.o The Court in the
Cole case expressly modified these precedents and declared that
the writ could issue even though both the competency of the
tribunal and the validity of the sentence were unquestioned."
While courts have generally been reluctant to grant the writ
when it would interfere with internal prison discipline, the
propriety of this forbearance is open to serious doubt when the
prisoner makes a prima facie showing that his constitutional
rights have been violated during incarceration. If it is agreed
that such a prisoner ought to be afforded some relief, the problem
is narrowed to a determination of which remedy would be most
appropriate and effective.
As the Court recognized in Cole, a number of alternatives to
habeas corpus have been suggested as means for protecting
prisoners' constitutional rights. Nevertheless, actions to secure
injunctions or writs of mandamus regulating the conduct of
prison officials have usually been unsuccessful.'8 Some authorities
7. The federal courts have held a number of factors sufficient to deprive
a court of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (unconstitutional state statute); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (unconstitutional federal statute); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 168 (1874)
(excessive sentence).
8. See Ex parte Maro, 248 P.2d 185 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); of. United
States v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1946).
9. Mmx. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (quoted in note 2 supra). MmAE
. STAT. § 589.01
(1961) provides:
Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty,
except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment
of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, . . . may
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful ....
10. State ex rel. Richter v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 42, 66 N.W.2d 17, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 893 (1954); State ex rel. Koalska v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 46,
66 N.W.2d 337, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 908 (1954).
11. 129 N.W.2d at 908.
12. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829

(1951).
13. See, e.g., Sutton v. Settle, 302 F2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962); Dayton v.
Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949); Mummiani v. La Vallee, 21 Mise. 2d 437, 199 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1959). But
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have suggested that courts might invoke their contempt power
to protect a prisoner on the theory that prison authorities, as
officers of the court charged with responsibility for carrying out its
judgments, are obligated to receive and safely keep the prisoner.
On this analysis, their failure to do so subjects them to liability
for contempt." However, this remedy is apparently too broad and
generally has been denied on the ground that supervision of
penal institutions is an exclusively executive function' 5 Federal
legislation also grants a claim for damages to any party deprived
of his constitutional rights under color of law.'6 But the value of
this remedy in preventing cruel and unusual punishment is limited by the slight deterrent effect upon potential wrongdoers of
the rather remote possibility of damage actions.' 7
These limitations on the effectiveness of alternative remedies
were apparently recognized by the Court in the Cole case. Moreover, the expeditious nature of the writ of habeas corpus makes
it a peculiarly appropriate remedy for cases of cruel and unusual
punishment. 8 While habeas corpus formerly was available only
where the appropriate relief in the event of the prisoner's success would be complete release,' 9 it has recently been used to
reach a wider scope of remedies, including a directive to prison
authorities to respect a prisoner's constitutional rightso Though
see, Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 .(D.N.H. 1949) (by implication) (under certain circumstances use of injunction would be appropriate).
See also Sturm v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472, 478 (10th Cir. 1949) in which it
was said that a court lacks power to supervise "through mandamus or injunction processes the administrative conduct of a penitentiary or its discipline."
Generally, equity will not enjoin threatened physical injury. See McCLuFFOCK,
EQurrr §§ 158, 164 (2d ed. 1948).
14. See In re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889); Howard v. State, 28
Ariz. 433, 287 Pae. 203 (1925).
15. Ridgeway v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 117, 245 P.2d 268 (1952); People
ex rel. Grenfell v. District Court, 89 Colo. 78,299 Pac. 1 (1931).
16. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any . . . person . . . to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consitution ...

shall be liable to the party injured . . . ." 17 Stat. 18 (1871),

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). For cases permitting suit where mistreatment was
alleged, see, e.g., Hughs v. Noble, 95 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961); Coleman v.
Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp.
112 (N.D. Cal. 1955). For a general discussion of the remedies available under
civil rights legislation, see Comment, 8 Vna. L. REv. 379, 388 (1963).
17. See id. at 890.
18. 36 MxDm. L. REv. 974, 978 (1952).
19. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
20. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945); of. Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949).
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the applicable Minnesota statute contemplates complete release
of the prisoner," the Court indicated in Cole that upon a finding
of cruel and unusual punishment a court should issue such order
as it deems necessary under the record before it." The Court
probably reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to protect
any civil rights retained by prisoners, and that relief should be
directed to that end. 23 Hence it would not contravene the statute
to afford the prisoner a remedy less than complete release.
The Cole case, however, did not direct that the writ should
issue wherever a prisoner alleges cruel and unusual treatment.
Instead, the use of the writ was limited to those situations in
which the petitioner sets forth "(a) the facts respecting the
treatment claimed to be cruel and unusual; (b) the time and
place of such treatment; and (c) the identity of the person or
persons considered responsible for it."' Moreover, the Court
indicated that the facts alleged in the petition must give rise to
a reasonable inference that infringement of constitutional rights
will be continued or repeated unless judicial relief is granted. 5
Adherence to these standards should discourage application for
the writ where the claim of cruel and unusual punishment is
spurious. Thus the Cole decision represents a well-reasoned solution to the problem of preserving a prisoner's constitutional rights
without at the same time unnecessarily draining the efficiency
of the prisons or the courts.
D.

INCORRECT CITATION OF GOVERNING STATUTE IN INDICTMENT
OR IN-FORMATION AS BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTION

The primary purpose of an indictment or information is to
inform the accused of the charge against him so that he may prepare an adequate defense. In addition, they serve as a record of
the charge against the defendant to protect him from double
jeopardy and to inform the trial judge of the nature of the case.'
21. "If no legal cause is shown for such imprisonment or restraint, or for
the continuation thereof, such officer shall discharge the petitioner therefrom."
In.

STAT.

§

589.13 (1961).

22. 129 N.W.2d at 908.
23. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945): "The judge is not limited to a simple remand or discharge
of the prisoner, but he may remand with directions that the prisoner's retained civil rights be respected. .
24. 129 N.W.2d at 907-08.
25. Id. at 908; cf. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 259 (Srd Cir.) (separate
opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
1. See generally State v. Brown, 72 N.M. 274, 383 P.2d 243 (1963); 1 KwmIsAR, CREm\NAL LAW AND INVmuAL LEERTES 75-115 (rev. ed. 1960).
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Minnesota has provided by statute that a defect in the form of
an indictment or information shall not constitute ground for its
invalidation unless the defect operates to prejudice the substantial
rights of a defendant? Normally, if such instrument sets forth
the facts constituting the offense with which the defendant is
charged in a manner that clearly apprises him of its nature,3 designation of the wrong statute will be considered immaterial.' The
majority of jurisdictions have reached this result regardless of the
point in the proceedings at which objection to an erroneous designation is raised.'
In State v. Briton6 the Minnesota Court departed from this
general rule and held that designation of the wrong statute did
constitute substantial prejudice even though the facts constituting the offense were adequately presented. In that case defendant
had been charged with the crime of "uttering" a forged instrument, which was prohibited by Minnesota Statutes, section 620.19
2. MiNN. STAT. § 628.19 (1961).
3. The general tests by which the sufficiency of indictments and informations is determined axe set forth in Maur. STAT. § 628.18 (1961), which
provides in part:
The indictment shall be sufficient -if it can be understood therefrom:
(6) that the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition;
(7) that the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such
a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment,
upon a conviction, according to the right of the case.
The provisions of §§ 628.18-.19 apply to informations by virtue of MNur. STAT.
§ 628.30 (1961), which states that "all . . . provisions of law relating to indictments and for testing the validity thereof, shall apply to informations . . . ."
4. In Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382 (1897), the leading case in
point, the Supreme Court held that it was wholly immaterial what statute
the District Attorney had in mind when he drew the indictment or information so long as the charges made were embraced by some statute in force. The
Court went on to say that an examination must be made of the indictment
itself; if it properly charges an offense under the laws of the United States,
it will be upheld even though the District Attorney may have supposed the
offense was covered by a different statute.
5. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 3s Ala. App. 70, 30 So. 2d 479 (1947); People
v. Aresen, 91 Cal. App. 2d 26, 204 P.2d 389 (1949); Scott v. State, 49 Del.
401, 117 A.2d 831 (1955); State v. Morton, 142 Me. 254, 49 A.2d 907 (1946);
People v. Wolfe, 338 Mich. 525, 61 N.W.2d 767 (1953); State v. Brown, 72
N.M. 274, 383 P.2d 243 (1963); People v. Meyers, 207 Mise. 431, 138 N.Y.S.2d
613 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State v. Anderson, 259 N.C. 499, 130 S.E2d 857 (1963);
Scott v. State, 316 P.ad 192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
6. 265 Minn. 326, 121 N.W.2d 577 (1963). That branch of the Briton case
dealing with application of the recidivist statute is considered in Note, 48
Mmw. L. REv. 119, 152-56 (1963). The problem raised by the defective information was dealt with briefly, id. at 152 n.59.
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(1961). However, the information incorrectly stated the crime
of uttering to be governed by section 620.10,7 which in fact prohibits the act of forging an instrument. The Court held that
defendant's demurrer prior to the entry of a plea should have
been sustained since the citation of the wrong statute per se
resulted in defendant's being inadequately informed of the crime
with which he was charged and consequently prejudiced by being
deprived of the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
Subsequently, in State ex rel. Masters v. Tahash, the Court
refused to hold an identical information "fatally defective" when
the issue of prejudice to defendant's substantial rights was first
raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. Instead it was held that
even though the indictment was defective, the defect did not
prevent the convicting court from acquiring jurisdiction - hence
the judgment was not subject to collateral attack. More important for present purposes, the Court went on to hold that the
defect amounted to nothing more than "mere surplusage or an
irregularity" which was regarded as waived by defendant's plea.o
A similar result was subsequently reached in State v. Owens'0
and State v. Clark" where the defects in form were first raised on
appeal.
The only basis for distinction between Briton and its successors
appears to be the point in the proceedings at which the objection
to the indictment is raised. This distinction seems immaterial
in light of the purpose for requiring precisely worded indictments.
If a defendant is confused and cannot adequately prepare his
defense, a substantial right is prejudiced, and the conviction
should be reversed regardless of the phase in the proceeding
when the objection is first raised.' 2 In such cases there is no
rational justification for a court to hold that a conviction will
7. In the current Criminal Code these provisions are in MmN.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 609.625 (1964).
8. 266 Minn. 848, 128 N.W.2d 600 (1963).

9. Id. at 352, 123 N.W.2d at 603.
10. 129 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1964).
11. 131 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1964).
12. There are undoubtedly cases in which an error in the information could
prejudice a substantial right of the defendant. See People v. Meyers, 207
Misc. 431, 138 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955), in which defendant pleaded
guilty to an information charging him with a "traffic infraction." He was
adjudged guilty and fined five dollars. The court reversed, dismissed the
information, and ordered the fine remitted. It then held that the act in question
constituted a "crime" rather than a "traffic infraction." In so holding the
court concluded that a substantial right of defendant had been prejudiced
in that he was charged with a "traffic infraction" and convicted of a "crime."
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be reversed because a substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced only where the defendant objected at pre-trial, and will
not reverse for prejudice if the objection was first raised on appeal
or in a habeas corpus proceeding.' Thus, in determining whether
a defect warrants reversal, a court ought to consider whether
the error in fact prevents the indictment or information from
serving its essential functions and thereby prejudices defendant's
substantial rights.
It is arguable that Briton's substantial rights were not prejudiced. 4 While section 620.10 contained no reference to uttering,
section 620.19 provided that one who utters a forged instrument
shall be guilty in the same degree as if forgery had been committed. Thus, the information taken as a whole properly charged
Briton with forgery in the second degree, and the only error was
the section of the statute cited. Moreover, his demurrer to the
information indicated that he was aware of the error. Since the
Court's opinion contains no indication that Briton was confused
or that his defense was inadequately prepared as a result of the
defect, the conviction should have been sustained.r In addition,
since no objections were made on evidentiary questions, it would
seem that the judge was well informed as to the charge. Finally,
the Owens Court pointed out that the offense charged in an
indictment is determined by the facts alleged and not necessarily
by the name by which it is designated.' Hence, it would seem
that a defective citation would not raise a double jeopardy
problem.
It is difficult to explain the result in Briton in view of the
persuasive authority and subsequent decisions to the contrary."
Conceivably the Court was disturbed by the fact that defendant
had been sentenced under a recidivist statute to up to 20 years
13. MirN. STAT. § 628.19 (1961) provides for the invalidation of a defective indictment where the defect operates to prejudice substantial rights of
the defendant, without drawing any distinction as to the time the defect is
raised. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
14. Briton was charged with uttering a forged instrument. He pleaded
not guilty to that charge, defended against it, and was tried and convicted
of it. 265 Minn. at 328, 121 N.W.2d at 578.
15. In sustaining the convictions in Masters, Owens, and Clark, the Court
stated that there was no evidence of confusion or lack of adequate preparation. However, in Briton there was no mention of evidence of prejudice; the
Court evidently determined that prejudice existed as a matter of law because
of the trial court's failure to sustain the demurrer based on the defect.
16. 129 N.W.2d at 287.
17. See notes 4, 5, 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
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imprisonment for forging a check for $30.36.'8 However, even
this is not a satisfactory explanation since the Court also held
9
that the recidivist statute was inapplicable to the Briton facts.Y
Whatever the reason may be, the result was to force the Court
to distinguish Masters, Owens, and Clark on the basis of the
timeliness of the defendant's objection. Since this distinction is
untenable, Briton ought to be repudiated and future similar
cases resolved on the basis of the presence or absence of actual
prejudice.
E.

MusT INDUSTRIAL Co1\GVHssIoN APPOINT NEUTRAL PHYsICIAN TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN MEDICAL TESTImONY?

Confronted with a conflict in expert medical testimony' in
Chinn v. Board of Edue.,2 the Court remanded an Industrial
Commission decision awarding an employee workmen's compensation and ordered the Commission to designate a neutral physician to examine the employee and report his findings. The
Commission is to reconsider its decision in light of the physician's
report and testimony on cross-examination at a subsequent hearing. The Court ostensibly relied upon the Commission's statutory
power to appoint a neutral physician," asserting that this power
18. The Court stated: "While there were two other forged checks in small
amounts passed by defendant at about the same time, and he has a long
record of similar check-writing offenses, we cannot escape the conclusion that
a sentence of up to 20 years in prison is unduly harsh." 965 Minn. at 328 n.1,
121 N.W.2d at 578 n.1 (1963).
19. The prior conviction, in a foreign jurisdiction, was held not to be of
a "felony" within the meaning of the Minnesota recidivist statute, Minn.
Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 236, &1, at 338; see 265 Minn. at 29, 121 N.W.2d at 579.
1. The question was whether the employee was suffering from rheumatoid
spondylitis (an inflammation of the tissue of the spine) as a result of a fall
or whether he was suffering from hypertrophic arthritis attributable to his age.
2. 129 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1964).
3. Mumr. STAT. § 176.155(2) (1961) provides in part:
In each case of dispute as to the injury the commission ... may
upon its own ... motion, or upon request of any interested party ...
designate a neutral physician of good standing and ability to make an
examination of the injured worker and report his findings to the commission ...

. [E]ither party ...

may demand that such physician be

produced for purposes of cross-examination.
See also Mum. STAT. § 176.391(2) (1961), which permits the Commission, or
a commissioner or referee with the Commission's consent, to appoint a neutral
physician to examine the employee and report thereon, as part of their independent investigatory power.
Compare Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 390 (1964), which discusses the power of a
trial court to appoint a neutral physician in civil cases, and finds no case in
which the appointment of a neutral physician has been reversed, even though
not explicitly authorized by statute.
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was provided for cases where the Court "cannot find any basis
in the record which permits or justifies acceptance of one medical
opinion in preference to the other."'
Because fault is not at issue in workmen's compensation cases,
their resolution usually depends upon expert medical evidence of
the cause and extent of an employee's injury or illness. The parties to the litigation will often, therefore, lay opposing medical
opinions before the Commission which paradoxically must be
resolved by a non-expert trier of fact.' The frequent result is the
spectacle of a courtroom battle among physicians, compounded
by intimations of inadequate qualification and bias, which merely
confuse the trier of fact. The introduction of impartial physicians
has been advocated to minimize these difficulties.
Although technically a neutral physician's testimony merely
contributes evidentiary weight to one side or the other, there is
little doubt that, because of his court appointment, a neutral
witness possesses such an aura of authority that he essentially
becomes the trier of fact.7 But if, as is likely, the court-appointed
Since the statute leaves the choice of a neutral physician to the Commission, there is some danger that it will be tempted to select a neutral physician likely to sustain its findings. In New York an attempt has been made
to solve this problem by selecting neutral physicians on a rotating basis from
a panel selected by local medical associations. See Botein, The New York
MedicalExpert Testimony Project, 3 U. DET. L.J. 388 (1956).
4. 129 N.W.2d at 791.
5. Although the members of the Commission are not, strictly speaking,
medical experts, they will inevitably possess more expertise in medical matters
than a lay jury. This development of skill through the continuous handling
of medical questions is one of the reasons for entrusting adjudication of workmen's compensation cases to administrative bodies rather than the courts.
See, DAvis, ADMuISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 1.05 (1958). To the extent that
these bodies do possess such expertise, the utility of neutral physicians declines.
6. See Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App. 789, 799, 10 S.E.2d
99, 105 (1940), where the court said, "an examination by disinterested experts
chosen by the court would be more conducive to the ascertainment of truth
than that of physicians selected by the plaintiffs antagonists, whose examination and opinion are more apt to be partisan."
7. An example of the considerable influence a neutral physician may
exercise over the Industrial Commission is found in Baker v. MacGillis Gibbs
Co., 916 Minn. 469, 13 N.W.2d 457 (1944). The parties' physicians substantially agreed that the employee was totally disabled; they disagreed as to
whether the disability resulted wholly from an injury related to his employment. An impartial physician called to resolve this conflict stated that the
employee was unable to do heavy work, but that he should attempt to do
some light form of work. Apparently on the basis of this testimony, the Commission found the employee to be only partially disabled. The Minnesota
Court reversed, holding that the neutral physician's testimony fell "far short
of giving support to a finding of partial disability... ." 216 Minn. at 477,
13 N.W.2d at 460.
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physician is competent and objective, it is arguable that he will
more often be correct than will a lay fact-finder relying on conflicting medical testimony.8 If so, the complaint that the neutral
expert's testimony carries excessive weight loses some force. Furthermore, the parties' counsel retain the right to cross-examine
the impartial physician to demonstrate deficiencies in his analysis
or bring to light facts which he may not have considered in formulating his opinion.'
The statute conferring power upon the Commission to designate a neutral physician is phrased permissively,"o and the failure
to exercise this power has not previously been the basis for reversing Commission action." To the contrary, the Court has held
that, notwithstanding a conflict in medical testimony, the appointment of a neutral physician is discretionary with the Commission, whose action will only be disturbed, if ever, where it
constitutes a "manifest abuse of discretion."" Although the Court
8. However, the factors justifying the use of neutral physicians are inapplicable where conflicts in testimony arise from the existence of two schools
of thought, or from the possibility of drawing two equally reasonable inferences from a particular set of medically significant facts, rather than from
the incompetence or bias of the parties' witnesses.
9. The right of the parties to cross-examine neutral physicians called by
the Industrial Commission is guaranteed by MmN. STAT. § 176.155(2) (1961),
which is quoted in part in note 8 supra.
10. See ibid. See also O'Neil's Case, 262 Mass. 266, 159 N.E. 731 (1928), in
which the court said with reference to a statute similar to the foregoing
Minnesota provision, that, "while an impartial physician may be called by a
member of the board, the statute is not mandatory but permissive . . ."; and
Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App. 789, 800, 10 S.E.2d 99, 106
(1940), where the court, under a virtually identical statute, held that an administrative decision whether to appoint a neutral physician is not subject
to judicial review unless it appears that there has been a "clear and manifest
abuse" of discretion.
11. But of. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Downing, 218 S.W. 112 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1919).
12. Astell v. Cooke, 201 Minn. 108, 110, 275 N.W. 420, 421 (1937); accord,
Rehak v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 206 Minn. 96, 288 N.W. 22 (1989).
See also Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App. 789, 10 S.E.2d 99
(1940).
It might be argued .that Mmw. STAT. § 176.481 (1961) authorizes the Court
to order the appointment of neutral physicians whether or not there has been
"abuse of discretion." That statute empowers the Court to "reverse, affirm
or modify the order allowing .. . compensation and enter such judgment as
it deems just and proper. Where necessary the supreme court may remand
the cause to the commission for a new hearing or for further proceedings with
such directions as the court deems proper." However, the Court has apparently
not construed this statute that broadly, holding in Yureko v. Prospect Foundry Co., 262 Minn. 480, 115 N.W.ed 477 (1962), that, in workmen's compen-
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has not defined this phrase in the context of the Commission's
power to appoint a neutral physician, it has stated that a discretionary power is abused only when it is exercised arbitrarily."3
At the same time, recognizing that the trier of fact is in the best
position to evaluate the evidence, the Court has consistently
refused to disturb the Commission's findings of fact where they
are supported by competent testimony. 4 Thus it is quite inconsistent for the Court to reverse as "arbitrary" the Commission's
failure to appoint a neutral physician on the ground that the
evidence is so evenly balanced that there is no "basis" for choice
between conflicting testimony. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of
a situation where the failure to appoint a neutral physician would
constitute an abuse of discretion, except where there is insufficient
evidence to support the Commission's decision. In that case the
Court logically should reverse rather than remand with an order
to appoint a neutral physician.
In Chinn the Court did not hold that the Commission's decision was without evidentiary basis. Without citing any authority,
it simply remanded and directed the appointment of a neutral
physician on the ground that there was no "basis" in the record
for the Commission's choice between the conflicting medical
sation cases, it reviews only questions of law arising from the record, and
not questions of fact.
Since the statute appears at first blush to grant extremely broad power
to the Court which had not heretofore been exercised, the legislature might
be well advised to limit explicitly the Court's scope of review to matters
of law.
13. Batchelder v. Northwestern Hanna Fuel Co., 225 Minn. 250, 257, 30
N.W.2d 530, 534 (1948); Ogrosky v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 172 Minn. 46,
48, 214 N.W. 765, 766 (1927).
14. Yureko v. Prospect Foundry Co., 262 Minn. 480, 490, 115 N.W.2d
477, 484 (1962); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 287, 101 N.W.2d
435, 439 (1960); Richter v. Shoppe Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 108,
112, 100 N.W.2d 96, 98 (1959); Erickson v. Knutson, 237 Minn. 187, 195, 54
N.W.2d 118, 122 (1952); see 2 LAusoN, Wommnmns COMPENSATION LAW §
80.10 (1961) (the proposition called a truism). In Anderson v. Armour & Co.
the Court said: "[I]t is the policy of this court, in reviewing the findings of
the Industrial Commission, not to determine whether on the facts the decision
of the commission is correct or even preferable to another, but, rather, only
to determine whether the findings have sufficient basis of inference reasonably
to be drawn from the facts." 257 Minn. at 987, 101 N.W.2d at 439.
In general the findings of the Industrial Commission will not be disturbed
unless manifestly contrary to the evidence or unless a consideration of al
the evidence and the inferences permissible therefrom would require reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion. Richter v. Shoppe Plumbing &
Heating Co., supra. See generally Note, Evidence Before Administrative Tribunals in Minnesota, 23 MIxn. L. REv. 68 (1938).
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opinions. Thus, in a total departure from precedent, the Court in
effect assumed the Commission's responsibility for weighing expert testimony though lacking any opportunity to test credibility.
Subsequent decisions, ignoring the Chinn case, appear to reaffirm the Commission's power to resolve conflicts in medical
testimony unassisted by neutral physicians." Hence the explanation of this case may be that the Court realized that the Commission's decision was adequately supported by the evidence but
saw the appointment of a neutral physician as an excuse for
requiring reconsideration of a decision which it plainly did not
like, possibly because it doubted the credibility of some of the
testimony. If so, the Court has created no general principle to
guide the Commission's future decisions, but has simply provided
itself with a precedent for future, unpredictable intervention in
the province of the fact-finder when it disagrees with the latter's
judgment.

VIII. TAXATION
A.

CoRPORATE CONTRACTION ADOPTED AS STANDARD OF DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE IN TAXATION OF PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS

In Great No. Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation,'
taxpayer knew that Northwestern Fire and Marine Insurance
Company was managed entirely by Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, and that pursuant to contract Hartford had given
notice to terminate that arrangement. Following termination
Northwestern would have no employees or facilities; however, it
would retain a portfolio of securities with a fair market value in
excess of 6,000,000 dollars. Taxpayer determined to acquire these
securities for its stockholders by purchase of Northwestern's outstanding stock and complete liquidation of that company and
itself. However the Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance indicated that he would refuse to approve complete liquidation of
Northwestern. Therefore, while acquiring approximately 96 per
cent of the stock, taxpayer adopted a plan providing for complete
liquidation of Northwestern, or in the alternative for distribution
of its surplus and subsequent sale of its stock to third parties,
either one to be followed by complete liquidation of taxpayer.
While still seeking the Insurance Commissioner's approval to
15. Martin v. Swift & Co., 130 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1964); Jensen v. City
of Duluth, 130 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1964); Christenson v. Pedersen Bros., 130
N.W.ad 234 (Minn. 1964); Meyer v. A. B. McMahan Co., 130 N.W.2d 46
(Minn. 1964); Peterson v. Dairy Distribs., Inc., 129 N.W.Qd 908 (Minn. 1964).
1. 127 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. 1964).
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completely liquidate, taxpayer, pursuing a third alternative,
negotiated for a merger of Northwestern with Guaranty Security
Insurance Company to take effect after distribution of Northwestern's assets in excess of 750,000 dollars. When it appeared that
merging with Guaranty was the only feasible means of liquidating,
Northwestern authorized a distribution of 50 dollars per share,
which eliminated its retained earnings. Subsequently, taxpayer
caused Northwestern to undergo a statutory reduction of capital,
distribute the resulting surplus, and effectuate its merger with
Guaranty. Thereafter, Great Northern underwent a complete
liquidation and on its final tax return reported its profit from
these transactions as unrecognized gain? The Commissioner of
Taxation determined a deficiency on the ground that the gain
constituted dividend income subject to tax. The Board of Tax
Appeals reversed the Commissioner, holding that business contraction is the test of dividend nonequivalence for the purpose
of partial liquidation, and that physical redemption of stock was
not necessary to effectuate a partial liquidation in this case
Hence, the distribution was in partial liquidation and consequently would be treated as payment for the stock," and therefore the gain would not be recognized to taxpayer.6 The Minnesota Court affirmed, holding that the Board's determination was
reasonably supported by the evidence.7
2. Taxpayer relied upon Mnr. STAT. 1 290.135 subd. 2(a) (1961) which
provides:
If: (1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after
December 31, 1956, and (2) within the 12-month period beginning on
the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet
claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation
from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month
period.
8. Great No. Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, Minn. Bd.
of Tax Appeals, No. 893, June 20, 1962.
4. MnrN. STAT. § e90.135 subd. 4(a) provides in part:
distribution[s] shall be treated as in partial liquidation of a corporation
if ... (2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend,
is in redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation pursuant to
a plan, and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan is
adopted ....

5. "Amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation... shall
be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for the stock." Mnur. STAT.
2290.134 subd. 1(a)(2) (1961).
6. MAnr. STAT. § 290.185 subd. 2(a) (1961), quoted in note 9 supra.
7. The Court's scope of review is limited to the question of whether there
is reasonable evidence to sustain the Board's finding. Mu. STAT. § 271.10
subd. 1 (1961).
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The parties stipulated that if the distribution was in partial
liquidation, no gain or loss would be recognized to taxpayer.
Moreover, the dispute was limited to treatment of the original 50
dollars per share distribution from surplus.9 Thus, the only issue
was whether that distribution was in partial liquidation. 0 The
Commissioner contended that the distribution was not in partial
liquidation because not in accordance with the statutory requirement that it (1) be pursuant to a plan of liquidation; (2) not be
essentially equivalent to a dividend; and (3) be in redemption of
a part of the corporate stock." The Court summarily affirmed
the Board's finding that the distribution was pursuant to a plan
of liquidation on the ground that it was reasonably supported
by the evidence.' 2
In determining whether a distribution is essentially equivalent
to a dividend, Minnesota Statutes section 290.131, subd. 2, which
is identical to section 302 of the InternalRevenue Code of 1954,
must be distinguished from Minnesota Statutes section 290.135,
subd. 4(a) (2), the counterpart of section 346(a) (2) of the code."
Section 302, entitled "Distributions in Redemption of Stock," is
concerned primarily with corporate distributions involving only
a portion of the shareholders, e.g., purchase of stock by a corporation to eliminate a group of hostile shareholders. While that section does not define a "dividend," it does provide that the distribution will not be taxed as a dividend, inter alia, if the distribution is "substantially disproportionate" to the ownership
interest of the recipient, as defined in section 302(b) (2) (c), or if
it terminates the recipient's entire interest in the corporation."
8. Thus, it was agreed that if the distribution was in partial liquidation,
it would be treated as payment in exchange for the stock and the resultant
gain would not be recognized to taxpayer since it was undergoing a 12-month
plan of liquidation. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
9. Since the $50 per share distribution eliminated earned surplus the remaining ones were a return of capital.
10. 127 N.W.d at 448.
11. See MuN. STAT. § 290.135 subd. 4(a)(2) (1961), quoted in note 4 supra.
12. 127 N.W.ed at 449.
13. The Minnesota Court had never before had occasion to construe Mum.
STAT. § 290.185 subd. 4(a)(2). Hence it was necessary to rely on the relevant
provisions of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, their equivalents from the 1939
Code, and the cases decided under them.
14. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 30(b)(2) & (3). Section 302(b)(1)
provides that a distribution may also escape treatment as a dividend if it is
not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Moreover § 802(b)(5) provides
that in determining whether the test under § 802(b)(1) is met, the fact that
the requirements of § 802(b)(2)-(S) are not met "shall not be taken into account." It is arguable, therefore, that a pro rata distribution may qualify as
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It is true that both section 802 and section 346(a) (2) (defining
partial liquidations) pertain to transactions in which a corporation
makes distributions to its shareholders. Moreover, both provide
for capital gain treatment for the shareholder if the distribution
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend and is in redemption of
part of the corporation's stock. 5 However the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 failed to distinguish between "redemptions" and
"partial liquidations." Although there was provision for both
in section 115 of that code, they were defined in substantially
similar terms.'( But judicial decisions distinguished the two and
treated a distribution as in partial liquidation when dictated by
sound business purposes other than a desire to minimize taxes. 7
The courts deemed the business purpose test satisfied when the
distribution was incident to a "corporate contraction." 8 Nevertheless, the drafters of the 1954 Code felt that "existing law ...
[was] complicated by the fact that stock redemptions .

.

. [were]

included within the terms of the partial liquidation provisions.""
Accordingly, in an effort to articulate the distinction between the
two, they provided that partial liquidations were to be "characterized by what happens solely at the corporate lever' while
redemptions were to be viewed "at the shareholder level" (i.e.,
the effect of the distribution upon the relative interests of the
stockholders) They further stated that "corporate contraction"
a redemption under § 302. If so, and if the phrase "essentially equivalent to
.o

a dividend" means the same thing in M$302 and 846(a)(2), it may be that
§ 346(a)(2) is surplusage. Both also require a "redemption," and the additional
requirement of a "plan" under § 346(a)(2) would seem to be more a matter
of form than substance. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
15. See note 14 supra.
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1989, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (1939), provided that
"if a corporation cancels or redeems its stock .. . at such time and in such
manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole
or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend
. . .," it shall be treated as such, while § 115(i) provided that a partial liquidation "means a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete
cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of its stock."
17. See 3 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 2308.0815-.0328.
18. See, e.g., Joseph W. Inler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948); Sam Rosania, Sr., 25
P-H TAx CT. MEM. 56-116 (1956).
19. S. Rn. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954); see note 16 supra.
20.
... [The] Committee, as did the House bill, separates into their significant elements the kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated
in the definition of a partial liquidation. Those distributions which may
have capital-gain characteristics because they are not made pro rata
among the various shareholders would be subjected, at the shareholder
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is the relevant test for the purpose of partial liquidation to
determine what happens at the corporate level and consequently
whether the distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend.2 1
Relying upon this legislative history, the Minnesota Court
applied the corporate contraction test to determine whether the
distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend?. A corporate contraction for this purpose is a curtailment of corporate

business activity necessitated by the distribution in question."
Thus, a distribution accompanying a contraction is not regarded
as essentially equivalent to a dividend, 4 but as the sale by the
corporation of a segment of its business, or by each shareholder
of a portion of his stock." Such a distribution is a limited version
of a complete liquidation, which in turn has been regarded as
analogous to the sale by shareholders of their entire interests.
level, to the separate tests described in part I of this subehapter [section
802]. On the other hand, those distributions characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets distributed
would be included as within the concept of a partial liquidation [section
846J.
S. REP. No. 1622, 88d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954). (Emphasis supplied.)
21. "It is intended that a genuine contraction of the business as under
present law will result in partial liquidation .... However, a distribution of
a reserve for expansion is not a partial liquidation." Id. at 962. However, one
authority has argued that even in the absence of this express repudiation of
that line of pre-1954 cases holding that distribution of a reserve for expansion
is a partial liquidation, "it would be improper to interpret a general intention
to carry forward 'existing law' as either a blanket endorsement of every
judicial decision theretofore rendered or as preventing further evolutionary
developments in what is at best an imprecise concept imposed upon very
divergent sets of facts." Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and
PartialLiquidations,44 Comma L.J. 299, 309 (1959).
22. The Court treated "business-purpose" and "corporate-contraction" as
unrelated tests of dividend equivalence. However, the business-contraction
theory is the accepted test for determining valid business purpose. Of. Chrommie, Section 846(aX2)): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Rzv. 407, 416
(1956). Contra, Bittker, supra note 21, at 807 n.29.
28. See notes 20 & 21 supra.
24. In recognition of this, the Court stated in GreatNorthern:
The distributions made by Northwestern reduced its assets from something over $6,000,000 to $750,000. Northwestern continued to exist as
a corporate entity, but after distributing its portfolio of securities it
was incapable of engaging in the insurance business to the extent that
it had previously. Northwestern had held the portfolio to cover losses
arising under the policies it had written. With the portfolio gone and
only $750,000 in remaining assets, Northwestern was necessarily required to contract the scope of its business.
127 N.W.2d at 458. (Footnotes omitted.)
25. See generally Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 Sari. L. REV. 13 (1956).

1964])

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

193

Because of these analogies both partial and complete liquidations
are taxed at capital gain rates.
In Joseph W. Imler," taxpayer elected to forego rebuilding
two floors destroyed by fire, and instead distributed the insurance
proceeds to its shareholders. As a result taxpayer discontinued
two unprofitable segments of its operations. The Tax Court held
this to be a valid business contraction.T Furthermore, business
contraction has been found where a corporation, as a consequence
of losing a franchise, has sold its inventory and distributed the
proceeds to its shareholders;" where a corporation has voluntarily
discontinued part of its business and excess assets, including
working capital attributable to the discontinued portion of the
business were distributed in exchange for its stock; 9 and where
discontinuance of a corporation's nonprofitable departments was
followed by a 30 per cent stock redemption.so The Great Northern
Court was apparently concerned with whether Northwestern,
the distributing corporation, had in fact restricted its business
operations. The Court concluded that after termination of its
contract with Hartford and distribution of its assets in excess of
750,000 dollars, Northwestern necessarily contracted its business,
notwithstanding that it continued to exist as a corporate entity and
remained licensed to do insurance business, 1 and in fact remained
in the insurance business as a result of merging with Guaranty.
The fact that the contraction was voluntary3 2 did not foreclose
a finding that Northwestern underwent a partial liquidation."
The difficulty with the Court's finding that a business contraction occurred is the apparent absence of any "contraction"
in the sense that a portion of the corporate business was "lopped
off" as in the cases cited above. Instead, Northwestern entirely
terminated its business activity when Hartford canceled its contract and remained dormant for six months while the bulk of its
assets were distributed. At the end of this period its remaining
26. 11 T.C. 886 (1948).
27. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1
(a) (1955); and Minn. Income Tax Regs. § 2013.5(4)-(a) cite the Iler facts
with approval as a situation which satisfies the business-contraction test.
28. Clarence R. O'Brien, 20 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 1140 (1951).
29. Rev. Rul. 232, 1960-9 Cmvr. But,. 115.
30. Heber Scoweraft Inv. Co., 14 P-H TAx CT. MArn. 775 (1945).
31. 127 N.W.2d at 453-54.
82. The Court was cognizant that Great Northern's sole purpose in buying
Northwestern's stock was to acquire the latters portfolio. 127 N.W.2d at 452.
3. This result does not conflict with legislative history: "Voluntary bona
fide contraction of the corporate business may of course also . . ." satisfy
the corporate contraction test. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
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assets were in effect sold to Guaranty in exchange for Guaranty
stock. However, while a contraction in the classical sense was
absent, the overall transaction bore striking resemblance to a
complete liquidation which, but for the Insurance Commissioner's
position, would have eventuated. In effect the bulk of Northwestern's assets were distributed to its shareholders, and the
remainder sold to Guaranty, a third party, while the proceeds
of the sale of Guaranty stock were distributed to the Northwestern shareholders. Accordingly, it would appear that the decision promotes realization of the legislative purpose by extending
capital gain treatment to a distribution essentially in complete
liquidation even though it technically met the requirements of
neither complete nor partial liquidation. Thus, the decision did
not permit utilization of the partial liquidation provision to "bailout" corporate earnings and profits at capital gain rates. In
Great Northern there is no indication that earnings and profits
were retained with an eye to tax avoidance; moreover there was
in essence a complete termination of Northwestern's business.
Even though the Court's decision may accord with legislative
purpose, it is questionable whether it ought to be permitted to
separate earnings and profits from a corporation and distribute
them to shareholders at capital gain rates without an accompanying change in proportionate interests of the stockholders. 4 It
is difficult to comprehend what rationale, if any, justifies favored
tax treatment of such pro rata distributions merely because they
are accompanied by business contraction. The decision of the Tax
Court in Joseph W. Imler 5 seems to suggest that the preference
is premised upon the view that retained earnings "used" in the
business somehow lose their character as "retained earnings" and
acquire that of "capital," 6 while this presumably is not true of
retained earnings saved or invested outside the corporation's
business activity. Thus, this reasoning proceeds, a distribution
of retained earnings used in the business which is made possible
by a contraction of business activity is a distribution of "capital."
The major difficulty with this argument is that no one has
84. Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and PartialLiquidations,
44 Conwnia L.J. 299, 807 n.22 (1959).
85. 11 T.C. 886, 841 (1948).
36. The Imler court reasoned that
this reduction in operations likewise reduced the amount of capital
necessary for carrying on the -business activities of the company. This
was a bona fide contraction of business operations and consequent reduction in capital used. The company thus had a real and legitimate
purpose for reducing its outstanding capital stock.
Ibid.
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been able to define what assets are used in the business. It would
seem rather arbitrary to define "business assets" to exclude savings, since there would seem to be no reason to distinguish between a distribution of assets presently used in the business and
of savings held for business expansion which for some reason never
occurred The economic decision in all cases is virtually identical
- the board of directors has determined that capital is no longer
required for the reasonable needs of the business. Consequently,
it would seem that in a sense only the corporate directors can
determine what are business assets by deciding not to distribute
them. A decision to distribute would reflect a belief that assets
which were formerly required for business purposes were no
longer needed, and any distribution would ipso facto be of
"capital" rather than of "retained earnings." Yet the absurdity
of this result - granting capital gain treatment to all corporate
distributions -indicates that the corporate contraction standard
may not be a desirable test for deciding whether a distribution
is essentially equivalent to a dividend.
A number of alternatives to corporate contraction have been
proposed as tests of whether a distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend. The most far-reaching is the so-called "automatic dividend equivalence" rule, under which all distributions
out of earnings and profits are regarded as dividends." This approach is a product of language in Commissioner v. Estate of
Bedford," a corporate reorganization case. The Minnesota Court
refused to apply Bedford on the grounds that subsequent federal
decisions had limited it to its facts and that to use it in defining
partial liquidations would be to misapply it and to nullify the
partial liquidation statute. This is true because every distribution for which qualification as a "partial liquidation" is sought
will be from corporate earnings and profits in the sense that
earned surplus equals or exceeds the amount of the distribution
at the time of distribution.40 Consequently, application of the
"automatic dividend equivalence" rule would prevent any dis87. See Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and PartialLiquidations, 44 CoRNLL L.J. 299, 308 (1959).
88. Of. Mrm. STAT. § 290.01 subd. 21(1) (1961) which defines a "dividend"
as any distribution out of earnings and profits. Accord, INT. REV. CoDn OF
1954, § 316(a).
39. "That cash therefore came out of earnings and profits and such a
distribution would normally be considered a taxable dividend ... ." 825 U.S.
283, 290 (1945); accord, Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.),

cert. denied, 861 U.S. 875 (1959).

40. If the redemption did not involve earnings and profits, it would be a
return of capital and thus non-taxable.
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tribution from qualifying as a partial liquidation.
Another proposed test makes dividend equivalence dependent
upon whether the stockholders' proportionate interests in the
corporation are unaffected by the distribution.4 1 The Court rejected this test in reliance upon the legislative history of the
partial liquidation provisions, which indicates that if there has
been a contraction of the business, the distribution may be
made "pro-ratato the shareholders without the imposition of a
tax at the rates applicable to the distribution of a dividend."4 2
Consequently, it was held that the "proportionate interest" test
is applicable only to the redemption provision (section 302) and
not to distributions in partial liquidation (section 346).
It is true that adoption of the "automatic dividend equivalence" test would nullify the partial liquidation section, that adherence to the "proportionate interest" test would just as surely
make the partial liquidation section an unnecessary appendage
to the redemption provision," and that both tests would conflict
with legislative history. Nonetheless, any pro rata distribution
from earnings and profits necessarily bears close resemblance to
a dividend. Hence it is arguable that the liquidation provisions
merely provide a license to distribute dividends at capital gain
rates."
The Court was also required to determine whether Northwestern had "redeemed" part of its stock. Although the statute
seems to require a physical redemption or cancellation of stock,"
the Court considered "whether a 'redemption' under [Minnesota
Statutes section 290.135] subd. 4(a)(2) may be made by reduction in par value."46 It concluded from an analysis of judicial
precedents that a reduction in par value discharges the statutory
redemption requirement only if the distribution is made during
the course of a complete liquidation 47 but that physical redemp41. See, e.g., Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 888 (8d Cir. 1957).
42. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
43. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 802 (b)(2), (3); Mumi. STAT. § 290.181 subd.
9(b) (2)-(8) (1961).
44. "Under the federal revenue Acts of 1916, 1917 and 1921, liquidating
dividends were .. . included in ordinary income to the extent of . . . [retained]

earnings." Chrommie, supra note 22, at 409.
45. Iwr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 317 (b) provides that "stock shall be treated
as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property . . . ." One authority has argued that although
"this definition . .. does not technically apply to § 846, . . . [it] probably. .
was [omitted] by . .. oversight." Bittker, supra note 21, at 310.
46. 127 N.W.2d at 454.
47. See, e.g., Tecla M. Straub, 29 B.T.A. 216, aff'd, 76 F.2d 888 (3d Cir.
1935). But see Bittker, supra note 21, at 810. Professor Bittker argues that a
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tion is otherwise essential. 8 Nevertheless, the Court regarded
the Great Northern case as extraordinary since the distribution
was made while it was still hoped that a complete liquidation
could be realized and was pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation, although that plan never reached fruition.4" It was held
that in these circumstances the reduction in par value satisfied
the redemption requirement.
The Court did not consider whether there was a rationale for
requiring a physical redemption of stock for a distribution to
qualify as in partial liquidation. While section 302 seems to require
physical redemption,50 the fact that it contemplates disproportionate distributions would seem to render that result inevitable.
On the other hand, since the legislative history of section 346(a)
(2) indicates that pro rata distributions may qualify under it,"
it would seem to be of no significance whether such a distribution
is accompanied by a reduction in par value or the physical redemption of stock. In either case the proportionate interests of
the stockholders and the distribution of voting power will not
be affected. Thus, it would seem futile and unnecessary to require
physical redemption to obtain partial liquidation treatment under
section 346(a)(2). In apparent recognition of this fact, it has
recently been held that a "redemption" does not necessarily require a physical surrender or cancellation of stock and that the
question of "whether the formality of a surrender of stock must
be observed is one of fact," depending on the circumstances of
the particular case.5 2
The decision in the Great Northern case is correct if considered
in light of the legislative history of the liquidation provisions.
However, there would seem to be no compelling reason to treat
any pro rata distribution from earned surplus as a return of capital. It may be that both partial and complete liquidation statutes
are unwise and that in both situations the shareholder should
be taxed at ordinary rates to the extent of his interest in retained
earnings. Such a proposal is an indirect challenge to the capital
gain provisions themselves because of the similarity of complete
and partial liquidations to the sale of stock. Its effectuation would
distribution accompanied -by a reduction in par value was never equivalent to
a redemption under the 1939 Code and that the 1954 Code did not change
this rule.
48. 197 N.W.2d at 455.
49. Ibid.
50. Section 802 requires a redemption as defined in
note 45 supra.

§ 817(b), quoted in

51. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 9d Sess. 49 (1954).
52. Fowler Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1962).
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seem to require the abolition of capital gain treatment of at
least that portion of the gain realized upon the sale of stock which
reflects the shareholder's interest in retained earnings accumulated during the period of his ownership. However, that result
may not be desirable because the preferential treatment accorded
gain realized on the sale of stock encourages investment in corporate stock and thus provides capital to bolster the economy via
corporate production. On the other hand no similar economic rationale exists for allowing the distribution of earning and profits
at capital gain rates through a liquidation, since such a provision
may tend only to encourage corporate liquidation. Thus, there
may be independent economic reasons for preserving preferential
tax treatment of stock sales regardless of how liquidations are
treated.
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN

A.

ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERs ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION
FOR DEPRIVATION OF REASONABLY CONVENIENT AcCESS TO

MAIN

THOROUGHFARE

In Hendrickson v. Statex plaintiffs, the owners of property
formerly abutting a conventional two lane highway to which
they had direct and unlimited access, were denied compensation
by summary judgment in the trial court for their loss of direct
access when the highway was converted into a limited access
road over the existing right of way. It was held that since the
plaintiffs were furnished a service road adjacent to their property
which connected with the new highway at interchanges they were
not entitled to recover damages even though their access to the
main stream of traffic was now over a more circuitous route. On
appeal, the Minnesota Court reversed and remanded, holding
that any diminution in market value of plaintiffs' property caused
by "substantial impairment" of their right to "reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main thoroughfare" was a
deprivation of property for which compensation must be paid?
1. 127 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1964).
2. The Court's decision was based upon MIm. CoNsT., art. 1, § 13:
"Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation therefore, first paid or secured." The reported
opinion was filed after rehearing. It withdrew an earlier opinion fled on May
3, 1963 and discussed at 88 U. Cmc. L. REv. 307 (1964). Excerpts from the
earlier opinion found in 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2559 (May 14, 1963) indicate that
the Court there held that any diminution in value of abutting property as
a result of the construction of a limited access highway was compensable,
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The question presented by Hendrickson may be phrased in
the alternative. In terms of legal conclusions, is the diminution
in value of abutting property arising from the elimination of
reasonably convenient access to the through flow of traffic a
"taking," "destruction," or "damage" of property so as to require
compensation under the Minnesota Constitution, or is it a "traffic regulation" within the scope of the state's police power, for
the exercise of which no compensation need be paid? In policy
terms, should this loss be borne by the general public or by the
individual property owner?4
Prior decisions in Minnesota and other jurisdictions have held
that a property owner is not entitled to compensation because
access to his property is made more circuitous by road construction, traffic regulations or land developments," or because the
main flow of traffic is diverted from the highway which his property abuts.6 The basis of these decisions appears to be judicial
reluctance to impose burdens upon road building and traffic regulation programs. A contrary result has been reached with regard
to compensation of persons whose property abuts a roadway
which has undergone a change in grade.7 The distinction between
a change in grade and other traffic regulations or diversions would
seem to be that while the former may entirely deprive the abutting property owner of access to his property, other types of
traffic regulation affect only the route over which the abutting
property owner must travel to reach his property, and a diversion
of traffic affects only the commercial benefit which he may derive
from a large volume of passing traffic. Neither of the latter affects
the accessibility of the property to the public road system. This
regardless of whether the property owner could prove that the limitations on
his access "subtantially impaired" his right to "reasonably convenient and
suitable access" to the main thoroughfare. In the opinion on rehearing the
Court emphasized that "not every denial of immediate or convenient access
... will support a claim for damages unless the aggravation is to a degree we
have here proscribed." 197 N.W.2d at 173.
3. See note 2 supra.

4. See Covey, FrontageRoads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56
Nw. UL. REV. 587 (1961); Rollins, The Controlled Access Highway-Con-

flicting Rights of Highway Users and Abutting Commercial Enterprises, 11
BAYLOR I.. REv. 149 (1959).
5. In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 203 N.W. 534 (1925). See also People v.
Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944).
6. State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728
(1960); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384
P.2d 241 (1963); Walker v. State, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956).
7. See Dickerman v. City of Duluth, 88 Minn. 288, 92 N.W. 1119 (1903).
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distinction is consistent with the Court's statement in Hendrickson that to recover damages for loss of access a property owner
must have suffered damage different in kind, not merely in degree,
from that incurred by the general public.' The issue presented in
Hendricksonrelates to the scope of this distinction - has one suffered a compensable taking of "access" where his access to a particular road, formerly direct, has been limited though direct access
to the general public road system is still available, or is continued
access to the public road system the limit of his rights?
Courts confronted with the problem presented in Hendrickson
have resolved it in one of three ways. Some have denied the
property owner any compensation.' Others have allowed recovery
of damages where reasonably convenient access to the main
thoroughfare is impaired." Arizona has allowed compensation
for loss of access only when a portion of the abutter's land has
also been taken.'
The Hendrickson decision places Minnesota in the second
category. The opinion of the Court indicates that the test for
allowance of compensation is whether access between the mainflow
of traffic over the abutting roadbed and the property has been
made unreasonably circuitous. 2 In determining whether access
is reasonably convenient and suitable the existence of service
roads and the location of interchanges affording access to the
main thoroughfare are relevant considerations.s If access has been
8. 127 N.W.2d at 170.
9. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 833 S.W.2d
728 (1960); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361,
384 P.2d 241 (1963); Selig v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 59, 217 N.Y.S.9d
33 (1961); Darnall v. State, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201 (1961).
10. See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943);
Franks v. State Highway Comm'n, 182 Kan. 131, 319 P.2d 535 (1957).
11. State v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960). See Gorman,

Access Los&Distinguished from Traffic Flow Diversion, 3 Ams. L. REv. 48
(1961) for a discussion of this alternative.
12. The standard by which unreasonable circuity of travel is to be measured remains unclear, and will present a difficult question for property owners,
the highway department and the courts. See generally In re Hull, 163 Minn.
439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925).
13. MNm. STAT. § 161.24(3) (1961) authorizes the construction of service
roads connecting any road which has been closed off by highway construction
with any other road or highway "in mitigation of damages." The Court states
that this statute evinces a legislative intent to compensate abutting property
owners for a loss of access. 127 N.W.2d at 169 n.1. However the Court further
points out that where the service road permits access to the main flow of
traffic by means of interchanges which are reasonably conveniently located,
property has not been damaged and no compensation need be granted. Id. at
172 n.19. Therefore it need not be inferred that use of the word "mitigate" in
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rendered unreasonably circuitous, the measure of damages is the
difference in market values of the property for its "highest and
best use" before and after denial of suitable access."
This test and measure of damages interject several inconsistencies into Minnesota law. The function of the remainder of
this discussion is to identify the difficulties which exist in the
limited area of highway access rather than to reach any conclusions as to the direction which the law ought to take in this complex area.
While the Court holds that a property owner may suffer compensable damage when a controlled access highway is built over
the right of way on which his property abuts, it also states that
he may not recover compensation if the new thoroughfare is
built over a different right of way. The reason for denying recovery in the latter situation is said to be that a property owner
has no vested interest in the commercial benefit to be derived
from the continued flow of the main stream of traffic past his
property,"' and consequently may not recover damages for the
diversion of that traffic."' Yet by awarding damages measured
by the decrease in market value of the abutting property when
the new highway is built over the existing right of way, the Court
compensates an abutting property owner not merely for inconvenience or circuity of travel, but also for his loss of the commercial benefit which would otherwise be available to him from
direct access to the main flow of traffic. 7 Thus it would seem that
the Hendrickson decision requires compensation indirectly of
what would not be compensated directly. Moreover it would
seem to require compensating he who may have lost less, since
both access to the main flow of traffic and the market value of
the property may be affected more substantially when the con§ 161.24 evinces a legislative understanding that compensable injury from loss
of direct access to the main flow of traffic on the abutting highway necessarily
remains where access to the public road system is preserved by construction of
service roads.
14. 127 N.W.2d at 173.
15. Id. at 170.
16. Id. at 173.
17. In State v. Kohler, 198 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1964), decided shortly after
Hendrickson, the Court reaffirmed the implication contained in Hendrickson
(127 N.W.2d at 173) that evidence of the best use to which the land might
reasonably be put is admissible to show the effect of the elimination of direct
access upon market value. Thus it appears that the commercial 'benefit which
might be derived from a large volume of passing traffic would always be a
relevant consideration in assessing damages where the most productive use of
the property prior to construction of the limited access highway is for a commercial enterprise serving passing traffic.
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trolled access highway is built over a different and more distant
right of way than when it is built over the existing one.
The criticism that the Hendrickson measure of damages compensates indirectly what would not be compensated directly
would be overcome if it were feasible to apply a measure which
would separate injury due to diversion of traffic from injury due
to circuity of travel."' Theoretically, this might be done by granting compensation for the decrease in market value of the property
for uses which do not serve the traveling public. Practically, however, the difficulty in separating the various elements constituting
the market value of the property may be so great that such a
measure is not practicable.
Even if it were possible to develop a measure of damages which
compensated the property owner only for circuity of travel, compensation of the abutter even for that element would appear to
favor the owner of abutting property over owners of nonabutting
property and the traveling public who are subjected to similar inconvenience. Access to certain property is made circuitous whenever traffic regulations such as one-way streets or restrictions on
turns are introduced. Yet because the effect of these regulations
upon the owners of such property is similar to their effect on the
general public, they are said to be an exercise of the state's police
power, for which property owners are granted no compensation.
The Hendrickson facts do not indicate that the owners of the subject property incurred any damage peculiar to them but only that
they may have suffered some injury. It is difficult to believe that
any damage suffered by the owners of abutting property differed,
other than in degree, from that of the owners of nonabutting
property or of the general public, where access to the public road
system has been provided.
Conceivably circumstances may exist where access to a portion of the public road system is made so circuitous as to inflict
damage of a relatively unique nature upon a particular property
owner. However, the difficulty in determining the standard to be
applied for deciding when such injury has occurred may be so
great that the better rule would be to provide compensation only
18. Such a distinction would seem to have been effected in Burnquist v.
Cook, 20 Minn. 48, 19 N.Wad 894 (1945), which involved a situation where
the elimination of direct access, without the construction of a service road,
isolated a portion of the abutting property. The Court concluded that the
property owner had suffered damage different in nature from the general
public and indicated that an award of damages equal to the cost of constructing a road which would provide access to the isolated portion of the property
from the general system of roads would 'be adequate compensation.
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for loss of access to the public road system."9 In any event it seems
unlikely that application of such a standard would turn on
whether the subject property abutted an existing roadbed.
X. TRUSTS

A.

"TOTTEN" TRUST ASSETS To BE INCLUDED IN SETTLOR'S
ESTATE TO SATISFY SURVIVING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY INTEREST

A bank deposit made "in trust" for another person is generally
held to establish a tentative or "Totten" trust which is revocable
at will by the depositor during his lifetime, but may be made a
completed gift by some unequivocal act or declaration of the
depositor.' In the absence of an act disaffirming or completing
an inter vivos gift, the presumption arises that an absolute trust
was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor 2 It is not clear under this presumption whether the trust is
deemed to have arisen at the time of the initial deposit or at the
death of the depositor. If the latter, it would seem that this type
of disposition is testamentary in character and a violation of the
Statute of Wills, unless treated as an exception. If the former,
the creation of the trust may be viewed as vesting an immediate
interest in the beneficiary subject to a condition subsequent of
revocation.
The Minnesota Court adopted the Totten rule in Walso v.
Latterner.' Subsequently it has consistently protected the interests of beneficiaries from the attacks of those claiming through
19. See In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1924).

1. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), for which these
trusts are named.
2. Id. at 126, 71 N.E. at 752; 1 Scorr, Tausrs § 58.1 (d ed. 1956). As
Scott points out, however, not all States follow this rule. In Maine the form
of the deposit alone, when unaccompanied by the explicit reservation of a
power of revocation, apparently raises the presumption that an irrevocable trust
is intended. See Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315 (1935); Cazallis
v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359 (1920). See also Springvale Natl Bank
v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 Atl. 529 (1923). Massachusetts, on the other hand,
has ruled that the mere fact that a person puts money belonging to him in
a savings bank account in his name as trustee for another does not even
create a valid revocable trust. The depositor must indicate his intent to create
a trust by some additional act. Hogarth-Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 2
N.E.2d 446 (1936).
3. 1 Scorr, Tnusrs § 58.3 (2d ed. 1956).
4. 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 853 (1918), 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711
(1919). In applying the Totten rule the Court had to deal with the argument
that even though the depositor intended to create a trust when making the
deposit, savings account trusts were not authorized by the statute regulating
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the estate of the depositor following death.' Thus, for example, in
Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank,' the Court upheld
Totten trust transfers against the claim of the depositor's widow
that the trusts were testamentary in character and consequently
invalid because not in compliance with the Statute of Wills. It
was held that such deposits vest title in the beneficiary unless
disaffirmed by the depositor during his lifetime or set aside for
"fraud or incompetency," thereby implying that Totten transfers
are not testamentary in character.7
In the Court's recent decision of Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal,"
decedent had been estranged from his second wife during the
months immediately preceding his death. In an attempt to reduce
his wife's share in his estate,' he had placed a substantial portion
of his assets in Totten trusts in favor of several of his and his first
wife's relatives. Upon his death the widow renounced his will
and sought to have the Totten trust assets included in the estate
trusts, now MN. STAT. ch. 501 (1961). The Court held, however, that a
savings account trust is an express trust "to receive and take charge of any
money . . . and to invest and loan the same for the benefit of the beneficiaries
of such express trust . . ." within the meaning of the statute. 140 Minn. at
459, 168 N.W. at 355; see Mizm. STAT. § 501.11(5) (1961).

5. Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W.
166 (1937) (widow-administratrix of depositor's estate versus beneficiaries);
Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N.W. 865 (1930)
(administratrix of depositor's estate versus beneficiaries); of. Rickel v. Peck,
211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.ed 140 (1942). In the latter case, it was held that the
court had the power to order the revocation of a tentative trust on behalf
of an incompetent depositor notwithstanding the claims of the beneficiary.
However, Totten trust assets form part of the depositor's estate if necessary to meet funeral expenses and debts and expenses of the estate. They may
also be reached by the depositor's creditors during his lifetime. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRuSTS § 58, comment d (1959).
6. Supra note 5.
7. However, the Minnesota Court seems to have taken the opposite view
in Estate of Jerusal v. Jeruzal, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. 1964):
Since the trust does not in fact arise until the death of the depositor, it would seem that the disposition is testamentary in character
and should be invalid for that reason. Nevertheless, courts 'have adopted
the policy of holding these trusts valid since they provide a method for
disposing of small estates in a convenient and reasonably fraud-proof
way without the formalities specified by the Probate Code and without
the expense of probate proceedings.
8. 130 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. 1964).
9. It appeared that decedent's motive in establishing the trusts was to
reduce his wife's share in his estate as well as to benefit his relatives. 130
N.W.2d at 476.
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for the purpose of computing her statutory share.'0 She argued
that the trusts were illusory because decedent had retained substantially complete control over the assets during his lifetime,
and consequently that they might not be used as a testamentary
device to deprive a surviving spouse of her statutory forced share.
The trial record indicated that the trusts were established with
the good faith intent to confer a gift upon the named beneficiaries
and to divest decedent of ownership, and that the depositor's
widow would not be left "destitute" if the trust assets were held
to be beyond her reach. On the basis of this record the Minnesota
Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the trusts were valid
as against the surviving spouse. It indicated, however, that unless
a statutory provision to govern surviving spouses' interests in
Totten trusts were enacted in the next session of the legislature,
it would henceforth follow, in cases involving depositors who die
after the adjournment of that session, the Restatement rule that
the trust assets are includible in the estate for the purpose of
computing the marital share and are subject to attack to pay
that share if the probate assets are inadequate to do so.'1
10. Decedent's assets at death were valued at $81,661.93, including $28,100
in 11 Totten trusts, $15,000 in United States Government bonds payable to
decedent during his life and on his death to various relatives, and a homestead
valued at $17,500. In his will, after providing for debts and funeral expenses,
decedent left his wife a life estate in the homestead and one-half of his remaining probate estate. The widow renounced the will. Since decedent had
had no children, the widow was entitled to a statutory forced share equal
to the fee in the homestead and, after payment of widow's allowances, taxes,
debts, and expenses, one-half of the remaining estate. Mth. STAT. H§ 525.145,
.15-.16 (1961). Since the government bonds are excludible from the probate
estate, see 130 N.W.2d at 476 n.3, and the homestead would pass to the
widow before computing her share of the remaining estate, the result of
excluding the Totten trusts from the estate would be to reduce the amount
from which her share would otherwise be computed ($49,161.98, less widow's
allowances, taxes, debts, and expenses) by $28,100, or well over 50%.
11. This is the rule adopted in RESTATEiETT (SECOND), TRUSTs § 58,
comment e (1959), which provides in part:

Restrictions on testamentary disposition.Although the surviving spouse
in claiming his or her statutory distributive share of the estate of the
decedent is not entitled to include in the estate property transferred
during his lifetime by the decedent in trust for himself for life with
remainder to others, even though the decedent reserves a power of
revocation (see § 57, Comment c), the surviving spouse of a person who
makes a savings deposit upon a tentative [Totten] trust can include
the deposit in computing the share to which such surviving spouse is
entitled.
Although the amount which the surviving spouse is entitled to
receive is measured -by the sum of the decedent's owned assets and the
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The Minnesota Court has never invalidated an inter vivos
transfer as being in fraud of the marital rights of a surviving
spouse, although it has been asked to do so on three occasions
where Totten trusts were not involved. In Smith v. Wold" decedent's outright gifts to his children and a conveyance by trust
deed of personalty with reservation in himself of a life estate
were upheld as valid transfers not in fraud of the widow's marital
rights. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there
was no fraud without defining a fraud upon the marital rights
of a surviving spouse. In Van Devere v. Moore" an administratrixsole beneficiary, prior to her death, had sold realty from her son's
estate to her sister for less than market value. In denying her
surviving husband's claim of fraud, the Court adopted the New
York rule of Newman v. Dore" that the transferor's motive is
irrelevant; the proper test is whether the transaction is "illusory"
in the sense that the transferor retains complete control of the
funds. This test was again followed in Balafas v. Balafas." Two
other Minnesota cases have recognized the existence of a doctrine
of marital fraud in dicta.j
In Matter of Halpern,'1 the New York court purported to
apply the Newman v. Dore rule to Totten trusts, but in fact
created a standard which was considerably more liberal from the
point of view of depositors and beneficiaries. It was held not only
that the depositor's motive to affect his spouse's marital interest
is irrelevant in determining whether a trust is "illusory," but that
the virtually complete "control" exercised by the depositor over
the trust during his lifetime is equally inconsequential when the
trust is attacked by the surviving spouse. Instead the test is
amount of such deposits, the owned assets are to be first applied to
the satisfaction of the claim of the surviving spouse. The situation is
somewhat similar to that in which creditors seek to reach the estate of
a decedent who has by will exercised a general power of appointment.
See Restatement of Property § 829.
12. 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914).
13. 248 Minm. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954).
14. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1987).
15. 263 Minn. 267, 117 N.W.2d 20 (1962). This case involved an implied,
in-fact agreement by the decedent that at his death ownership of 'his partnership property would pass to his surviving partner. Decedent's widow
unsuccessfully challenged this result.
16. Nash v. Kirschoff, 157 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W. 488, 490 (1928), 166
Minn. 464, 208 N.W. 193 (1926); Amundson v. Hanson, 150 Minn. 287, 292,
185 N.W. 252, 254 (1921).
17. 308 N.Y. S3, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951), affirming in part 977 App. Div.
525, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894, modifying 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Surr. Ct.
1950).
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whether the depositor is motivated by a desire to create an interest in the named beneficiary rather than merely to use the trust as
a device for conducting his own affairs. It would seem, therefore,
that where a depositor uses the Totten trust device to diminish his
spouse's marital rights, an attack upon the trust on grounds
other than incompetency is doomed to failure under the Halpern
test. In such a situation the very purpose of the depositor in
creating the trust is to shift an interest in property from his estate
to the named beneficiary. Moreover, the beneficiary will be aided
in proving the depositor's donative intent by the presumption
that the latter intended to create an absolute trust as to the
balance on hand at his death. 8
In the Coughlin case' the surviving spouse had argued simply
that the Totten trusts constituted an attempted testamentary
disposition without the formalities required by the Statute of
Wills, and did not specifically plead that the trusts were in fraud
of her marital rights. Nevertheless, the adverse impact of that
decision on the marital rights of surviving spouses generally had
been called to the attention of the Courto Thus, the refusal of
the Minnesota Court to protect marital rights in Coughlin might
have suggested that it meant to apply to Totten trusts the relatively narrow definition of an "illusory transfer" subsequently
formulated by the New York court in Halpern.Rather than following this approach, however, the Jeruzal Court prospectively
adopted the Restatement rule," in effect overruling Coughlin.
It reasoned that since the Totten trust is a judicial creation which
restricts the effect of statutory provisions for the distribution of
decedents' estates, a court may properly limit its effect to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of legislative policy. The
Court found the Restatement rule a particularly attractive alternative in that it prevents the depositor from depriving his surviving spouse of her statutory share of the assets controlled by him
during his lifetime while simultaneously preserving the utility
of Totten trusts in estate planning to the extent that their use
does not prejudice the surviving spouse's statutory interests.2 2
18. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
19. 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
20. Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-3, Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Say.
Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937).
21. Quoted in note 11 supra.
22. 130 N.W.2d at 481. The Court pointed out that Totten trusts may
provide a convenient method of disposing of small estates without substantial
danger of fraud and without the formalities and expense incident to passing
property through the probate estate. See note 7 supra.
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The Court stated that the Jeruzal holding was not meant to
"limit the effect of any ... earlier decisions on the extent to which
marital rights may be defeated by the use of trusts" other than
Totten trusts.2 The former are generally held valid against the
claim that they constitute testamentary dispositions in violation
of the Statute of Wills and are not included in the estate even
to protect the statutory interest of the surviving spouse? 4 A
desire to defeat the statutory interests of a surviving spouse
could probably be implemented, therefore, through the use of a
revocable trust, although this would be impossible to achieve
by means of a Totten trust under the prospective holding in
Jeruzal. The Court does not attempt to justify this distinction
other than to say that it could not "overlook the danger that lies
in the general use of Totten trusts as they may affect the surviv23. 130 N.W.2d at 482.
24.
[I]f it is provided by statute that the wife of a testator shall be
entitled to a certain portion of his estate of which she cannot be deprived by will . . .

,

a married man can nevertheless transfer his

property inter vivos in trust and his widow will not be entitled on his
death to a share of the property so transferred, even though he reserves
a life estate and power to revoke or modify the trust. Where, however,
an outright gift would not operate to deprive the wife of her distributive share, a trust created under the same circumstances would be
equally ineffective.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 57, comment c (1959); see 1 Scor, TRUsTs
§ 57.5 (2d ed. 1956). Scott points out that this result has been reached even
where the 'husband declares himself trustee, although he cites only one case
supporting this proposition, Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1887).
1 ScorT, op. cit. supra at 470 & n.5.
The general rule appears to be that if a trust is otherwise valid under
local property law, a surviving spouse will not be permitted to attack it to
satisfy her forced share. Thus, in Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio
St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961), where the husband had conveyed property to
a trust company as trustee-reserving in himself a life estate, an absolute
power to revoke in whole or in part, and the right to control investments
and to modify in any respect-the court upheld the trust against the claims
of his widow, overruling Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58
N.E.2d 381 (1944), and Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378
(1947), which had permitted the surviving spouse to include revocable trust
assets in the estate for the purpose of determining and satisfying her statutory share.
Some jurisdictions would alter this rule for the purpose of protecting the
statutory interests of surviving spouses by adopting a standard under which
a trust may be valid for other purposes, but may nevertheless be subject to
the claims of surviving spouses. This is the apparent result of Newman v.
Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). Although that case indicated that
the settlor's intent to deprive his widow of her statutory expectancy was
irrelevant, the retention by him of a high degree of control over the trust
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ing spouse,"** apparently implying thereby that its special concern with Totten trusts as opposed to revocable trusts generally
arises from the relatively high frequency with which the former
are used. But by excepting revocable trusts generally from the
application of Jeruzal, it seems unlikely that the Court has effectively deterred those persons who desire to reduce the statutory
shares of their surviving spouses and possess the means to employ
counsel. They remain able to achieve their purpose by creating
revocable trusts over which they retain substantial control during their lifetimes. However, the Jeruzal Court, relying on Smith
v. Wold, does seem to indicate that even where a revocable trust
is used, a court may intervene to protect a surviving spouse if it
appears that she would otherwise be left "destitute."" If destituassets was held to make the trust illusory as to his widow. Pennsylvania has
protected surviving spouses by statute, subjecting assets over which substantial control has -been retained by decedent during his lifetime to the
widows' forced share. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1963).
A third line of cases holds that the settlor's intent to substantially deprive his surviving spouse of her statutory expectancy in his estate is the
determinative factor, and that such intent may be inferred from the extent
to which he has attempted to decrease the assets in his estate. See Edgar v.
Fitzpatrick, 369 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), modified on other grounds,
377 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1964), which said an intent to deprive the surviving
spouse of a substantial portion of the settlor's estate could not be inferred
from the facts.
There is no Minnesota case law to indicate clearly how much control a
settlor may retain without rendering a trust illusory against his surviving
spouse, nor is it clear that Minnesota would follow that part of Newman
which seems to suggest the application of different tests for determining the
validity of trusts generally, and the validity of trusts as against surviving
spouses.
See generally Von Iloene, Fraudon Spouse's Rights, 100 TausTs & ESTATES
1186 (1961); Annot., 49 AL.R.2d 521, 602 (1956).
25. 130 N.W.Rd at 481.
26. In Smith v. Wold, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914) (of. note 12
supra and accompanying text), the Court held that certain inter vivos gifts
and property transferred under an irrevocable inter vivos trust deed in which
decedent retained a life estate would not be subjected to the statutory claims
of the surviving spouse where she had sufficient assets to live "in comfort."
This seems to imply that a different result might be reached where it appears
that the surviving spouse would be left destitute. In Jeruzal the Court said
that "the trial court's decision should [not] be disturbed for equitable reasons
because it does not appear from the record . . . that the surviving spouse

has been left destitute." 130 N.W.2d at 481. The Court cited a destitution
test as the Maryland rule, although this is merely one of many factors which
the Maryland court has indicated it will take into consideration. See Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954); Allender v. Allender, 199
Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952); Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d
465 (1944); Sturgis v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927).
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tion is an additional test of marital fraud under Minnesota law,
it would seem that no plan which substantially reduces an estate
to deprive the surviving spouse of her statutory share of the
assets controlled by the deceased at his death could be adopted
with any certainty that it would be upheld by the courts.
This case will necessarily alert the legislature to the possible
inadequacies in existing law governing Totten trusts and to the
available alternatives, including the Restatement rule, although
it may be significant to note that the legislature did not alter the
law following Coughlin. The basic question for consideration will
be to what extent a person should be permitted to control his
personalty during his lifetime and still possess the means to
deprive his surviving spouse of her statutory share in them at
his death. The Restatement rule assures the surviving spouse of
a statutory share in decedent's aggregate assets, including Totten
trust assets, while upholding the validity of the Totten trusts
to the extent consistent with the protection of marital rights.
This rule presents certain disadvantages, however. First, since
the estate assets will be subject to attachment before the Totten
trusts assets to satisfy the surviving spouse's forced share, the
rule may give an unintentional preference to the Totten trust
beneficiaries over legatees under the decedent's will. This result
might be avoided by a provision that the Totten trust assets
abate with the legacies to satisfy the surviving spouse's forced
share. Second, the rule would be applied uniformly, regardless
of whether the decedent's inter vivos transfers had in fact worked
any hardship on his surviving spouse, notwithstanding that the
Jeruzal decision seems to be predicated on a concern only with
surviving spouses who are left destitute. 7 This difficulty could
be obviated by the so-called Maryland rule, under which the
validity of Totten trusts depends inter alia upon whether the
spouse would be left destitute if not permitted to attach the trust
assets.2 8 While this rule would take into account the circumstances
of each case, it would seem that the Minnesota Court properly
rejected it because of its countervailing weakness - inherent uncertainty in application. Third, since the Restatement rule apparently would not be applied to trusts generally, it seems probable
that an intent to deprive one's spouse of a forced share could
as easily be achieved via a revocable trust." Thus, the Jeruzal
97. "The Restatement rule must recommend itself because it prevents
the depositor from leaving the surviving spouse destitute while he retains
complete control of the funds during lifetime." 130 N.W.2d at 481.
28. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 28-25 supra and accompanying text.
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Court may be suggesting the adoption of the Pennsylvania
statute,"o which protects the surviving spouse as to all revocable
trusts.3
In any event it is not entirely clear why the Jeruzal Court
chose to utilize the device of prospective adoption of a rule of law
effective at the adjournment of the next legislative session. It
suggested that it did so because this was a case of first impression
in Minnesota and depositors had doubtless relied upon its earlier,
more general decisions which narrowly circumscribed the doctrine
of marital fraud.3 2 But it also emphasized that the Totten trust
is a judicial creation which limits the effect of statutory provisions
for the disposition of property by will, and is therefore a proper
subject for judicial regulation 3 3 It would seem that these considerations could have been taken into account by a decision
adopting the new rule with an effective date in the near future sufficiently remote only to permit prompt remedial action by
those who might have relied upon past judicial intimations that
Totten trusts were unqualifiedly valid.
Moreover, the problem involved in Jeruzal would seem to lack
those characteristics which made the device of prospective overruling to take effect at the adjournment of a subsequent legislative session appropriate in the recent case of Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist.,34 where the Minnesota Court prospectively
overruled the common law doctrine of governmental tort immunity. In the latter instance there was a compelling need to make
legislative findings as a basis for altering a long established principle of law.3 3 By postponing the effective date to the adjourn30.
A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be treated as
a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse is concerned ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§ 301.11(a) (Supp. 1963).
31. The Jeruzal Court stated that it did not feel free to adopt the Restatement rule "without first giving the legislature an opportunity to provide
for it by statute as was done in Pennsylvania." 130 N.W.2d at 481. (Emphasis
added.)
32. Id. at 481.
33. Ibid.
34. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), 47 Mmii. L. Rnv. 1124 (1963).
See also Note, 48 MImN. L. REV. 119, 198 (1963), for a discussion of the legislation which followed the Court's decision.
35.
[Imposing liability in an area where immunity has existed for a long
time may require the flexibility of the legislative process; unlike the
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ment of the legislature the Court facilitated orderly change. If
the mere adoption of the Restatement rule is at issue, Jeruzal
would not seem to present the same problem. It related to a considerably narrower area of law and affected a more homogeneous
class of subjects.
Nonetheless, it is true that the Court was able to avoid the
prospect of disuniform treatment of the trusts of persons dying
before and after the legislature acts should it choose to enact a
statute varying the rule adopted by the Court." Thus, the Court
may well have felt that in view of the imminence of the next session of the legislature and the desirability of postponing the effective date to some extent to allow for reliance on prior decisions,
the adjournment of the legislature provided in all respects a convenient date. In light of the possibility that the Restatement rule
will not adequately meet the problems posed by the Jeruzal situation, the postponement of the effective date of the new rule until
after the legislature meets may be fortunate.
legislature, a court is not equipped with the "modem machinery" to
facilitate the change by providing for monetary limits on recovery,
notice of claims, or authority to insure.
47 Mnr. L. REv. 1124, 1120 (1963).
36. Cf. id. at 1130-31.

